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Criminology and Perpetrator Studies

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1. FASHION JUSTICE

1.1. "FASHION JUSTICE"

The term "fashion justice" covers "the numerous injustices experienced in the ways garments are produced, consumed and disposed of within the globalised fashion system" (Payne et al 2022 pi) [1]. There is a parallel to "environmental justice", which is concerned with "the racial implications of air, water and land pollution in communities of colour" (Payne et al 2022 pi).

Schlosberg (2007) described different aspects of environmental justice, including "distributive" (the unequal burden of environmental impacts), and "procedural" (fairness in access to environmental decision-making). For example, the decision to build a toxic waste plant near minority communities (distributive environmental justice) who have little say in the decision (procedural environmental justice).

Schlosberg (2007) also talked of "justice as recognition" where minorities groups are ignored in some way. Fraser (1998) used the term "status injury" to describe injustice "rooted in patterns of representation, interpretation and communication... [including] cultural domination (being subjected to patterns of interpretation and communication that are associated with another culture and are alien and/or hostile to one's own); non-recognition (being rendered invisible via the authoritative representational, communicative, and interpretative practices of one's culture); and disrespect (being routinely maligned or disparaged in stereotypic public cultural representations and/or in

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[1] In the 21st century, fashion consumption has had a "renewed ethical turn" or "remoralisation" (Holgar 2022).

everyday life interactions)" (quoted in Payne et al 2022). For example, the ignoring of Indigenous groups when settlers/colonists used their land.

Schlosberg (2007) included capabilities in environmental justice - ie: the potential to control one's destiny. "What is ultimately important is that people have the freedoms or valuable opportunities (capabilities) to lead the kind of lives they want to lead, to do what they want to do and be the person they want to be" (Robeyns 2005 quoted in Payne et al 2022).

There are many issues with "global apparel chains", including modern slavery, gender inequality, textile waste, pollution and environmental degradation (Payne et al 2022).

Applying Schlosberg's (2007) ideas to fashion justice, within apparel global supply chains "devaluing the work and skill of garment workers along with failing to recognise the environmental degradation to air, water and lands arising from unsustainable fashion production and consumption" (Payne et al 2022 piii).

Fashion supply chains involve a number of links with different justice issues:

a) Fibre and textile production - eg: health hazards to workers in garment factories; at its extreme in the 2013 Rana Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh (which killed over 1100 workers) (Payne et al 2022). More generally, Bick et al (2018) outlined the "myriad occupational hazards", including "poor ventilation (leading to respiratory risks), musculo-skeletal risks from repetitive tasks, and other disease including cancers, damage to endocrine function, injuries and adverse reproductive and foetal outcomes" (Payne et al 2022 piv).

This is distributive justice/injustice - "the winners (those profiting from and consuming fashion) versus the losers (those dealing with externalities of fashion sector pollution and environmental degradation and those producing garments who are underpaid and undervalued)" (Payne et al 2022 piv). The covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated "the asymmetries around worker protection and well-being..., while the cancellation of garment orders in low- and middle-income countries post-pandemic has triggered other externalities, including workers being left without pay and access to formal financial support (especially where they are engaged in precarious labour situations)" (Payne et al 2022 piv).

b) Purchase, wearing and disposing by consumers -
eg; textile waste disposal. "Natural fibres buried in
landfills are essentially like food waste, producing
greenhouse gases as they degrade. But unlike food, they
have been treated throughout the production process with
bleaches and dyes, which also leach out of the textiles
into landfills and potentially into groundwater or the
air if they are incinerated" (Payne et al 2022 pv).
Procedural justice/injustice can be seen in where
landfill sites are based, and the regulation and
enforcement of laws relating to them.

1.2. HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE

The Rana Plaza building collapse was around one
hundred years after the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire
in New York, which killed 146 mostly women workers, and
led to health and safety reforms (Nolan 2022).
Concerns in the West about the global supply chains
have led to "human rights due diligence" (HRDD), an
United Nations initiative in the 2010s, to address human
rights abuse in these supply chains (Nolan 2022).
"Allegations of human rights and labour abuses are
not new to the apparel sector. Production processes are
spread across diverse countries utilising complex supply
chains and are difficult to regulate. Apparel supply
chains are noteworthy for a lack of transparency and
'short lead times and short-term buyer-supplier
relationships [that] can reduce visibility and control'
[OECD 2018] in the chain" (Nolan 2022 p3). HRDD is an
attempt to regulate, and some Western countries have
enshrined the principle in laws (eg: "Child Labour Due
Diligence Law" 2019 in the Netherlands) (Nolan 2022).
Nolan (2022) noted two issues with HRDD:

i) Defining and enforcing HRDD - The "social audit"
is one means to enforce HRDD, but the Rana Plaza building
did have such an audit prior to the disaster, so the
social audit's value is limited. This is Nolan's (2022)
view: "Despite more than two decades of evidence that
illustrates that audit programs generally fail to detect
significant labour abuses in supply chains, they are
still being used as a principal compliance tool, and
there is little evidence that they have led to sustained
improvements in many social performance issues, such as
working hours, overtime, wage levels, freedom of
association and modern slavery" (p7).
The social audit is but a "superficial 'snapshot'",

and "[W]ith weak or unclear legal definitions of HRDD and a focus on compliance over substance, there is a real danger that businesses will outsource their human rights risk assessments to third-party auditing firms to meet procedural requirements" (Nolan 2022 p7).

ii) Involving the workers in the process - "Recognising the failure of social auditing to fully capture issues at particular worksites, the Clean Clothes Campaign has argued that the best auditors are 'the workers themselves since they are continually present at the production site' (Pruett 2005...)" (Nolan 2022 p8).

Nolan (2022) described HRDD as "now at a crossroads... How it is designed and implemented — by states, businesses, workers and other stakeholders — will firmly test its potential to contribute substantively to the prevention and remediation of corporate human rights abuses" (p9).

1.3. TRANSPARENCY INDUSTRY

Richards (2022) criticised the fashion industry's "reporting regimes that allow for virtue signalling and moral capital while simultaneously allowing for breaches of human rights" (Payne et al 2022 pvi). Particular reference was made to the Modern Slavery Act (MSA) (2018) in Australia.
This Act aims to increase transparency in the global industries by improving knowledge about the labour conditions of workers that supply Australian shops. But "the MSA 2018 is not designed to provide comprehensive supply chain information for consumers. Rather, it is conceived as a way to protect against 'severe legal and reputational risks' (MSA 2018) to business by holding companies to account for their practices" (Richards 2022 p48).
This is part of the "'industrialisation' of transparency, built on a regime of 'ethical auditing' (LeBaron et al 2017)" (Richards 2022 p48). Richards (2022) referred to Khan's (2019) concept of a "politics of saving" - ie: "a rhetoric of rescue that, far from disrupting or challenging the existing structures that buttress the global fashion economy, merely works to re-entrench long-standing structures of inequality" (Richards 2022 p48).
Pham (2022) was more explicit about "sweatshops" in the fashion industry: "Not 'bugs' in the global supply

chain or the results of some individual brands misbehaving. They're built into the racialised, gendered, and colonial structure of international trade and labour arrangements that are designed precisely to extract from, neglect, and forget an array of human and environmental resources (eg: skill, knowledge, time, health, wages, clean water, clean air) from the people and places of the Global South" (quoted in Richards 2022).

The MSA is a "first step", but "it also contributes to the 'transparency industry', which relies on an ethical auditing regime in the service of political ends that prioritise the needs and experiences of consumers and stakeholders in the Global North over those of workers in the Global South" (Richards 2022 p57).

1.4. LIVING WAGE

A "living wage" is another initiative that can benefit workers in the garment industry. This is sufficient wages "to support housing, food, health care and education costs" (Coneybeer and Maguire 2022 p16), though there is no global consensus on the amount or its calculation. The "Clean Clothes Campaign's" definition, for example, includes "small savings for unexpected expenses to be covered" (quoted in Coneybeer and Maguire 2022). The "Fair Labour Association" used Bangladesh as an example to show the variance – from 5000 to 35 000 BDT (Bangladesh Taka) per month (2015-2017 figures) (Coneybeer and Maguire 2022).

The problem is that workers in the garment industry are in a structurally unjust situation. Young (2010) defined "structural injustice" as "social processes [that] put large categories of persons under a systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the same time as they enable others to dominate or have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising capacities" (quoted in Coneybeer and Maguire 2022). Change can only be brought about by those who have power and privilege, which in the garment industry refers to the brands and the retailers (Coneybeer and Maguire 2022 Coneybeer and Maguire 2022).

Workers' wages are about 1-3% of the garment's price (Coneybeer and Maguire 2022). "Poverty wages are embedded into the very structure of apparel production that favours profit over people" (Coneybeer and Maguire 2022 p18).

Coneybeer and Maguire (2022) explained: "Brands

evade responsibility for paying a living wage by blaming other actors within supply chains as those responsible for poverty wages. A common approach is to frame labour issues as factory-level problems... and then claim that they have limited power to influence suppliers... Brands also claim that paying more than their competitors puts them at an unfair disadvantage and argue that paying higher wages to suppliers will not guarantee that suppliers will pass along higher wages to workers" (p18). The factories are based countries in the Global South, and the governments fear the loss of business if they intervene to enforce fair wages.

Young (2006) saw the structural injustice as linked to capitalism and Eurocentric thinking (ie: the "accepted norms" of Western capitalism). McKeown (2017) expanded on the gendered and racial aspects (eg: the majority of garment factory workers are women).

Coneybeer and Maguire (2022) outlined some of the approaches to a "living wage":

a) Asia Floor Wage Alliance (AFWA) - A worker-led approach in South and South-East Asia which defined a living as "income from a regular working week (maximum 48 hours and excluding benefits) that can support a worker and their dependants (usually one adult and two children), housing, food (3000 calories per adult), education and healthcare" (quoted in Coneybeer and Maguire 2022). In the Bangladesh example, it is the highest figure (35 000 BDT per month).

The responsibility is placed on brands for enforcing appropriate wages, and so it has received "limited buy-in" from them (Coneybeer and Maguire 2022).

b) Global Living Wage Coalition (GLWC) - This approach used a definition based on the United Nation's International Labour Organisation, and defined a living wage as "the remuneration received for a standard workweek, by a worker in a particular place, sufficient to afford a decent standard of living for the worker and her or his family including: food, water, housing, education, health care, transportation, clothing, and other essential needs including provision for unexpected events" (Global Living Wage Coalition no date quoted in Coneybeer and Maguire 2022). In the Bangladesh example, the figure is midway (15 000 BDT per month).

Brands and retailers claim confusion around what the definition means in actual monetary terms (Coneybeer and Maguire 2022).

c) Action, Collaboration, Transformation (ACT) - An initiative, rather than a definition, supported by major retailers, which places the responsibility on labour unions and governments in each country to negotiate wages. It has been criticised as a "whitewashing" strategy by brands (Coneybeer and Maguire 2022).

d) Fair Labour Association (FLA) - A campaign by various parties in the garment industry to get companies to voluntarily commit to an (unspecified) living wage. It allows companies to use whatever calculation of a living wage they want, which is usually the lowest (Coneybeer and Maguire 2022).

e) Fair Wear Foundation (FWF) - An initiative from the Clean Clothes Campaign and labour unions, which defined a living wage as a "wage paid for a standard working week that meets the basic needs of workers and their families and provides some discretionary income. 'Basic needs' further include costs like housing (with basic facilities including electricity), nutrition, clothing, healthcare, education, drinking water, childcare, transport, and savings" (Fair Work Foundation 2019 quoted in Coneybeer and Maguire 2022).
Little support from major players in the industry (Coneybeer and Maguire 2022).

Coneybeer and Maguire (2022) ended with three reasons for the limited success of living wage approaches: "(1) the lack of gendered considerations; (2) the exclusion of workers' voices and their lived experiences; and (3) the failure of brands to take collective action and hold themselves accountable" (p26).

1.5. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

Payne and Mellick (2022) began with the sad observation: "Attempts to rein in the environmental impacts of the fashion and textile industries are impeded by relentless growth in clothing production and consumption. Between 2000 and 2015, clothing sales doubled from 50 billion units to 100 billion units per annum, while the number of wears of a garment halved" (p31). Textile and apparel industries have a negative environmental impact in different ways including water (use and pollution), energy consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, and waste.
How to address the "relentless growth" with its

overproduction and overconsumption? One response is
multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) (eg: "Better Cotton
Initiative"; "Textile Exchange"), which include brands
and retailers, manufacturers, non-governmental
organisations, and labour unions, and that attempt to
impose voluntary environmental standards, processes or
targets (Payne and Mellick 2022).

But the dominance of brands and retailers in MSIs
has been criticised as diluting such groups. Whereas
"radical" change is needed, they produce "pragmatic"
change, according to Mukendi et al (2020). While Bluhdorn
and Deflorian (2019) pointed out that the MSIs approach
"is so successful not although but precisely because it
is highly unlikely to disrupt the order of consumer
capitalism" (quoted in Payne and Mellick 2022). Any
improvements in the environmental impact from MSIs is
offset by the "relentless growth" of the industry, as
Fletcher (2016) explained: "Resource savings brought by
efficiency drives have, in the same period that
improvements have been introduced, been outstripped by
higher rates of consumption of clothes, increasing the
impact of the system at large. Viewed as a whole, things
have got worse, not better" (quoted in Payne and Mellick
2022).

A "real" radical approach is the challenge the
"growth narrative" of capitalism generally and the
fashion industry specifically. For example, Kallis et al
(2018) talked of "degrowth", which they defined as "a
process of political and social transformation that
reduces a society's throughput while improving the
quality of life" (quoted in Payne and Mellick 2022)
(appendix 1A).

Analysing secondary data on MSIs (eg: annual reports
and websites of retailers) since 2017, Payne and Mellick
(2022) identified two key themes:

i) The "accurate" measuring of environmental impact
- Payne and Mellick (2022) felt that focus on the
measuring of reduced environmental impact did not reduce
overall consumption of resources. Furthermore, there is
also a risk of the "Jevons paradox" (observed in the mid-
nineteenth century) that "increased efficiency in the use
of a resource can lead to greater consumption of that
resource (the rebound effect). Further, these changes do
not consider clothing utilisation, longevity and
durability, which are important factors when considering
how to curb overproduction and overconsumption" (Payne
and Mellick 2022 p41).

ii) Circularity (or the "circular economy") (eg: rental, repair, remaking, and resale of clothes) - But "despite isolated exemplars of these new business models, the vast number of retailers are founded on a model of selling new clothes" (Payne and Mellick 2022 p41) (appendix 1B).

Not wanting to dismiss MSIs completely, Payne and Mellick (2022) concluded: "In the absence of appropriate regulation to govern fashion's supply chains, MSIs have become the de facto framework to address the environmental injustices rife within the industry" (p43).

1.6. GOOD EXAMPLES

Ruthschilling and Artuso (2022) provided four case studies showing positive actions in the fashion supply chain in Brazil:

i) "Redeiras" - An association founded by female artisans working with fishing nets in southern Brazil. Old fishing nets are recycled into fashion accessories like bags and necklaces. "Although it is a small business, Redeiras has aided the community to escape poverty by guaranteeing financial autonomy to the female artisans who have a greater income than their shrimp-fishing husbands, without putting aside their tasks as mothers, wives and grandparents" (Ruthschilling and Artuso 2022 p77).

ii) "Casa das Rendeiras de Saubara" - An association of female artisans and bobbin lace in northern Brazil. The bobbin technique has a long history and part of the aim of the organisation is to maintain that heritage as well as produce traditional lace products and the use of recycling techniques. The experiences of Black women are foregrounded.

iii) "Justa Trama" - An organisation working with cotton in central Brazil. A co-operative that works with the whole production chain from farming, production and manufacturing, and sale of cotton garments. "Its success is based on the principles of solidarity economy and fair trade practices, linking farmers, yarn makers, weavers, artisans and garment workers from five Brazilian states..." (Ruthschilling and Artuso 2022 p79). Around 600 individuals are involved.

iv) "Seringo" - A brand working with rubber from Amazonia. "Rubber tappers are an 'invisible' population in society who live far from urban centres amid the vegetation of the Amazon rainforest. Basic services such as health, education, communication and public policies barely reach them, the true guardians of the forest against invasions and deforestation" (Ruthschilling and Artuso 2022 p80). So, a co-operative of Indigenous peoples, rubber tappers and others was created using "the sustainable management of rubber that transformed the industrial process of vulcanisation into an artisanal process is based on the latex handling process developed to free the local community from the need for the industrial process" (Ruthschilling and Artuso 2022 p81). Around 5000 people are involved.

Ruthschilling and Artuso (2022) summed up that these case studies "demonstrate how when fashion is integrated into community-led and women-centred projects, design-led approaches to fashion production can contribute to social and environmental justice. Although varied, each case demonstrates ways in which individuals or groups of people are able to provide effective solutions to promote changes for better living conditions for the inhabitants of rural settlements and how this can be in harmony with the local environment and with the community" (p82).

A small number of brands in the fashion industry have tried campaigns "aligned with social justice, sustainable and/or ethical principles" (Helm 2022 p103). Helm (2022) noted two in particular:

a) "Don't Buy This Jacket" in 2011 by "adventure clothing" manufacturer "Patagonia" - The campaign before Christmas advised consumers to buy only what they needed, and to think about the environmental impact of consumerism. "Despite the apparent aim of reducing consumption, the campaign unexpectedly produced a 30% increase in sales" (Helm 2022 p107).

b) "Buy Better, Wear Longer" in 2021 by "Levi's" - A campaign involving young influencers on social media "to encourage consumers to demonstrate agency and be more intentional about their apparel choices: to wear each item longer, to buy second-hand or to use in-store tailor shops to extend the life of their garments" (Helm 2022 p108).

Are these campaigns "another form of greenwashing or

'purpose-for-good washing'" (Payne et al 2022 pvii)? Helm (2022) felt that such campaigns were "not necessarily changing consumer behaviour", particularly as consumption increased for the products encouraging less consumption, but they were "triggering public discourse and opinion", and so "may still be effective in changing fashion consumer behaviour to improve social justice in the fashion industry" (Helm 2022 p102).

1.7. CRAFTIVISM

"Craftivism" (a portmanteau of craft and activism) is a term for activism in the fashion industry where individuals "use crafts such as sewing, knitting and embroidery to start conversations, raise awareness and protest injustices" (McGovern and Barnes 2022 p88). "Craftivism" is attributed to Betsy Greer, who described it as "a way of looking at life where voicing opinions through creativity makes your voice stronger, your compassion deeper and your quest for justice more infinite" (Greer 2007 quoted in McGovern and Barnes 2022).

Fitzpatrick (2018) produced a craftivism manifesto which included this statement: "Craftivism is both a strategy for non-violent activism and a mode of DIY citizenship that looks to influence positive social and political change. This uniquely 21st century practice involves the combination of craft techniques with elements of social and/or digital engagement as part of a pro-active effort to bring attention to, or pragmatically address, issues of social, political and environmental justice" (quoted in McGovern and Barnes 2022).

McGovern (2019) outlined three interconnected levels of engagement (McGovern and Barnes 2022):

i) Personal - eg: cross-stitching a feminist slogan to hang in the home.

ii) Community - eg: knitting circles that knit and discuss local issues.

iii) Political - eg: craft protest banners for a public march.

These three levels can be applied to "fashion craftivism". At the personal level, it could be "individuals adopting new practices and habits that reduce their reliance on fast fashion and consumer

culture" (McGovern and Barnes 2022 p92). The term "Slow Fashion Movement" has been coined to fit with the "Slow Food Movement". Practically, it might mean learning to repair one's clothes to make them last longer (also called the "Visible Mending Movement"; Sekules 2020).

At the community level, projects to help make their own garments and raise awareness in public events, like the "Street Stitching Movement" in the middle of high streets (McGovern and Barnes 2022).

The political level is seen in specific campaigns like "Love Fashion Hate Sweatshops" and its banner at the London Fashion Week 2012 (McGovern and Barnes 2022).

Supporters of craftivism see its "gentle" approach as more effective than "aggressive" political activism and demonstrations. While critics want more activism and less "political art" (McGovern and Barnes 2022).

Black and Burisch (2021) used the term "craftwashing" as a criticism. For them, craftivism only "capitalises on the individual consumer desire to do good - or be perceived as morally good - amid overwhelming, irreconcilable political anxiety and impending ecological collapse" (quoted in McGovern and Barnes 2022).

McGovern and Barnes (2022) ended that the success of craftivism may be in "the capacity to embed more long-term, transformative changes in the mindset of individuals and their engagement with fashion" (p98).

1.8. CONSUMER RESPONSIBILITY

Horton et al (2022) began: "The consumer is an important political subject in addressing global social issues. She is relied upon to serve as either an incentivising or penalising force for corporations in relation to a range of behaviours that can cause harm. This is especially the case in the fashion industry, where civil society organisations have sought to mobilise consumers against labour exploitation, animal abuse, environmental degradation and waste. Activist campaigns have invited individual consumers to recognise how their purchasing behaviour may come with 'moral responsibilities' (Barry and Macdonald 2016...) and have also instructed them on how they might acquit these responsibilities" (p117).

In the fashion industry the focus can be on women both as the main consumers, and the main workers, such that "many activist campaigns either explicitly or implicitly target female consumers" (Horton et al 2022

p117). Horton (2018) called this the "feminisation of responsibility", and it fits with the idea of a "global sisterhood" (Khader 2017), or that "women owe women" (Horton et al 2022).

But using two hashtag campaigns by the fashion activist organisation "Fashion Revolution" ("#WhoMadeMyClothes" and "#LovedClothesLast") as case studies, Horton et al (2022) argued that "the gendering of responsibility can be critiqued for failing to address the responsibility of all consumers and risking underplaying the role of corporate players, as well as failing to register the complexity of the relationship between gender and fashion in the 21st century" (p118).

The "Who Made My Clothes?" campaign encouraged consumers to attach the question, "who made my clothes?" to photographs of themselves and their outfits on Instagram as a means to challenge corporations about their supply chains. Some corporations responded with pictures of female workers saying, "I made your clothes" (Horton et al 2022).

The "Loved Clothes Last" campaign focused on the use and disposal of clothes, and promoted extended use of clothes. It was based on "the assumption that 'the longer active use of that specific product would prevent another product from being manufactured' (Laitala and Boks 2012...). This assumption is highly problematic given that garment production continues to increase by 2.7% annually... even throughout the covid-19 pandemic, and more than 70% of the fashion industry's greenhouse gas emissions come from the sphere of production... Thus, despite the increasing push for consumers to reduce the environmental impacts of their everyday life, the fashion supply chain and its resulting harms are still commanded by large corporations and their production schedules" (Horton et al 2022 p123).

1.9. WARDROBE RESEARCH

"Wardrobe research" and "garment storytelling" are methods to explore the meanings individuals attach to particular clothes. These could be used to bring about positive change in the fashion industry (Holgar 2022).

Listening to individuals talk about their "favourite garments" can show "the multiple dimensions of clothing use — the 'social, relational, material, practical' (Fletcher and Klepp 2017...) — that can help create a fuller, more accurate and useful understanding of fashion consumption" (Holgar 2022 p134).

For example, Fletcher (2016) collected around five hundred stories from nine countries, and found that individuals do have "resourceful and satisfying" clothing use, on the one hand. While "others have revealed how clothing practices can be driven by structurally induced anxiety... or already 'overburdened' with everyday complexity before any consideration of sustainability might occur" (Holgar 2022 p134).

Holgar (2022) argued that the concept of "fashion consumers" should be widened "beyond the image of wasteful young females" (p132) to include all wearers of clothing in the Global North.

1.10. APPENDIX 1A - DEGROWTH OR REBIRTH

"Degrowth" "signals a radical political and economic reorganisation leading to reduced resource and energy use" (Kallis et al 2018 quoted in Krpan and Basso 2021). A degrowth economy would involve "new economic, social, and environmental policies such as introducing a basic/citizenship income and a shorter working week, emphasising alternative economies and local sourcing, supporting small-scale producers, and/or accelerating the use of renewable energy" (Krpan and Basso 2021 p2).
Unfortunately, "degrowth" as a label has negative connotations, so other terms like "post-growth" and "prosperity without growth" have been used, or Krpan and Basso's (2021) choice, "rebirth". "As such, this label would express the positive effects of transformative change that a degrowth economy promotes at individual, societal, and ecological levels" (Krpan and Basso 2021 p2).
Krpan and Basso (2021) surveyed US and UK samples about the terms "degrowth" and "rebirth". Participants were recruited via Amazon MTurk, and randomly allocated to see the word "degrowth" or "rebirth", and asked if they associate any of twelve words with it (six positive - eg: success, aspiration; six negative - eg: failure, loss). Both samples (106 from the USA and 107 from the UK) associated significantly more positive words with "rebirth" and significantly more negative words with "degrowth".
In a further study with another US sample, participants were presented with a description of a future society described as a "degrowth economy" or a "rebirth economy". There were two descriptions, one which emphasised the positive ("promotion frame") (eg:

increasing human well-being), the other the negatives
avoided ("prevention frame") (eg: decreasing human
suffering), and the participants only saw one version
(table 1.1).

- 1 "Degrowth"; "Promotion frame" (n = 201)
- 2 "Degrowth"; "Prevention frame" (n = 201)
- 3 "Rebirth"; "Promotion frame" (n = 196)
- 4 "Rebirth"; "Prevention frame" (n = 202)

Table 1.1 - Four conditions and the number of
participants from the US sample ("Study 1"; Krpan and
Basso 2021).

Participants expressed more support for living in
the future society when it was called a "rebirth economy"
generally, and specifically when presented with a
"promotion frame" [2]. A replication study with another UK
sample (n = 1375) showed similar findings.
This research "focused on people's attitudes (ie:
degrowth support) rather than actual behaviours. Although
studying attitudes is valuable for policy making because
it concerns how people's support for degrowth-based
policies could be increased, this support may not
necessarily translate into the adoption of the desired
behaviours" (Krpan and Basso 2021 p10).

1.11. APPENDIX 1B - SECOND-HAND CLOTHING

Second-hand clothing (SHC) is one way to deal with
waste (ie: the reusing/reselling of clothes). The Global
South receives much of the SHC, and the Global North's
textile waste management becomes the problem of these
countries. The negative term "fashion dumping" may be a
better description of the SHC trade (Gachenga 2022).
Where there is so much SHC as more and more new
clothes are purchased in the Global North, SHC is a
"recycling fallacy" as it ends up as waste in the Global
South. Thus, the waste burden is placed upon the Global
South. This is opposite to the "polluter pays principle"
(Gachanga 2022).

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[2] Eg: "To what extent would you be willing to live in a degrowth/rebirth economy?". Response options
of "not at all" (1) to "extremely" (5).

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2. PSYCHOLOGY OF ANIMAL CRUELTY

2.1. INTRODUCTION

"Cruelty towards animals is not a new phenomenon", began Alleyne and Henry (2018 p451). One concern, however, is that "people who perpetrate animal abuse are cause for concern for the wider society because they are likely to engage in other crimes such as property damage, theft, and even interpersonal violence" (Alleyne and Henry 2018 p451).

A broad definition of animal cruelty is "all socially unacceptable behaviour that intentionally causes unnecessary pain, suffering or distress and/or death to an animal" (Ascione 1983 quoted in Alleyne and Henry 2018). This includes active cruelty in the form of physical abuse, and the passive form of neglect (Alleyne and Henry 2018).

Vermeulen and Odendaal (1993) distinguished four sub-types of maltreatment of companion animals based on two dimensions - mental or physical, and active or passive.

In terms of research, Hensley and Tallichet (2005) surveyed over 250 male prisoners, and found that the motivations for animal abuse included anger, fun, control, and dislike of animals, for instance.

In terms of important areas of research about the psychology of animal cruelty, Alleyne and Henry (2018) included:

a) The cognitive structures and processes that underlie hurting animals as compared to other types of offences. For example, unique "scripts" (defined as "the cognitive rules that bias how we interpret and evaluate social information, which also impacts on our decision-making"; Alleyne and Henry 2018 p454) learned from experiences that influence behaviour. "Perhaps abusers

think that when an animal engages in undesirable
behaviour (eg: urinating inside the house) they are doing
this on purpose and are, thus, deserving of punishment.
Other distorted beliefs could be: animals as objects –
animals do not feel and think like people so no harm is
actually being caused; or even, entitlement – animals are
inferior to people and it is a person's right to assert
their dominance over them" (Alleyne and Henry 2018 pp454-
455).

Scripts are not unique to animal cruelty, they have
been reported in relation to other offences. "For
example, in the child sexual abuse literature, some
abusers believe that the world is a dangerous place and
within this belief children are perceived
as threats that need to be 'taught a lesson'" (Alleyne
and Henry 2018 p454).

b) Is childhood animal cruelty a precursor to adult
interpersonal violence? This is known as the "violence
graduation hypothesis" (Alleyne and Henry 2018). Related
questions include, what factors influence the type of
adult offending by childhood animal abusers, does
childhood animal abuse continue into adulthood, and is
there a difference between early-onset and late-onset
animal abuse offending?

c) What are the unique and the shared factors for
animal cruelty and other types of offending?

d) Prevention and intervention strategies.

2.2. THEORIES

The theories of the psychology of animal abuse
include:

i) Childhood animal cruelty as a "form of play that
allows them to explore aspects of adult life (eg: acting
independently of adult control or monitoring, exerting
control and dominance over one's environment)" (Henry
2018 p460) ("dirty play"; Arluke 2002).

ii) The displacement of frustration – "The person's
initial state of frustration may arise from an
interaction with someone against whom retaliation is not
possible (perhaps because the person sees the original
target as too powerful). In this case, the person may
shift his/her aggressive impulses to a weaker target, ie:

an animal" (Henrry 2018 p461).

iii) Observational learning - eg: children observing family violence imitate it with animals.

iv) Cultural norms - "Pagani et al (2010) argue that value systems often include 'mixed messages' about our relationships with animals – we protect and embrace some (eg: dogs and cats) while we kill and eat others (eg: cows and pigs.) Some behaviours, such as slaughtering and eating a cow, are acceptable, while the exact same behaviour as unacceptable if the target is different (eg: a dog.) Thus, cultural and sub-cultural contexts define the human-animal interactions that are either acceptable or are 'animal cruelty'" (Henry 2018 p459).

v) Social-cognitive models of behaviour "focus on the information processing mechanisms an individual utilises to respond to immediate social situations" (Henry 2018 p458). These processes include cognitive biases (eg: perceiving ambiguous situations as hostile), schemas and scripts, and normative beliefs (eg: the acceptability of cruelty towards animals).

2.3. VIOLENCE GRADUATION HYPOTHESIS

The "violence graduation hypothesis" (Alleyne and Henry 2018) is the name given to the idea that animal cruelty in childhood is a predictor of adult violence generally. Anecdotal evidence comes from "famous" serial killers, like Ted Bundy and Jeffrey Dahmer. Hensley et al (2018) described the latter: "As a young child, Dahmer would collect the dead bodies of animals in his neighbourhood and dissect them. As his fascination and dark fantasies increased, he began capturing live animals. He would skin these animals, soak their bones in acid, and mount their heads on stakes in his backyard. Eventually, he would turn to killing humans and replicated many of the same methods he had used on animals on his human victims, removing the skin, soaking their bones in acid, and eating their flesh" (pp490-491).

But more formal studies are divided. One meta-analysis (Felthous and Kelbert 1987) found five studies showing a clear association between childhood animal abuse and adult violence, but ten studies did not. Differences between the studies included the use of single or recurrent acts of animal abuse and violence,

and the methods used (eg: case studies vs self-reported surveys). Studies with good methodology "have helped demonstrate a stronger association between childhood animal cruelty and later adult violence" (Hensley et al 2018 p491).

Verlinden (2000 quoted in Hensley et al 2018), for example, found that five of eleven adolescents involved in recent school shootings in the USA had committed acts of animal cruelty. "For example, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the shooters from Columbine High School, frequently told friends about their acts of animal mutilation. Evan Ramsey, the school shooter from Bethel, Alaska, amused himself by throwing rocks at dogs. One well-documented case was Luke Woodham, the school shooter from Pearl, Mississippi, who tortured and killed his pet dog before taking the lives of his mother and two schoolmates. Finally, Kipland 'Kip' Kinkel, the school shooter from Springfield, Oregon, admitted that he had beheaded cats and attached explosives to a cow prior to his school shooting" (Hensley et al 2018 p491). Arluke and Madfis (2014) reported that nearly half of twenty-three such shooters between 1988 and 2012 had a history of animal abuse, while Ressler et al's (1998) interviews with 36 "sexual murderers" found that twenty-eight admitted to childhood animal cruelty.

In terms of studies of violent and non-violent prisoners, animal cruelty is self-reported more often by the former group (eg: Florida maximum-security prison; Merz-Perez et al 2001).

"While much research has been conducted on the link between acts of animal cruelty and violence against humans, it is necessary that some focus should shift to the emotional and social contexts around which behaviours may be developed. Factors such as the lack of development of empathy during childhood, and the environment in which acceptable behaviours are learned may be found to influence the lens through which individuals, particularly children, view the abuse of an animal" (Hensley et al 2018 p492). Violent offenders are significantly more likely to show no apathy for their animal victims than non-violent offenders committing animal cruelty (eg: Merz-Perez and Heide 2004).

So, in summary, Hensley et al (2018) stated that "although not all violent individuals have been previously cruel to animals, a significant percentage has" (p493).

Hensley et al (2018) were interested in variables

around animal cruelty in their study with US inmates (eg: age of onset; frequency of behaviour; emotional responses to behaviour). In March 2007 180 men in one medium-security and one maximum-security prison in a southern US state agreed to complete a 26-item questionnaire, and 103 of them reported childhood animal abuse. Thirty-eight respondents reported no feelings of being upset by their behaviour.

A significant relationship was found between recurrent childhood animal cruelty and recurrent violence later, with younger age of first abuse being important. The following variables were not significant - being upset or not about abuse, abusing animals alone or with others, and trying to hide the abuse or not.

This study, like many of its type, has methodological weaknesses, including low response rate (180 of 1800 inmates), unverified self-reports, and a pencil-and-paper survey that excluded illiterate inmates. Furthermore, Hensley et al (2018) admitted that the inmates were "asked whether or not engaging in animal cruelty had upset them. This is a leading question because it implies the answer, and this may have skewed the participants' responses. It would have been better to ask, 'Did you have any feelings after engaging in this behaviour?' By proposing the second question, inmates who felt remorse for their behaviour could have answered accordingly, and other feelings experienced after committing animal cruelty could have been taken into account as well" (p497).

An alternative idea is the "deviance generalisation hypothesis" (Arluke et al 1999), which sees animal cruelty as "one component of a larger deviance syndrome" (Walters 2018 p479), or one-third of a triad of "aggressive sociopathy" (Macdonald 1961). For example, Walters (2014) found that childhood animal cruelty was as good in predicting non-aggressive as aggressive delinquency later.

2.4. GENERAL ANTI-SOCIAL TENDENCY

The idea of a general anti-social tendency that includes animal abuse and aggression towards humans is supported by the link between animal abuse and bullying.

Among US male undergraduates, for example, Henry and Sanders (2007) found that individuals who admitted to animal abuse were more likely to also admit to bullying than non-abusers. The findings were confirmed with female

students subsequently by Sanders and Henry (2015).

Sanders and Henry (2018) found a similar relationship with cyberbullying. The participants were 439 US undergraduates who took part as a partial requirement of an introductory psychology class. The online questionnaire contained a number of measures, including:

- Experiences with Animals (EWA) (Flynn 1999) - 74 items covering pet ownership, and observation of and participation in animal abuse (eg: "Have you ever intentionally killed your own or someone else's pet (other than to help the animal because it was hurt, old, or sick; to protect yourself or another person; or because they were farm animals always intended for slaughter)?").

- Normative Beliefs About Aggression Scale (NOBAGS) (Huesmann and Guerra 1997) - Twenty items measuring the approval of aggression (eg: "It is generally wrong to get into physical fights with others").

- Bully/victim questionnaire (BVQ) (Olweus 1993) - 21 items covering victimisation and perpetration of verbal and physical bullying.

- Cyberbullying and Online Aggression Survey (Patchin and Hinduja 2015) - 49 items (eg: "Someone posted mean or hurtful comments about about me online"; "I threatened to hurt someone online").

Overall, 26% of males and 8% of females were classified as perpetrators of animal abuse. Previous research has found that males are four times more likely to abuse animals than females (Sanders and Henry 2018). Teasing or torturing an animal was the most common of four behaviours (figure 2.1).

The researchers tested the following hypotheses:

i) Individuals who engaged in animal abuse will be more likely to perpetrate face-to-face and cyberbullying than non-abusers - This was supported by the data as both male and female abusers scored significantly higher on BVQ bullying and Cyberbullying perpetration than non-abusers (figure 2.2). Specifically, there was a significant association between animal abuse and cyberbullying.

Figure 2.1 - Percentage of respondents who abused animals admitting to four types of abuse.

(Data from table 2 Sanders and Henry 2018)

Figure 2.2 - Mean scores of two measures based on animal abuse and gender.

ii) Perpetrators of animal abuse and bullying will hold more positive attitudes about aggression than non-abusers and non-bullies - Male abusers scored significantly higher on the NOBAGS than non-abusers, but not female abusers.

iii) Beliefs about aggression, gender of the individual, and bullying will predict animal abuse - A logistic regression model found support for this prediction.

Sanders and Henry (2018) stated: "Together, this pattern of associations suggests that animal abuse is part of a generalised aggressive disposition, rather than a situation- or target-specific form of aggression. Parents, educators, and clinicians should view animal abuse as a potential 'red flag' for subsequent or co-occurring violent behaviour, including bullying" (p567).

Evaluation of Sanders and Henry (2018):

1. Use of validated measures of variables (+), but these were self-reports with no independent verification (-). Sanders and Henry (2018) admitted: "Though self-report measures are a widely used source, this measurement technique could potentially be a source of bias. The types of questions asked are vulnerable to the social desirability effect. Moreover, we would be remiss to consider the possibility that individuals with a more accepting view of aggression may be less inhibited to disclose their acts of violence compared to individuals with fewer normative beliefs about aggression" (p568).

The participants had to recall past experiences with bullying and animal abuse (-), which depends on the accuracy of memory, and "could be biased due to many factors including amount of time elapsed since the occurrences and/or their current feelings" (Sanders and Henry 2018 p568).

2. Variables and measurement - Individuals were classed as abusers or non-abusers by answering "yes" to one or more of four key questions on the EWA. This is straightforward (+), but it ignores frequency of abuse (-). Sanders and Henry (2018) accepted that "[P]erhaps individuals who engage in frequent episodes of animal abuse may differ in the way they process information, particularly with schemata related to aggression. Future investigations should consider operationally defining animal abuse as a continuous variable in order to explore

potential differences between individuals who are one-time animal abusers and those who are frequent abusers" (p568).

Attitudes towards aggression was the main mediating variable measured, but there may have been other not included (-), like emotional arousal, and moral disengagement (Sanders and Henry 2018).

3. The sample was US social science undergraduates in Denver, Colorado, which limited generalisability of the findings (-). Information about ethnicity was not available, but the researchers assumed that around two-thirds were White (ie: similar to the general student population of the area).

A reasonable sample size (+) (over 400), of which 267 were female (+/-).

2.5. MEASUREMENT OF ANIMAL CRUELTY

Childhood animal abuse is often based on self-reports either by adults in retrospect or by children themselves at the time. How to view the accuracy of such data? One answer is the use of parent's reports as well as the children's reports.

Walters (2018) is an example of a study to do this. Data came from the Fragile Families and Child Well-Being study (FFCW) in twenty US cities (began in 1998-2000). Subsequent data collections occurred at one, three, five, and nine years old.

Two questions from Wave 5 (nine years old) were important here, asked to both the 3997 children and the parent: whether an animal was hurt on purpose, and engagement in any of fourteen delinquent behaviours (eg: taken or stolen something; cheated on a school test; run away from home).

Children reported a significantly higher amount of animal cruelty than parents (4.7% vs 3.0% of respondents), and a significantly higher delinquency (51.2% vs 20.9% at least one behaviour). At least in the FFCW, this suggested that child and parent reports measured different things.

It may be that children know of behaviours that their parents do not, or it could be the language used in the questions. "Perhaps nine-year-old children are just less capable of accurately assessing animal cruelty compared to their parents. It is also possible that the different phrases used to identify animal cruelty in the current study played a role in the results. Whereas

children were asked if they ever hurt an animal, their parents were asked if the child was ever cruel to animals. The words cruelty and hurt do not necessarily mean the same thing and could have been interpreted differently" (Walters 2018 p485).

Solutions to these problems include combining the child and parent reports, or using more questions as in the semi-structured interview of the Children and Animals Inventory (CAI) (Dadds et al 2004) (table 2.1) (which takes 15-30 minutes with a trained interviewer).

- Have you ever hurt an animal on purpose? (Never, Hardly ever, A few times, Several times, Frequently)

- How many times have you hurt an animal on purpose? (Never, Once or twice, Three to six times, More than six times)

- How long did you do this for (on and off)? (Never, For about 1 month, For about 6 months, Longer than 6 months)

- Do you treat animals cruelly in front of others or by yourself? (I have never hurt an animal, In front of others, Alone)

(Source: Dabbs et al 2004)

Table 2.1 - Selected items from CAI.

An alternative to direct questioning is the use of hypothetical scenarios (eg: Alleyne et al 2015) - eg: a dog has chewed a pair of shoes and urinated on the floor and so the owner hits the dog on the head in annoyance until the dog becomes unconscious (Newberry 2018).

2.6. TYPE OF ANIMAL

The type of animal (farm, pet, stray, wild; Merz-Perez et al 2001) can influence the likelihood of being abused. The attitude towards the different types, and the empathy towards them are important here (Signal et al 2018).

The Pet, Pest and Profit (PPP) scale (Taylor and Signal 2009) was developed to measure attitudes towards different animals. It has thirty items covering pet/companion animal (eg: "I find my pet a source of emotional comfort (or I would if I had one)"), pest (eg: "It is acceptable to personally kill feral animals in whatever manner I choose"), and profit (eg: "Humans have a right to use animals as food"). Each item is scored 1-

5, and a higher score is a more positive attitude towards animals in that category.

Signal et al (2018) used the PPP scale in an online survey of over 1600 Australian adults, along with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis 1980). The IRI has twenty-eight items measuring aspects of empathy, like "I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me", and "I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision").

On the PPP scale pets received higher scores than the other two categories, and this correlated with IRI scores. In other words, high empathy scores were associated with positive attitudes towards pets in particular. This can be taken as indirect evidence that negative attitudes towards animals, and lack of empathy generally are involved in animal cruelty.

Signal et al (2018) noted "the liminal and often ambiguous nature of species designated pests. In the Australian context many of these species hold conflicting statuses, such as kangaroos who are simultaneously pests and national icons, or dingoes who are simultaneously pests and protected species" (p534).

2.7. METHODS OF ANIMAL CRUELTY

Newberry (2018) noted the criticism that understanding about the psychology of animal cruelty has been "slow because the majority of research on animal cruelty has amalgamated all types of abuse into one homogenous variable which means that the variability of animal cruelty is overlooked" (p501). Thus, the need to distinguish the methods of animal cruelty.

From interviews with psychiatric patients, Felthous (1980), for example, found the following methods used against cats and dogs - beating, choking, fracturing bones, scalding, burning, hanging, exploding, limb amputation, and decapitation (Newberry 2018). While Miller and Knutson's (1997) interviews with male prisoners produced the methods of poisoning, drowning, beating/kicking, shooting, strangling, stabbing, burning, throwing against an object, and exploding against animals generally (Newberry 2018). Merz-Perez et al (2001) reported that violent prisoners had used a wider variety of methods than non-violent prisoners.

Turning away from incarcerated populations, student samples are easily accessible to academic studies. Newberry (2018) admitted: "Despite the fact that

undergraduate student samples may not be representative of the general population, data obtained from such samples is consistent with recommendations that prevalence data on maltreatment should be obtained from 'natural collectivities' of participants" (p502). For example, Arluke (2002) found, from interviews with twenty-five male undergraduates, that animal cruelty was viewed as a form of play, with a thrill of not getting caught.

In terms of personality, animal cruelty is more likely among impulsive individuals, and less likely among high Neuroticism scorers (Parfitt and Alleyne 2018; appendix 2A). These authors went farther and suggested that "impulsivity and neuroticism may relate to different types of animal cruelty; a high level of impulsivity may be associated with 'explosive' animal cruelty, whereas low neuroticism may be associated with pre-meditated, methodical cruelty" (Newberry 2018 p504).

Newberry (2018) investigated motivations for and methods of animal cruelty, and impulsivity among 130 undergraduates in a northern English city university. The Boat Inventory on Animal-Related Experiences (BIARE) (Boat 1999) was used to measure pet ownership, attitudes towards pets, and animal cruelty. Further questions were added about animal cruelty to cover the different methods (table 2.2).

Motivations	Methods
Control	Drowned
Retaliation Against an Animal	Beat/kicked
Prejudice	Shot
Expression of Aggression	Burned
Enhancement of aggression	Trapped
Amusement	Squashed
Retaliation Against a Person	Threw an Object at
Displacement of Aggression	Stabbed
Sadism	Strangled
	Deliberately Did Not Feed

Table 2.2 - Motivations for and methods of animal cruelty used by Newberry (2018).

The 59-item UPPS-P Impulsive Behaviour Scale (eg: Cyders et al 2007) covers five aspects of impulsivity – Sensation Seeking, Lack of Pre-meditation, Lack of Perseverance, and Positive and Negative Urgency (table 2.3).

- Sensation Seeking - the inclination to enjoy thrilling activities and openness to new experiences that could be dangerous.

- Lack of Pre-meditation - not considering the consequences of a behaviour before acting.

- Lack of Perseverance - difficulties in staying focused on a long or difficult task.

- Negative Urgency - the tendency to have strong impulses when feeling distressed.

- Positive Urgency - the inclination to act rashly in response to a positive mood.

Table 2.3 - Five types of impulsivity in UPPS-P (Newberry 2018 p507).

Overall, 55% of the sample reported intentional harm to at least one animal, or killing, including for sport or food, and humanely euthanising, while 12% had given an animal recreational drugs, and 2% made an animal fight. Dogs were the most common victim overall.

The most common motivations were Prejudice (ie: dislike of a particular animal or species), Amusement, and Control, and the most common methods were Beat/kicked, Squashing, and Throwing an Object at, in that order.

The following hypotheses were tested:

a) The motivations of Retaliation and Control will be associated with the method of Beat/kicked. This hypothesis was supported as statistical significant using the chi squared test.

b) The motivations of Retaliation and Control will be more common among high impulsivity scorers (specifically Negative Urgency). This was found to be the case.

c) The motivation of Amusement will be reported more often by high Sensation Seeking scorers. The data supported this prediction.

d) High Sensation Seeking scorers will be more likely to have Shot an animal. There was a predicted significant difference here.

e) Burning or Drowning will be used by low Lack of Perseverance scorers more often. This prediction was supported for Drowning, but not for Burning.

This study showed the association between different motivations for and methods of animal cruelty, and the role of the different aspects (or sub-types) of impulsivity.

Evaluation of Newberry (2018):

i) The measures were self-reports with no independent verification. Newberry (2018) admitted: "While participants were asked to complete the measures quietly and alone without discussing their responses with anyone in order to reduce the potential effects of social desirability/peer pressure it must be acknowledged that the measures were administered in social areas of the University campus (eg: waiting areas by the helpdesk, non-quiet study areas of the library) which could have increased the likelihood that participants may have exaggerated or fabricated their responses. On the other hand, given that students are more likely to under-report than over-report animal cruelty (Arluke 2002) this figure may not reflect the true extent of the problem" (pp519-520).

ii) Though the level of animal cruelty was similar to other studies of students, and studies of clinical and offender populations (Newberry 2018), the generalisability of these findings are limited (ie: an opportunity sample of 77 females and fifty-three males with a mean age of 23 years, 93% White, Social Science undergraduates, in a city in northern England).

iii) The categories of motivations for and methods of animal cruelty were based on previous research, but they may have overlapped, or missed behaviours, or been unclear to the respondents. "For example, it could be argued that if a person harms or kills an animal for Amusement then they are deriving pleasure from it, meaning that the motivation of Sadism may also apply to some extent", admitted Newberry (2018 p520).

iv) The study was cross-sectional (ie: a single-shot survey), and could not assess causality or development of the behaviour as with the longitudinal method.

v) The study showed the importance of distinguishing the sub-categories of behaviour - the different aspects of impulsivity (as there was no difference between animal abusers and non-abusers on the total UPPS-P score), and that researchers "should consider motivations for animal cruelty and methods of animal cruelty rather than simply classifying individuals as 'animal abusers' or 'non-animal abusers'..." (Newberry 2018 p520). Impulsivity appears to be a multi-dimensional than uni-dimensional concept (Newberry 2018).

vi) Standardised measures (BIARE and UPPS-P) were used with established reliability and validity.

vii) The overall prevalence figure was a combination of different behaviours (intentional harm, killing, euthanising) which it could be argued are separate behaviours. In other words, the figure could be seen as conflated.

2.8. APPENDIX 2A - PARFITT AND ALLEYNE (2018)

Parfitt and Alleyne (2018) recruited 150 undergraduates at a university in southern England to complete their questionnaire. It included a version of the BIARE, and the Modified-Animal Abuse Proclivity Scale (M-AAPS) (Alleyne et al 2015) [3]. The latter used hypothetical scenarios to imagine (eg: kicking a cat; microwaving a cat). Other questions covered personality dimensions, anger, and impulsiveness.

Overall, 10% of the sample admitted to an act of animal abuse before sixteen years old, and 8.7% since that age. Killing a pet or stray animal were the most common behaviours. This was the actual behaviour, while the M-AAPS showed who could perform the behaviour (around half of participants based on their answers). The M-AAPS score was significantly negatively correlated with the personality dimensions of Agreeableness [4], and Conscientiousness, and positively correlated with impulsivity, and illegal behaviour. Low Extraversion was also associated with animal abuse. Separating the

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[3] Parfitt and Alleyne (2018) explained: "Proclivity scales are a self-report method, designed to measure participants' proclivity, or likelihood, to engage in a particular behaviour. Assessing behavioural propensity is a validated method of deriving inferences about offending behaviour via the process of motor imagery... In a non-offending sample, the process of motor imagery has been shown to activate the same/similar offence-supportive attitudes and beliefs as those reported by offenders who actually engage in the behaviour" (p541).

[4] Low Agreeableness is manifest as low trust, sympathy, and co-operation.

severity of animal abuse, "neuroticism was a unique correlate for low-severity animal abuse proclivity" (Parfitt and Alleyne 2018 p549) (ie: a negative correlation).

The association between actual animal abuse or behavioural propensity, and self-reported illegal behaviour fits with previous research, but no association with substance abuse was found by Parfitt and Alleyne (2018) (contradictory to other studies). Parfitt and Alleyne (2018) admitted that "it is possible that the measure used to assess substance misuse [Texas Christian University drug screen] may have limited these findings. Also, utilising a student sample may restrict the range of substance misuse that would otherwise be found in a more diverse sample recruited from the general public" (p550).

The finding of introvert (ie: low Extraversion) as associated with animal abuse is opposite to previous research, as was the association of low Neuroticism.

Though the questionnaire was completed online, the measures were self-reports, which are vulnerable to socially desirable responses, and dependent on honesty and recall accuracy. The M-AAPS measured the response to hypothetical abuse scenarios with questions like, "In this situation, how thrilled would you be?", "How powerful would you have felt?", "Could you see yourself doing the same?", and "Imagine that someone has seen you in this situation. How much would you have enjoyed watching their reaction?" (p543). This is different to actual behaviour carried out.

The sample was two-thirds female, and predominantly White, and they were offered course credit for participation. There is always a question around motivation to participate when such credit is offered, though it is common practice.

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3. FRAUDSTERS AND ANTI-SOCIAL ATTITUDES/COGNITIONS

The Internet provides a great opportunity for fraud with the ability of users to communicate anonymously or while using fake identities. A study in China, for example, found that victims were contacted and exploited via business invitations, money transfers, account-hacking, and online shopping (Hua et al 2017).

Orjiakor et al (2022) studied internet fraud in Nigeria, where it is popularly called "yahoo yahoo", and the perpetrators "yahoo" or "G" guys/boys. Predominately young men, these individuals can gain great attention on social media and via their affluent lifestyles.

Akanle et al (2016) had found that these individuals "operate with a sense of entitlement and rationalisation, and may believe that the money they are getting from their clients is their right" (Orjiakor et al 2022 p430). Andrews and Bonta (2010) talked of "anti-social attitudes/cognitions" (ie: "thoughts, feelings and beliefs that are supportive of criminal conduct"; quoted in Orjiakor et al 2022). Orjiakor et al (2022) concentrated on these in their interviews with twelve young men (19-35 years old) engaged in internet fraud.

The following themes emerged from analysis of the interviews:

i) The role of peers as the route into internet fraud - For example, one interviewee talked of "updates and directions" from his university roommate.

ii) Motivations for engaging in internet fraud - Money was the main motivation, for themselves or their family (eg: "I went into it because things were hard for my parents and so I needed to make money to pay my [school] fees and that of my siblings"; "Koko"; p433).

"However, at closer examination, deeper level constructions regarding the motivations to join internet fraud begin to emerge. Social pressures arising from peers who flaunt wealth, or who are deemed more responsible as they are able to provide for their families and wield influence in their local communities are a strong source of attraction to internet fraud for youths" (Orjiakor et al 2022 p433).

iii) Thoughts about targets/victims - The prime pargets were "white foreigners", who were "seen as people

who are paying the price for the evils perpetrated against Africans during the colonial era: 'I feel like I am doing my bit... avenging our forefathers' [Ken]" (Orjiakor et al 2022 p434). But victims were also of similar ethnicity.

Victims generally were described as "gullible" ("Ken" talking about women), or greedy (eg: "humans are naturally greedy... so they are now my clients"; "Peter"; p434).

iv) Anti-social attitudes/cognitions:

a) Rationalisation/justification - As mentioned above with the thoughts about the victims, rationalisation/justifications "seemed to strengthen the convictions of internet fraudsters that their activities were not so bad or are not the worst kind of crime there is. They also rationalised that their victims deserved the losses that they incur or that their victims have other ways of covering for their losses" (Orjiakor et al 2022 p435).

b) Entitlement - eg: "A lot of our country's revenue goes into those foreign countries... I feel I am taking my share back" ("Koko"; p435).

c) Revenge - eg: "doing my bit of avenging our forefathers" ("Ken"; p435).

d) Normalisation - "Perpetrators of internet fraud tend not to see anything wrong with defrauding their victims particularly when they are [white] foreigners" (Orjiakor et al 2022 p435).

e) Minimisation of impact - eg: "I am not taking their entire money" ("JayBoy"; p436).

f) Dehumanisation of victims - Through the use of terms like "client" or "pawns".

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4. GENDER INEQUALITY IN ILLICIT PAY

The gender gap in pay in legal employment is also seen in illicit work.

Three general perspectives are taken on this topic (Nguyen et al 2022):

i) The illicit world reproduces the gender inequalities of the licit world.

ii) Certain crimes are more "female-oriented" (or at least stereotyped as such).

iii) There are "structural constraints that shape the ways in which women get involved in crime and how they navigate the criminal world as agentic actors" (Nguyen et al 2022 p427). For example, Nguyen et al (2022) continued, "parenthood is described as a double-edged sword for women at the margins of both legal and illegal worlds. For those who lack access to and the skills necessary to be successful in legitimate work and who feel desperate..., having dependent children can motivate both offending and desistence" (p427). Among a sample of over 250 women in prison, Yule et al (2015) found that women were less likely to be involved in economic-related crimes in periods when they lived with their children than not.

Nguyen et al (2022) investigated the gender gap in illegal pay using data from the Delaware Decision Making Study (DDMS), which included three samples - individuals in prison for crimes with no illegal pay ("non-earners"), those in prison who reported earnings ("earners"), and a community sample. The community sample included 156 adults (seventy-one male and 85 female) at the University of Delaware, and the incarcerated samples were recruited in the local prisons (395 male and 116 female) in 2016.

Questions were asked about participation in four "economic" crimes (burglary, robbery, drug dealing, and forgery/fraud). the "earners" (279 males and sixty-five females) reported an average "profit" of $1 156 for men and $675 for women.

In terms of the characteristics of the groups, male "earners" had more "criminal capital" (ie: younger age of first crime, and more total arrests) than "non-earners", and female prisoners. Males were more involved in robbery, and females in forgery/fraud relatively. male prisoners had a greater preference for risk than females.

Using statistical techniques that compare gender and

legal pay across the working life and type of employment, Nguyen et al (2022) found a gender gap in illegal pay. The difference was partly explained by factors like male criminals beginning at an earlier age (criminal capital), and the taking of more risks (psycho-social factors). part of the difference could be "traditionally interpreted as a measure of discrimination" (Nguyen et al 2022 p442).

Ethnicity/race was also found to influence illegal pay. Nguyen et al (2022) explained: "Unexpectedly, race accounted for a large portion of gender gap in illegal pay per crime. Unlike research on the legal labour market, we observed a large illegal pay premium for non-whites among both males and females" (p444).

The data on illegal pay were self-reported for the "typical crime".

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5. BURGLARS' DECISION-MAKING

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is an approach based on changing physical and social factors to make crime unattractive. It has been applied to burglary by understanding the variables that burglars pay attention to in targeted buildings. This has led to research on burglars' decision-making, and in recent years, using virtual reality (Park and Lee 2021).

Park and Lee (2021) created a virtual street and varied factors to be burglary-causing or burglary-deterring. The former included low fence, weak front door, long distance to road, no security camera, and hiding places. Burglary-deterring features included house visible from the road and facing the road, high gate and fence, and security alarms. The participants in the study, for ethical reasons, were thirty-two non-criminal males in South Korea.

Each participant was allowed to roam the virtual street of eight houses and investigate access points before telling the experimenter their preferred means of entry into the property and into the building.

For access to the property, the majority of respondents (around three-quarters) preferred the fence to the gate.

Entry to the building was most commonly preferred as by the back door, followed by upper window, side window, and front door in that order.

Access to the property was significantly related to fence and gate height, and gate lock. The ease of access factors (eg: weak type of door) influenced entry to the building choices. But "participants tended to consider the risk of detection when comparing intrusion routes that do not function as normal entrances, such as the side-window and the 2nd-floor window" (Park and Lee 2021 p1).

The participants were non-burglars, but how did their choices compare to studies with burglars? Preference for back door entry has been found, for instance (eg: Palmer et al 2002). Park and Lee (2021) argued that there is criminals' expertise that influences decision-making, but "also universal (bounded) rationality" (p8) (ie: commonality between offender and non-offenders).

The study was virtual reality-based, but this method has been used before. For example, Nee et al (2019) compared different groups, and found that "incarcerated burglars scrutinised the neighbourhood more thoroughly,

stayed longer in high-value areas, and targeted different items from other groups (ie: other offenders and non-offenders)" (Park and Lee 2021 p2).

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6. CRIME HUBS

Trans-national organised crime can be "best understood as the continuation of commerce by other means" and as "the illicit counterparts of multi-national corporations" (Williams 2001a quoted in Keefe 2013). "Whether your cargo is narcotics or light arms, undocumented people or dirty money, endangered species or highly enriched uranium, you will find that some geographic locales prove to be especially congenial and can function as a staging area or trans-shipment point or even a base of operations" (Keefe 2013 p98). This also occurs if trans-national criminal networks are mobile and can move to "appealing locations" (ie: the groups have what Williams (2001b) called "jurisdictional arbitrage") (Keefe 2013).

Keefe (2013) attempted a "geography of badness", to map the "black market hubs" (or "geopolitical black holes" Naim (2006); "twilight zones" Luke and O Tuathail (1998); or "pseudo-states" O'Loughlin (1998)).

A former US government official described the characteristics of such places thus: "There's concentrated power, resources in very few hands, no oversight, no separate functioning judiciary, a huge porous border, huge inherited military facilities, lots of airstrips, a bunch of old planes" (quoted in Keefe 2013). A US report after the "9/11 attack" included these characteristics as important to international crime and terrorism: "official corruption, incomplete or weak legislation, poor enforcement of existing laws, non-transparent financial institutions, unfavourable economic conditions, lack of respect for the rule of law in society, and poorly guarded national borders" (quoted in Keefe 2013).

Putting the different ideas together, Keefe (2013) presented his key characteristics that make any area/country attractive to international crime networks:

i) Partial state degradation - Enough state failure to diminish local law enforcement, but "trans-national criminal organisations will likely be repelled by a degree of state failure that results in isolation from the broad currents of global communications and commerce, or an unacceptable level of anarchy or uncertainty on the ground" (Keefe 2013 p102).

ii) Areas of contested sovereignty - eg: "Tri-Border Area" (or "Triple Frontier") (where Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay meet); Transnistria (Moldova); Abkhazia

(Georgia) (Keefe 2013).

iii) Official corruption - "Depending on the level of corruption in the country in question, and the skill and resources of the briber, corrupt accomplices can often be secured at the very highest levels of government — indeed, even in the very organs of government whose mission it is to crack down on crime" (Keefe 2013 p104).

iv) Poverty - "In a destitute country, crime may appear to loom large because it is often one of the few viable revenue streams available... [However] most illicit trans-national activity unfolds in wealthy countries, where it is simply obscured by the white noise of a booming legitimate economy" (Keefe 2013 p105).

v) An informal economy - "From Thailand to Transnistria, from Equatorial Guinea to Guatemala, an informal economy is as crucial an ingredient as corruption for an underworld economic hub because the fungibility of cash and other commodities in an underground marketplace allows criminal enterprises to launder their proceeds" (Keefe 2013 p106).

vi) Power structures that trump the official state - eg: tribes and kinship networks.

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7. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

7.1. SOCIAL JUSTICE

Social justice refers to "the fair allocation of human rights, protections, opportunities, obligations, and social benefits... [as well as] acknowledging and addressing social and economic inequalities, and seeking to eliminate discrimination and oppression associated with race, ethnicity, national origin, colour, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, marital status, political belief, religion, immigration status, and mental or physical disability" (Reamer 2014 pp260-270).

Applied to criminal justice, social justice can be described as "wholesale" or "retail" (Reamer 2014). The former relates to changes in society (eg: in income distribution) that reduce the motivation for certain crimes, while the latter is applied specifically to the behaviour within the criminal justice system (CJS) (eg: treatment of prisoners; behaviour of police).

Social injustice in the CJS "entails various forms of dehumanising and coercive domination, oppression, discrimination, and exploitation...[;] examples include police brutality and discrimination, coerced confessions by suspects, knowingly wrongful prosecutions and convictions in criminal court, and prison inmate abuse" (Reamer 2014 p270).

Focusing on the areas of the CJS, and social injustice:

1. Law enforcement

"The great majority of police officers are committed to honourable and competent public service and consistently demonstrate integrity and accountability in carrying out the often difficult, complex and sometimes dangerous activities involved in policing by consent. However, in every police agency there exists an element of dishonesty, lack of professionalism and criminal behaviour" (Dean and Gottschalk 2011 quoted in Reamer

2014).

Kane and White (2009) distinguished three main areas of police misconduct - "police crime" (eg: stealing from victims of crimes during investigations), "police corruption" (eg: bribes to not enforce certain laws), and "abuse of authority" (eg: excessive force during investigations).

Dean and Gottschalk (2011) produced nine categories of motives/types of unethical conduct:

i) "Overzealous" - In the determination to solve a case, there is the violation of rules, procedures and laws.

ii) "Misguided" - A misunderstanding of the purpose of policing that leads to rule-breaking.

iii) "Unethical" - Knowingly violates rules because of the perceived protection of being in the police service.

iv) "Opportunism" - Views the public as the enemy and takes the opportunity to take advantage of them.

v) "Condoning" - "Turning a blind eye" to others or participating because "everybody does it".

vi) "Obstructionism" - Condoning motive plus hindering any investigations of the police.

vii) "Greed" - Personal gain from their position.

viii) "Collusion" - Working with others in the police for personal gain.

ix) "Connected" - Working with criminals for personal gain.

2. Judiciary

Social injustice can occur at the stages of the decision to prosecute, during the trial, and in the sentencing of the individual. "Prosecutors wield enormous power and enjoy remarkable discretion with respect to their decisions to file criminal charges, support or oppose bail, disclose potentially exculpatory evidence to defence counsel, offer or accept a plea bargain, challenge potential jurors, and recommend prison

sentences. Although the vast majority of prosecutors are principled, earnest professionals who practice law with impressive integrity, some engage in misconduct or fall prey to human biases that taint their judgment" (Reamer 2014 pp273-274).

One well-researched example is "racial bias". For example, a meta-analysis of seventy-one studies (Mitchell 2005) found that African Americans generally received harsher sentences than Whites in the USA for the same offence. This difference is seen in, for instance, "discretionary lenience" (eg: reducing a sentence compared to recommended guidelines for a mitigating reason) or "discretionary punitiveness" (eg: increased sentencing for repeat offenders) (Reamer 2014).

In relation to judges, Miller (2004) noted twelve categories of "bad judges", including abuse of office for personal gain, incompetence and neglect of duties, conflict of interests, and overstepping authority (Reamer 2014).

3. Corrections

"Once offenders are incarcerated, they run the risk of institutional abuse and discrimination" (Reamer 2014 p278).

For example, in a survey of over 7500 US inmates, Wolff et al (2009) found that nearly 40% had been victimised by staff in the previous six months (Reamer 2014).

7.2. DRUGS AND PRISON

Hatch (2019) critiqued the use of psychotropic drugs to "keep the prison quiet" in the USA, arguing that "'psychiatric treatment involving psychotropics is always going to involve a measure of control, regardless of whether the intention is to heal or simply to pacify'. The drugs are administered in the name of providing health care to prisoners, but at the same time, they are also administered in ways that compound the social death of mass incarceration by 'producing mass psychic death'" (Garcia-Deister and Pollock 2021 p575).

7.3. AGEING PRISONERS

The ageing prisoner population has increased in the

21st century, and, in the USA, "these older adults are disproportionately poor and Black or Latino" (Zaller et al 2022 p117). Such individuals have health problems related to age (eg: functional and cognitive impairment), and to ethnic health disparities (eg: early onset dementia) (Zaller et al 2022).

Zaller et al (2022) outlined three examples related to the ageing prisoner population:

i) The health of older women in the criminal justice system - These are "the forgotten population" and a "double minority", according to Handtke et al (2015) in a Swiss study.
More likely to have serious health problems than incarcerated older males, and to have the sometimes exacerbating experience of the menopause. "The majority of incarcerated women are survivors of violence, and traumas which may cast shadows on physical and mental health in older adulthood" (Zaller et al 2022 p118).

ii) The role of peer caregiving in prisons - Prisoners provide caregiving in formal (eg: infirmary) and informal (eg: dorms) situations. For example, "Gold Coats" in California are trusted prisoners who "may aid people in their activities of daily living, such as feeding, or by assisting the mobility impaired or transporting older adults who use wheelchairs..." (Zaller et al 2022 p119).

iii) Psychiatric conditions in prisons - In a classic study, Koenig et al (1995) found that over half of ninety-five males over 50 in one US (North Carolina) prison met the criteria for a current psychiatric disorder (figure 7.1). "The findings highlighted mental illness and unmet treatment needs as significant problems among incarcerated people. Yet, since this seminal study was published, the number of incarcerated older persons in the US has nearly quadrupled..., and their suicide rates have increased" (Zaller et al 2022 p120).

(* excluding simple phobia)
(Note that individuals may have been diagnosed with more than one disorder)

(Data from Koening et al 1995 table 1 p400)

Figure 7.1 - One-month prevalence rate (%) of psychiatric disorders in one North Carolina correctional facility.

7.4. ASSESSING SEXUAL OFFENDERS AGAINST CHILDREN

Egan et al (2005) surveyed 200 sexual offenders against children in the UK with the Sex Offenders Assessment Package (SOAP). Table 7.1 gives examples of the measures and items used in the SOAP. There are ten different scales involved.

Three factors emerged from statistical analysis of the answers:

I - Emotional distress (high): associated with high Neuroticism, low Extraversion, Openness and Conscientiousness, and high MOCI score.

II - Cognitions supporting sex with children.

III - Concern for others (high) - associated with high Openness and Agreeableness.

Factor III seems to contradict the other two, suggesting individuals with an ability to take another's

MEASURE	PURPOSE	ITEM
Personal Reaction Inventory (PRI)	How defensive an individual is about their faults and limitations	"I am quick to admit making a mistake"
Emotional loneliness	The degree of loneliness felt in everyday life	"There are people I feel close to"
Locus of control	The attribution of events to oneself or to others or chance	"Are some people just born lucky?"
Interpersonal Reactivity Index of Empathy (IRI)	Measures empathetic concern, and perspective-taking	"Before criticising somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place"
Victim Empathy Scale (VES)	Understanding how victim felt during sexual contact	"thinking about the person involved in your offence, do you think they felt safe in the situation?"
Children and Sex Questionnaire (KSQ)	A measure of cognitive distortions about children's sexuality	children desire sex with adults
NEO-Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI)	Measures the five personality dimensions of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness	
Maudsley Obsessive-Compulsive (MOCI)	Obsessive-compulsive behaviour	

Table 7.1 - Key measures in the SOAP.

perspective. But Egan et al (2005) argued that the obsessionality associated with factor I and the cognitive distortions of factor II trumped empathy, and underlie the individual's offending behaviour.

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8. PERPETRATOR STUDIES

8.1. PERPETRATORS

"Perpetrator Studies" has emerged as a discipline covering the humanities and social sciences with an interest in "perpetrators and perpetration of genocide, terrorism, and other forms of political mass violence" (Knittel and Goldberg 2019 p1). The different academic fields together "present a mosaic of the politics, ethics, aesthetics, and juridics of collective violence, the conditions for its emergence, the processes of its unfolding, and the long shadow of its aftermath" (Knittel and Goldberg 2019 p1). It is the inter- or cross-disciplinary nature of Perpetrator Studies that distinguishes it from past interest in perpetrators by specific disciplines.

The focus on the perpetrator, however, is not necessarily at the expense of the victim and bystander of collective violence because the "category of the perpetrator has proven to be perplexing and resistant to strict circumscription. Simplistic conceptions of perpetrators as evil or monstrous contrasted with ordinary victims and bystanders have proven inadequate and counterproductive. Ordinary people participate, often quite willingly, in the perpetration of mass atrocities, and it is clear that these subject positions exist on a spectrum and that specific individuals may occupy different and contradictory positions on that spectrum at different times and in different contexts" (Knittel and Goldberg 2019 p2) (appendix 8A) [5].

Seeking to expand the actors involved in political violence beyond victims, perpetrators, and bystanders, Rothberg (2019) introduced the term "the implicated subject". This is "an 'umbrella category' that refers to

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[5] Straus (2017) distinguished between direct and indirect perpetrators in genocide: "Perpetrators take part in violence against non-combatants. If they are direct, they kill; they maim; they torture; they incite violence; they order violence; they distribute weaponry. If they are indirect, they contribute to an institution or organisation that itself participates in violence; they make meals for people that go out and kill; they reveal the location of would-be targets; they steal or take advantage of victims" (p36).

indirect forms of participation in violence and thus
gathers subject positions such as the accomplice, the
beneficiary, the perpetuator, the spectator, etc.
Implicated subjects participate in 'histories and social
formations that generate the positions of victim and
perpetrator' [Rothberg 2019]" (Knittel and Forchieri 2020
p3) (appendix 8B).

The theoretical and conceptual framework of
Perpetrator Studies is the response to World War II, the
Nazis, and the Holocaust. "Although it goes without
saying that genocide, political violence, and mass
atrocity are fundamental features of human history in all
regions of the world, stretching back far beyond the
Twentieth Century, the Holocaust was a watershed in the
public and academic understanding of perpetrators and
perpetration" (Knittel and Goldberg 2019 p2). The
Nuremberg Trials after World War II introduced many
important terms and concepts like "the banality of evil",
"the desk perpetrator" ("Schreibtischtater"), and "the
Nuremberg defence" ("I was only following orders")
(Knittel and Goldberg 2019).

Introducing Perpetrator Studies, Knittel and
Goldberg (2019) described two over-riding categories of
interest for the discipline:

i) The object of study - "Who or what is a
perpetrator? Who decides? How is such a label applied and
by whom? How do such labels evolve? What are the means and
ends of perpetration? How do different societies conceive
of acts of political or mass violence?" (Knittel and
Goldberg 2019 p3). This category also includes the
motivation of the perpetrator, their responsibility and
agency, and prevention.

ii) How to study perpetrators? - This covers the
method, and theoretical and conceptual framework. "What
can we learn from studying perpetrators and perpetration
that cannot be learned by focusing on the victims of
genocide and mass violence, for example? What are the
ethical and moral implications of studying perpetrators?
How do ethical considerations influence the
methodological and theoretical criteria of the inquiry?
How can established and emerging theories, approaches,
and methodologies from the humanities and social sciences
be brought to bear on the study of perpetrators and,
conversely, what can a focus on perpetrators and
perpetration add to these theories and methodologies?"

(Knittel and Goldberg 2019 p3).

8.1.1. Reflections of a Researcher

Straus (2017) reflected on "the difficulties associated with studying perpetrators" (p28), with particular reference to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. He described his early interviews with imprisoned perpetrators where he expected "monsters" and found "ordinary in every demographic sense of the term" (p33). These points stood out to Straus (2017):

a) What is "actually knowable" from interviews with perpetrators? Straus (2017) noted: "Perpetrators 'self-fashion' in interviews and in court. As researchers, we know about social desirability bias and retrospective bias. We also know that genocides are crimes, and that perpetrators thus have an incentive to present themselves in the best possible light. And yet, even with those biases in mind, there remains something profoundly unsettling about their stories, about the fact that they killed other human beings, about the fact that they often committed these acts on multiple days and often in horrifying ways" (p29).
Straus (2017) accepted that the sample of perpetrators in prison may have been biased towards the less violent: "Presumably some of the worst perpetrators did not return to Rwanda after the invasion in the Congo, did not confess to their crimes, or were killed in revenge killings" (p34).
However, the reasons given for the behaviour included ideas like obedience, on the one hand, or "lost my mind" on the other. This led Straus (2017) to reflect: "I myself am not convinced that people can always know what they are doing. I have come to believe that there is something about the act of killing in genocide and mass violence that we do not understand and may not be able to understand, and I think that it is important to recognise that" (p36).

b) The unintended negative consequences of using the label "perpetrator". "Perpetrators are perpetrators when they commit an act of violence, but the act of violence is only one action in a broader repertoire of actions that individuals who commit violence actually carry out. During the period resulting in which we label them 'perpetrators', these individuals are also functionaries, fathers, mothers, sons, daughters, and friends, as well

as rescuers, helpers, hiders, and sometimes even victims. In a period of genocide or mass violence, individuals conduct themselves in a variety of ways. Using the label 'perpetrator' can blind us to that range of action, leading the analysis to focus only on the act of violence. In short, it can oversimplify" (Straus 2017 p29).

de Swaan (2015) has talked of "compartmentalisation" as a way that killers cope with their crimes and their everyday lives.

c) Concentrating on the individual perpetrators in situations of genocide can miss the wider factors like the behaviour of the elites who may have set the path towards extreme violence. There is "a certain disjuncture between elite decision-making and decision-making on the ground" (ie: between the macro-dynamics and micro-dynamics) (Straus 2017 p30).

Straus's (2017) experiences with Rwandan perpetrators led to the view that genocide/extreme mass violence "may happen through a process of escalation, which may be unforeseen even to those who set it in motion, rather than something that is all set up, planned in advance, and then implemented" (p34).

8.1.2. Perpetrator Testimony

The eyewitness to an event is considered important. The distinction is made between the third-party witness who is impartial and distant, and the victim or survivor witness. "The authority of the survivor witness is rooted in the fact that he or she has experienced an event first hand and completely" (Schmidt 2017 p87). There is also "perpetrator testimony" (Schmidt 2017).

The latter can be "deeply problematic". "Witnesses are endowed with moral authority. Thus, it seems morally highly problematic and even conceptually contradictory to attribute the capacity of bearing witness to the perpetrators, regardless of whether they were torturers or desktop murderers: the emphatic notion of testimony is, explicitly or implicitly, reserved for the victims" (Schmidt 2017 p87).

Schmidt (2017) reflected upon three aspects of perpetrator testimony:

i) Trust - "Testimony, of course, is always fallible, yet the risk that a perpetrator gives a false statement is even higher since he or she has a direct

motivation to make themselves appear in a more favourable light. Believing in and accepting a perpetrator's false testimony can result in (unintended) complicity: for instance, if the false report is accepted as a piece of historical evidence, it contributes to historical misrepresentation" (Schmidt 2017 p94).

Browning (2004) proposed four questions for historians to use with perpetrator testimony: "1. Is it in the speaker's interest to tell the truth? 2. Does the testimony show 'unusual attention to details of visual memory?' 3. Is the content of the testimony plausible, and are there any other sources that contradict the details? 4. Is it probable, that is to say, are there other sources which support it?" (Schmidt 2017 p95).

ii) Truth - The different types of testimony can offer different sorts of truth, and Schmidt (2017) distinguished between the external and internal truth of the testimony. The former is exemplified in the factual eyewitness in court (eg: "It was 4 pm when I saw the event"). Survivor testimonies, however, include external truth and "the internal truth of experience" (Schmidt 2017 p96).

Perpetrator testimony can include both types of truth, but in a different way to survivor testimony. Facts and experiences are reported, but often in an unemotional way which could be viewed as a third type of truth - "a negative variable — in other words, a specific lack or absence in their reports. While testimony is always selective, perpetrator testimony specifically requires one to reflect upon what is being said in light of what is being silenced" (Schmidt 2017 p98).

iii) Authority - Listening to survivor testimony is "an act of recognition" (Schmidt 2017) or "an act of empowerment" ("accreditation"; Ricoeur 2000 quoted in Schmidt 2017), which can help in healing the trauma.

Schmidt (2017) explained: "Accepting testimony is different from accepting a reason or a piece of evidence since it means to authorise and to give credit to the witness...[]... There is something disquieting about the accreditation of perpetrators, about giving them the opportunity to articulate their version of history and, above all, about accepting their epistemic authority." (p99). Put simply, giving the perpetrator testimony authority risks agreeing with their worldview, which includes dehumanising victims, for instance - "and thus victimising them twofold" (Schmidt 2017 p99). Schmidt (2017) emphasised that "if one decides to listen to the

perpetrators, they should not have the last word" (p101).

So, how to view perpetrator testimony? There is always something that can be learned from it, so not to dismiss it completely. But "the giving and receiving of testimony is a social practice" (Schmidt 2017 p101). The upshot is to be a "critical listener" (Schmidt 2017).

8.2. PARAMILITARISM

Dealing with the problem of "which groups are and are not paramilitaries", Ungor (2021) proposed a continuum of state involvement (figure 8.1) [6].

NO STATE INVOLVEMENT ———————————— **STATE INVOLVEMENT**

(1) "spontaneous bottom-up Initiatives" eg: local vigilantes, lynch mobs, self-defence groups

(2) "off-duty police/ army paid by businessmen or politicians - not institutionally supported but 'connected'"

(3) "covertly organised and supported armed groups whose affiliation with the state is denied and concealed in various degrees – such as death squads and proxy militias that are 'astroturfed' – surreptitiously supported but made to appear autonomous and grassroots"

(4) "officially sanctioned civil defence forces, irregular forces, and civil militias that function eg as auxiliaries in violent conflicts"

(5) "organised, top-down, professional paramilitary units of the state"

(Source: Ungor 2021 pp2 and 3)

Figure 8.1 - A continuum of paramilitaries and state involvement.

Ungor (2021) outlined some key problems with studying paramilitaries, including:

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[6] Ungor (2020) referred to "a nod and a wink" of complicity between the state and such groups.

i) How to define paramilitarism? Raleigh (2016) felt that research in this area "suffers from the politics of naming, leading to a proliferation of different terms to describe similar activities and functions" (quoted in Ungor 2021).

Ungor (2021), however, did not see this as a problem: "Conceptual proliferation simply attests to the fact that paramilitarism can emerge in different political and cultural contexts" (p4).

ii) How to study paramilitarism? "Paramilitarism is set up, through organisational ambiguity and plausible deniability, not to leave any political, physical, and legal traces in the state apparatus, neither in the present, and nor in the future. Studying the iceberg while only looking at the tip will reproduce the confusion, silence, and intrigue that is widespread in public perceptions and discussions on paramilitarism" (Ungor 2021 p4).

This calls for "unusual ethnographic methods including 'undercover' modes of approaching and interviewing respondents" (Ungor 2021 p5) (eg: Huggins's (2000) study of Brazilian death squads).

Hunt (2021) outlined they key areas to understand paramilitaries - "their involvement in illicit and licit economies, their relationship to state security forces, their training and level of professionalisation, their internal hierarchy and cohesion, and their ties to local communities" (p115).

Involvement in economic crime is common, including "forceful acquisition of property, particularly land and homes following forced displacement, extortion, racketeering, organised crime rings trafficking in illicit goods and activities, and corruption and clientelism, particularly in the distribution of limited state assets such as student housing and rationed foodstuffs" (Hunt 2021 p116). This involvement should be studied as "part of the continuum of violence", argued Hunt (2021 p117).

Self-enrichment is a fundamental part of the paramilitaries in many cases, but it is "essential to avoid reducing paramilitary forces to merely economic actors or conflating them with mafias or cartels" (Hunt 2021 p117).

Violence against women is one of the "varieties of different types of violence, enacted on different populations, for different purposes" (hunt 2021 p119).

Hunt (2021) quoted from Ortiz's (2004) book about her torture by US-trained paramilitaries in Guatemala: "She painfully describes the 111 cigarette burns she sustained on her back during her 'interrogation', being forced to drink urine and semen, gang rapes that left her pregnant and in need of an abortion, being suspended by her arms over a pit of mutilated children and adults, and being made to stab a woman to death. And yet there is one type of violence she endured that she cannot talk about: 'Dogs were used in my torture in a way that was too horrible to share with anyone. Even now I don't talk about that part of the torture'" (p119).

There is much to learn about paramilitaries, and Hunt (2021) gave some examples - "it is often unclear how low-level commandos are recruited and whether they are paid mercenaries invested in a salary, children who were forcefully conscripted, local residents drawn to power and the desire to settle petty debts or establish social hierarchies, zealots driven by ideological or identity-based animosity, or some combination thereof" (p116).

Understanding the demobilisation of paramilitaries and their reintegration into society is an area that needs further research. Some groups, though formally disbanded, can embed themselves in organised crime or security forces. Hunt (2021) hypothesised that "the more professional the paramilitary force, with hierarchical chains of command and effective internal discipline, the easier they would be to demobilise and reintegrate than disperse paramilitary forces; that paramilitary forces deeply imbedded in illicit economies and organised crime will be harder to demobilise than those unconnected to illicit economies; that international intervention and support to demobilise or continue fighting would weigh heavily and proportionally to the pressure exerted; and finally, that those motivated by personal status, power, and financial gain will be more difficult to successfully demobilise and reintegrate that those motivated primarily out of identitarian claims or disputes" (p121).

8.3. APPENDIX 8A - THE PERPETRATOR ERA AND ATROCITY-PRODUCING SITUATIONS

Morag (2018) described the 21st century as the "perpetrator era" as opposed to the "victim era" of the 20th century. Part of this change is that with "the last survivors of the Holocaust passing away, a new era marked by the end of the first generation's oral (face-to-face)

testimonial act is dawning" (Morag 2019 p14).

Another aspect is the complexity of "new war" (Morag 2019) (or counter-insurgency) [7], where perpetrators can also suffer mental health consequences as victims. Talking of US soldiers in Iraq shooting 24 unarmed civilians, Lifton (2006) stated: "The alleged crimes in Iraq, like My Lai [8], are examples of what I call an atrocity-producing situation – one so structured, psychologically and militarily, that ordinary people, men or women no better or worse than you or I, can commit atrocities. [...] This kind of atrocity-producing situation can exist [...] in some degree in all wars, including World War II, our last 'good war'. But a counterinsurgency war against a non-white population in a hostile setting, especially when driven by profound ideological distortions, is particularly prone to sustained atrocity — all the more so when it becomes an occupation" (quoted in Morag 2019).

While Crawford (2013) succinctly observed that soldiers "do horrible things when they are placed in horrible contexts" (quoted in Morag 2019).

Ungor and Isik (2021) observed: "Mass violence is not simply the plural of murder, in which one person grabs a weapon and kills another person. On the contrary, civil wars, massacres, and genocides are complex processes of explosive political forces..." (p3). These authors placed importance on the comparison of events. Ungor and Isik (2021) called this "juxtaposition", and described it as one of three approaches to mass violence research. The other two being "diachrony" and "transmission". Diachrony refers to the desire "to understand why mass violence occurred repeatedly within one society. The history of Germany in the first half of the twentieth century captures the imagination the most, with the Herero genocide, First World War, Armenian genocide, Second World War and the Holocaust all occurring in the time span of only 40 years" (Ungor and Isik 2021 p4).

Transmission "focuses on what political elites learned from each other during and after periods of crisis and violence" (Ungor and Isik 2021 p5). For example, Saddam Hussein was interested in Stalin, and "[I]t is plausible that partly because of this, Saddam

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[7] Morag (2019) stated that "new war, in its contemporary, multi-lateral, and multi-polar form, has been defined by various scholars as typified by radical transformations. The major traditional contrasts now in crisis are those of terror–war, front–home, civilian–soldier, defence–offence, beginning–end, victory–defeat, war–peace, and moral–immoral" (p16).

[8] The killing of many civilians at a village in Vietnam by US troops in 1968.

understood the importance of propaganda and ideology to
legitimise state violence" (Ungor and Isik 2021 p5).

8.4. APPENDIX 8B - IMPLICATED SUBJECT AND "#MeToo"

The approach of the "implicated subject" allows an
exploration of the "many intersectional grey zones of
responsibility" (van Rjiswijk 2020 p29), or between, what
Rothberg (2019) described as "those who have inherited or
who have been otherwise denigrated by histories of
victimization" and "those who have inherited or who have
otherwise benefited from histories of perpetration"
(quoted in van Rjiswijk 2020).
van Rjiswijk (2020) considered the "implicated
subject" in relation to her situation - "an Australian
non-Indigenous feminist, academic and lawyer working
through the questions raised by #MeToo in the context of
the ongoing colonial violence of Australian legal and
extra-legal life" (p29).

"MeToo" began in the USA in 2007 focused on the
experiences of adolescent Black women, but gained its
global fame with the hashtag "#MeToo" in 2017. The wider
fame has tended to be because of high-profile cases like
Harvey Weinstein (van Rjiswijk 2020).
The global "#MeToo" has been criticised for
"centering the experiences of white western women; and
for reifying white western women's subjectivity by
foregrounding self-disclosure as the primary means of
discursive agency. Academics and activists have also been
critical of parts of the #MeToo movement for its tendency
to advocate for harsher carceral punishments for sexual
violence, despite the disproportionate impact of this
state violence on Black and colonised groups. Asked
whether #MeToo is a white women's movement, Ashwini Tambe
[2018] says the answer is 'both yes and no'. The subject
matter of the movement - the injuries of sexual violence
and harassment - clearly go beyond the scope of white
women's problems; but in media coverage, Tambe [2018]
argues, 'it is certainly white women's pain that is
centred'" (van Rjiswijk 2020 p31).
Applying the concept of "implicated subject" to
"#MeToo", it "opens up a field of nuanced responsibility"
(van Rjiswijk 2020 p32). In the words of Rothberg (2019),
the "implicated subject" "both draws attention to
responsibilities for violence and injustice greater than
most of us want to embrace and shifts questions of
accountability from a discourse of guilt to a less

legally and emotionally charged terrain of historical and political responsibility" (quoted in van Rjiswijk 2020).

Continuing on: "'Implicated subjects... are morally compromised and most definitely attached – often without their conscious knowledge and in the absence of evil intent – to consequential political and economic dynamics' [Rothberg 2019] ... Implicated subjects occupy positions of privilege and relative power but are not direct agents of harm; neither do they intend evil" (van Rjiswijk 2020 p32). Being implicated is different to complicity, where an individual is "an accomplice... in an evil action" (Rothberg 2019 quoted in van Rjiswijk 2020).

In Australia it is estimated that Indigenous women are twelve times more likely to be victims of sexual violence than non-Indigenous women (McCalman et al 2014). "A number of factors have led to this appalling statistic, including systemic racism and poverty, and the understandable unwillingness of Indigenous women to access state services, including the police, because of the wider state violence towards Indigenous people. These colonial histories are not brought out by the individual call-and-response approach of much of #MeToo, but require attention to specific structures and histories of power in Australian political and legal life – to processes that have combined, at their limits, to criminalise, impoverish, and kill Aboriginal women" (van Rjiswijk 2020 p34).

van Rjiswijk (2020) argued for "#MeToo" to "do more work... in explicating the role of state violence in shaping sexual violence against Indigenous women" (p33) [9].

Non-Indigenous people are "implicated subjects" here. van Rjiswijk (2020) ended: "Sexual violence is in fact structurally connected to state practices of incarceration and punishment, to poverty, abuse of the rule of law, and to colonial histories of forced assimilation. As lawyers and legal theorists, we are implicated subjects in the habits that have brought law to this point. We need to bring out these implicated histories in law to reframe #MeToo in colonial contexts" (p38).

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[9] "State violence is defined broadly to include everything from obvious state harms such as direct police violence and genocide, to the provision or withdrawal of social services, and the covert use of new technologies of citizen surveillance" (van Rjiswijk 2020 p33).

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9. SPITEFUL VS PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

9.1. Spiteful behaviour
9.2. The opposite: Pro-social behaviour
9.3. Appendix 9A - Measurement of spitefulness
9.4. Appendix 9B - Laboratory games
9.5. References

9.1. SPITEFUL BEHAVIOUR

Spiteful behaviour is "harming another at some cost to yourself" (McCarthy-Jones 2021 p40), like buying a company at a financial loss in order to fire the disliked staff (appendix 9A). In everyday cases, "anthropologists find that good hunters sometimes get criticised when they catch large shareable game..., and workers in organisations are sometimes criticised for working harder than others" (Pleasant and Barclay 2018 p868).

McCarthy-Jones (2021) observed that "[A]s a psychological game where no one wins, spite is puzzling: we may wonder why it wasn't weeded out by evolution long ago" (p40).

Spite has been observed in the controlled situation of the "Ultimatum Game" (UG) (appendix 9B). This involves two players, and one player (the proposer) is given a sum of money to share between them as the proposer wishes. But if the other player (the receiver) refuses the offer, neither player gets anything. Receivers often reject offers of 20% or less (eg: Guth et al 1982) [10]. It was suggested that "spite evolved to make unfair people behave better" (McCarthy-Jones 2021 p41) (ie: to encourage co-operation).

The punishment of non-co-operators is called "moralistic punishment", while the punishment of highly co-operative individuals is "anti-social punishment" (Pleasant and Barclay 2018). In experiments, about one-fifth of all punishment is anti-social. For example, when the lowest co-operators target the highest co-operators, this might be "retaliation by low co-operators against whom they think punished them or might do so in the future" (Pleasant and Barclay 2018 p869) (the deterrence approach).

The two types of punishment are against norm violators according to normative conformity theory (Pleasant and Barclay 2018).

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[10] Pillutla and Murnigham (1996), for instance, found that one-third of participants rejected an offer of 2 points when the donor had 20 points to share.

An alternative explanation is linked to dominance hierarchies in social species, and that spite "may have its roots in the desire to get ahead of others (dominance) and to stop others getting ahead of you (counter-dominance)" (McCarthy-Jones 2021 p41). This has been linked to "do-gooder derogation" (Minson and Monin 2012). For example, in a sharing game, some players were happy to pay to penalise generous donors (eg: Herrmann et al 2008).

Barclay (2013) proposed a "biological markets theory" to explain anti-social punishment and do-gooder derogation. According to this theory, "organisms can choose partners for co-operative interactions. The best partners are those who are most able, willing, and available to provide benefits in co-operative interactions... This usually leads to organisms outbidding each other in order to be chosen as partners..., for example, by engaging in competitive helping or competitive altruism to attract social partners" (Pleasant and Barclay 2018 p869). Another way to make the self look better is to attack "high-value" individuals (the fitness-levelling approach).

Pleasant and Barclay (2018) tested this idea in an experiment with 117 Canadian psychology students. The participants played the public-goods game (PGG) in groups of four. Each player was given ten points and they could put as much as they wanted into a common fund. The total of the common fund was doubled by the experimenters and redistributed to all players. After each round, a player could pay to punish another player (ie: they reduced their earnings and that of the other player). Five rounds were played. This was the standard or control condition.

In the "markets condition", players were told that there was an observer who would select the most co-operative player for a future game. This created a situation of "competitive altruism". It was predicted that anti-social punishment would be used in this condition more than the control condition.

Anti-social punishment was significantly higher in the markets condition than the control condition. Note that anti-social punishment was categorised as punishing players who put more into the common fund than the punisher, while moralistic punishment, which did not vary between conditions, was punishing players who gave less to the common fund.

This study used "laboratory games to assess co-operation and anti-social punishment instead of real-world behaviour. However, such games are commonly used as models of real-world phenomena, with the monetary

incentives representing the real-world costs and benefits of helping or harming others" (Pleasant and Barclay 2018 p874).

9.2. THE OPPOSITE: PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

Van Lange et al (1997) provided evidence that "social value orientation" (SVO) in adulthood is rooted in social interactions in childhood and adolescence. SVO refers to "distinct ways in which outcomes for self and others are evaluated, some of which represent broader considerations that extend and complement the pursuit of immediate self-interest (eg: pro-social and competitive motivation)" (Van Lange et al 1997 p734).

The evidence comes from four studies. Study 1 was the investigation of SVO and attachment styles with 573 individuals at a university in Amsterdam. Participants played a sharing (or decomposed) game where they were offered 3 options:

- A - 480 points for self and 80 points for other
- B - 540 points for self and 280 points for other
- C - 480 points for self and 480 points for other

The choice of option was the measure of SVO - A (competitive - because it has the largest difference between self and other), B (individualistic - because it gives the largest gain to self), and C (pro-social - because there is an equal amount to self and other).

Based on choice, participants were divided into three groups and their attachment style was measured based on a series of questions about their adult relationships (eg: "I am nervous when anyone gets close"; "I find it easy to trust others").

Pro-social SVO was associated with a secure attachment (as opposed to avoidant or anxious-ambivalent attachments) more than the other two types.

This finding was confirmed in Study 2 with 136 more Dutch participants. Attachment was measured by a description rather than a series of questions. For example: "I find it relatively easy to share intimate feelings and experiences with my partner and am comfortable to be dependent on one another. I don't often worry that my partner abandons me, or that my partner wants to share loo intimate feelings and experiences, (secure attachment)" (Van Lange et al 1997 p737).

Though both these studies measured adult attachment style, attachment was "explicitly assumed to be developed

by early childhood experiences with the primary caregiver" (Van Lange et al 1997 p738). However, interactions with siblings can also influence attachment, and this was covered in Study 3 with 631 Dutch individuals. Pro-social individuals had more siblings (mean 2.03) than individualistic (mean 1.56) and competitive (mean 1.71) individuals.

The final study investigated SVO across the lifespan with 1728 Dutch adults (mean age 45.7 years). Pro-social SVO increased in older adults while the other two types declined. This suggested that "differences in social value orientation are further shaped by different interaction experiences that are characteristic of early adulthood, middle adulthood, and old age" (Van Lange et al 1997 p743). The researchers also warned that "because pro-social orientation systematically increases with age, studies with participants who have not yet reached middle adulthood might lead researchers to draw conclusions about the selfishness of human nature that are not entirely justified" (Van Lange et al 1997 p744).

The focus of the research was pro-social SVO, but it could be extrapolated that the opposite types develop from poor attachment experiences in childhood and adolescent.

9.2.1. Oxytocin

Martins et al (2022) observed that "[W]hile debate persists about the intrinsic motives that guide us towards behaving pro-socially, there is consensus that, in order to help, we must be able to learn the impact our actions have on others" (p1). Reinforcement learning theory is an explanation here (Martins et al 2022).

Though "humans rely on the same reinforcement learning algorithms when learning to benefit themselves (self-oriented learning)... and others (pro-social learning). Yet these algorithms are implemented by distinct circuits in the brain and have different influences on behaviour" (Martins et al 2022). Oxytocin plays a role in the latter (Martins et al 2022).

Martins et al (2022) injected three different doses of oxytocin or a placebo into twenty-four healthy male volunteers before they played a guessing game. The participants were offered two symbols, one having a higher probability of leading to reward, and a choice was made. The participants had to learn through trial and error which symbol was more likely to lead to a reward.

In the placebo condition, participants were more

likely to choose the symbol leading to reward when the reward went to themselves rather than to a briefly-met stranger. This confirmed the bias towards self-oriented learning. In the oxytocin conditions participants showed no difference when the reward went to themselves or the stranger.

Understanding the neurobiology of oxytocin tends to involve studies focusing on specific brain areas. But, as Putnam and Chang (2022) pointed out, "[I]n the brain, no single region or neuromodulator is an island, entire of itself, and although the practical considerations of laboratory experiments present limits on what any single experiment can address, studying the manipulations of oxytocin in isolation may lead to an incomplete or incorrect understanding" (p1).

Putnam and Chang (2022) outlined five areas of research on oxytocin that need further work and clarification:

i) How oxytocin modulates social cognition.

ii) The effects of oxytocin treatment and the context of use.

iii) How oxytocin impacts social behaviours in terms of neurobiology.

iv) How life experiences effect oxytocin's impact on behaviour.

v) A single overarching theory to explain oxytocin's impact on behaviour.

9.3. APPENDIX 9A - MEASUREMENT OF SPITEFULNESS

Spitefulness has not appeared much in psychology historically, not "directly represented" in the major personality theories, and only mentioned in relation to Oppositional Defiant Disorder in DSM-5 (Marcus et al 2014).
Yet spitefulness in the form of the willingness to "cut off one's nose to spite one's face" is evident in everyday life. Marcus et al (2014) suspected that "a primary reason why spitefulness has not received attention within the psychological literature is because there has been no instrument to measure this trait"

(p565). These researchers set out to rectify this problem with the "Spitefulness Scale".

Thirty-one situations where a person may behave spitefully were created and presented to three samples, along with various measures of negative personality traits like narcissism and aggressiveness. The samples were 556 US undergraduates from one university and 390 from another, and 297 Amazon Mechanical Turk users. Seventeen items remained after data analysis (table 9.1). These distinguished most effectively between respondents.

High scorers on the Spitefulness Scale were also high scorers on measures of aggressiveness, psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism, but low scorers on guilt-proneness, and agreeableness, for instance.

- It might be worth risking my reputation in order to spread gossip about someone I did not like.

- If I had the opportunity, then I would gladly pay a small sum of money to see a classmate who I do not like fail his or her final exam.

- I would be willing to take a punch if it meant that someone I did not like would receive two punches.

- Part of me enjoys seeing the people I do not like fail even if their failure hurts me in some way.

(Source: Marcus et al 2014 appendix)

Table 9.1 - Example of final items in Spitefulness Scale.

9.4. APPENDIX 9B - LABORATORY GAMES

In the "Dictator Game" one player (the decider) in the pair can share an endowment with the other player who has no say (the recipient), while the "Joy-of-Destruction Game" allows the decider to reduce the other player's endowment.

Using these two games with 167 students in Australia, Zhang and Ortmann (2013) found that "participants tend to be selfish but nonetheless make choices that increase social welfare when given the opportunity" (p1) (table 9.2). For example, the amount of money that could be given or taken influenced the decisions, while allowing players the option to reduce money at the same time as giving changed the decisions.

Behaviour	Dictator Game	Joy-of-Destruction Game
Status quo	Gave 0	Reduced 0
Pro-social	Gave >0	Reduced 0
Anti-social	Gave 0	Reduced >0
inconsistent	Gave >0	Reduced >0

Table 9.2 - Possible behaviours by participants in Zhang and Ortmann's (2013) experiments.

Another laboratory game is the two-player "theft game" (eg: Bone and Raihani 2015). One player (thief) is able to cheat by stealing from the other player (responder) after a sharing of an endowment has been agreed. The responder can choose to pay to reduce the thief's money. Studies using this game have found that punishment was motivated by both revenge and inequity aversion (the desire to increase their pay-off relative to the other player) (Deutchman et al 2021).

But the motivation for punishment depends on the conditions of the laboratory games as shown by Deutchman et al (2021). They recruited nearly 2500 participants from Amazon's Mechanical Turk to play an online version of the theft game. Being online the researchers could control the behaviour of the thief (ie: there was only one real player).

The responder (real player) was told that the partner (thief) had decided to steal from them ("Take condition") or give them extra ("Augment condition"). The responder could then decide to pay to reduce the partner's money.

Not surprisingly, responders were more likely to punish in the Take condition (ie: punishment as revenge). But punishment also occurred sometimes in the Augment condition when the difference between each player's share of the endowment was large (ie: punishment as inequity aversion). Overall, punishment was motivated mostly by revenge, but the researchers argued that "punishment is a behaviour that is sensitive to many, often competing concerns" (Deutchman et al 2021)(eg: how the punishment is perceived by others; expectations of the other player's sharing behaviour).

The study used very small amounts of money - an endowment of 50 cents and the theft of 5 cents, for example. Other studies have suggested that the amount of money does not influence the decisions made (Deutchman et al 2021).

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10. CRIME DURING COVID

10.1. FLY-TIPPING IN ENGLAND

Disruption and closure of waste services during lockdown in 2020 were reported in the media to have led to "fly-tipping" (illegal waste dumping) in the UK. Dixon et al (2022) investigated whether this was the case using local authority (LA) data in England on fly-tipping incidents from 1st January 2017 to 31st July 2020.

During the national lockdown in 2020, the number of illegal dumpings declined in March and April (ie: around 16-18% below expected monthly levels), but showed a resurgence in June (ie: 21% above expected level). Illegal dumping was higher in urban than rural areas.

The initial decline in dumping was unexpected. Dixon et al (2022) offered this explanation: "Most shops, services, cafes, and other businesses which concentrate in urban areas, were closed during lockdown. This would have reduced the volume of business waste material needing disposal, meaning fewer rewards from fly-tipping. Most household-level collections of perishable food waste continued during lockdown, so households would not have needed to fly-tip such waste. In addition, it is reasonable to expect there was increased actual and perceived natural surveillance in more densely populated urban areas" (p8). The subsequent increase when lockdown was relaxed in June was "likely to be a form of temporal displacement as fly-tippers cleared the backlog" (Dixon et al 2022 p9).

Data were provided to the researchers by just over half of LAs. "Potential sources of error in recorded fly-tipping data are similar to those for police recorded crime data... In particular, not all fly-tipping incidents are reported and, of those reported, not all are recorded" (Dixon et al 2022 p5). Furthermore, "duplicate records, errors in the recording of size, type and location of incident, and lack of standardisation of terms, are potentially sources of error" (Dixon et al 2022 p5). The number of incidents was the measure, which ignored other aspects like quality, and type of waste (eg: clinical).

"Aspects of recording practice are also known to

differ between authorities. For example, there is known variation in how 'side waste' is recorded. 'Side waste' is that which is placed alongside a lawful waste repository but not in the correct manner, such as waste from a residential collection that exceeds the maximum quantity permitted. Side waste was recorded by some LAs as fly-tipping but not recorded at all by others" (Dixon et al 2022 p5).

On the positive side, data were available for before the pandemic, which allowed the calculation of trends and monthly averages.

10.2. ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR IN ENGLAND AND WALES

Fly-tipping can be classed as a form of anti-social behaviour (ASB). A basic picture emerged that official recorded ASB increased sharply in England and Wales in 2020 and in the first quarter of 2021 (ie: more than double the expected level), but the Telephone Crime Survey for England and Wales (TCSEW) suggested a modest increase only (Halford et al 2022).

Leaving aside breaches of covid regulations, "traditional" ASB includes vandalism, graffiti, "noisy neighbours", public drunkenness, and littering (including fly-tipping), for instance.

Halford et al (2022) explored the data in more detail. Police-reported ASB data are publicly available as monthly counts, and it was possible to plot expected levels (using March 2015 to January 2020 as the baseline). Halford et al (2022) also surveyed each of 43 territorial police forces in England and Wales about their inclusion of breaches of covid-regulations in their ASB records. Artificial intelligence (in the form of natural language processing; NLP) was used to analyse the incident logs of the police forces from 1st January 2020 to 31st January 2021 (table 10.1).

1st national stay-at-home	26th March 2020 - end of June 2020 (though some restrictions loosened in May)
2nd	4th November 2020 - 2nd December 2020 (less strict than 1st lockdown)
3rd	6th January 2021 - 12th April 2021 (schools reopened 8th March)

Table 10.1 - Key lockdown dates in the UK.

Overall: "In the first national lockdown, there was a doubling of recorded ASB which then declined. It remained statistically significantly above expected levels through the first quarter of 2021 but with localised maximums. Across summer 2020, ASB remained around 25 percent above expected levels but rose to 50 percent above during second lockdown, and 75 percent above during third lockdown" (Halford et al 2022 p6). More than half of the 37 police forces that responded to the survey included covid-regulation breaches as ASB. After analysis of these responses with NLP to understand policing policies, Halford et al (2022) felt that traditional ASB was closer to expected levels throughout the lockdowns. In the main, covid-regulation breaches accounted for much of the official increases in ASB figures.

Finding of closer levels of ASB to expected was more consistent with the TCSEW. In summary: "The sharp increase in recorded ASB in first lockdown was primarily due to breaches of covid-regulations that were recorded as ASB. Around half of the increase also involved some form of traditional ASB" (Halford et al 2022 p11).

10.3. VIOLENCE IN NEW YORK CITY

What was the impact of covid-19 lockdowns on crime? For example, concentrating on one city, Koppel et al (2022) found a decrease in residential burglary, assault, rape, and robbery, but an increase in non-residential burglary, and motor vehicle theft during the "shelter-in-place" period in New York City (March-June 2020) [11]. Note that protests around the killing of George Floyd began in late May 2020 (Wolff et al 2022) [12].

Wolff et al (2022) focused on violence (assaults and shootings) in New York City. Data were taken from New York's open data portal of shootings for the period 1st January 2006 to 30th September 2021 (n = 4446 incidents) [13], and New York Police Department public data on assaults (1st January 2019 to 30th September 2021). Confounding variables included daily temperature, covid-19 rates and restrictions, and policing policy (eg: rates of arrest).

Overall, the number of positive covid-19 cases was

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[11] Overall, the data covered 2017 to 2020, and eight crime types.

[12] Key dates: "NYC Pause" ("shelter-in-place") 22nd March - 8th June 2020; Second Wave Indoor Dining Restrictions 14th December 2020 - 11th February 2021; George Floyd 25th May 2020 (Wolff et al 2022).

[13] See https://opendata.cityofnewyork.us/.

significantly negatively associated with number of shooting incidents, but unrelated to number of assaults, while lockdown negatively associated with both shootings and assaults. But "both shootings and assaults increased in the aftermath of the murder of George Floyd and the social and racial justice protests that followed" (Wolff et al 2022 p10). There were some differences between the five boroughs (Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, Queens, and Staten Island) of the city (eg: shootings decreased in Staten Island after George Floyd's murder).

Two methodological points need to be noted about this study:

a) The use of open/public data sources.

b) The focus on the incidence of two forms of serious violence only.

The "routine activity theory" (RAT) (eg: Cohen and Felson 1979), which sees crime as based on day-to-day routines, predicts that lockdowns mean less opportunity for crimes in public settings (eg: attacks on the person), and burglary at residential locations (as people stay at home), but more opportunities in unguarded places (eg: non-residential property). But domestic violence, which would increase with staying at home, according to RAT (Koppel et al 2022).

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11. MENTAL HEALTH VS CRIME

11.1. COMMUNITY RESPONSE

"Police often serve as first responders to emergency calls involving non-violent individuals in mental health distress or suffering from alcohol or drug abuse" (Dee and Pyne 2022 p1) (appendix 11A). This can be seen as an inappropriate use of police resources, and as a negative experience for distressed individuals. In the USA, in particular, three alternatives have been tried - the training of specialist police officers ("crisis intervention team" (CIT) approach), professional mental health practitioners working with the police ("con-response" model), or "Community Responders" (ie: mental health specialists respond before the police) (Dee and Pyne 2022).

In terms of research on CIT and co-response model, these have "beneficial effects by reducing arrests and detention rates, but evidence is mixed on whether these programmes are cost-effective. However, the research designs used in these studies (eg: case notes, qualitative and descriptive studies, before/after comparisons, and cross-sectional comparisons) generally do not support credible causal inference" (Dee and Pyne 2022 p1).

Dee and Pyne (2022) reported an evaluation of a community responders programme in Denver, Colorado, called the "Support Team Assistance Response" (STAR) programme. This involves mobile crisis response teams of a mental health clinician and a paramedic who provide rapid support to individuals in crisis, and they decide if subsequent police involvement is required. A six-month pilot study began on 1st June 2020 in selected police precincts.

Data were compared for the six months before STAR began, and its first six months, and between police precincts with and without the programme. The study used a "difference in differences" quasi-experimental design. It is assumed that the comparison period and the precincts are similar to the intervention time and precincts. There is always the possibility of confounders that are not controlled.

It was found that less serious reported crimes (eg: public disorder; trespass) declined by 34% with the programme, but more serious crimes did not change. So, the study suggested that "the STAR community response program was effective in reducing police-reported criminal offences (ie: both reducing the designation of individuals in crisis as criminal offenders and reducing the actual level of crime)" (Dee and Pyne 2022 p6).

11.2. APPENDIX 11A - LAY THEORIES OF MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS

Secondary to mental health problems themselves is how sufferers and others think about mental health, what is known as "lay theories". For example, believing that the problems are changeable, fixed, or manageable.

"An incremental lay theory (or growth mindset) refers to attributes considered to be malleable and capable of change through personal effort, whereas an entity lay theory (or fixed mindset) refers to attributes considered to be immutable (eg: due to genetics) and therefore incapable of being changed" (Erb and Busseri 2022 p300). Depending on the view taken, individuals will vary in their motivation to perform health-promoting behaviours, while others will vary in their motivation to help.

Both theories can have a "double-edged sword effect" (Hoyt and Burnett 2020). In the case of obesity, say, the individual is motivated to behaviour to reduce weight (positive side), but a negative attitude from others towards individuals who do not succeed. "Additionally, those who hold more incremental (changeable) beliefs may be initially more optimistic about the success of promises/attempts to make change, but are also more likely to attribute an individual's failure to change to a lack of effort" (Erb and Busseri 2022 p302).

With an entity theory, individuals may feel no motivation to change their behaviour because the problems are determined by genetics, say (and pessimistic about recovery), but experience less feelings of personal responsibility for the problems (Erb and Busseri 2022).

Burnette et al (2019), for example, attempted to take the best of both theories with "a compensatory-growth mindset of addiction in order to promote beliefs in the possibility of personal change through personal effort without heightening the blame generally associated with an incremental (changeable) lay theory" (Erb and Busseri 2022 p302). Burnette et al (2019) randomly

assigned participants to receive compensatory-growth or disease-fixed information, and found that the former led to more positive attitudes towards the problems.

Lebowitz and Ahn (2015) promoted a similar idea, "malleability intervention", with depression. This emphasised "the malleability of gene effects and brain chemistry in the biology of depression. The malleability intervention (vs control) reduced prognostic pessimism and hopelessness, and increased feelings of agency in symptomatic individuals" (Erb and Busseri 2022 p303).

Erb and Busseri (2022) investigated the double-edged sword effect in two experiments.

Study 1

This online study tested the hypothesis that "the incremental (changeable) condition would result in greater blame and more stigma toward those with mental health problems, and yet also greater willingness to help, as well as greater perceived likelihood of success than the entity (fixed) condition" (Erb and Busseri 2022 pp304-305). A total of 571 US adults were recruited via Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk), and were randomly assigned to one of four conditions - (i) manageable condition, (ii) incremental (changeable) lay theory condition, (iii) entity (fixed) lay theory condition, and (iv) control condition.

Participants read a short "scientific article" about mental health problems that either emphasised their manageability, changeability, or fixed nature (or no article in the control condition). Then a series of questions were asked covering responsibility for the problems, blame, stigma, willingness to help, and likelihood of treatment success.

The findings supported the hypothesis in the main - ie: participants in the incremental condition scored higher on likelihood of success, but also on responsibility and blame than the entity condition. "Contrary to predictions, the incremental (changeable) and entity (fixed) conditions did not differ significantly in stigma or willingness to help" (Erb and Busseri 2022 p308).

Study 2

This was a replication of Study 1 (with some minor changes) with 718 more participants. The small changes

included the control group reading an article (about gardening), more questions on perceived manageability, and a modification of items on blame, and willingness to help. Results similar to Study 1 were found (figure 11.1).

(Data from tables 1 and 2 Erb and Busseri 2022)

Figure 11.1 - Mean scores on three measures in two conditions of Study 1 and 2.

Both studies showed the double-edged sword effect of the incremental and fixed lay theories of mental health problems.
These studies used the materials from Burnette et al (2019), but included control conditions which Burnette et al (2019) did not.
Erb and Busseri (2022) accepted that "it is unclear whether the manipulations we employed resulted in any lasting changes in participants' ways of thinking about mental health or their treatment of those with mental health problems. Further, given our focus on how individuals view others with mental health problems, we did not assess participants' personal experiences with mental health and thus we were not able to determine how such experiences might influence the effect of the manipulation" (p319).

Gender, age, and ethnicity were variables not tested.

The drop-out rate was high. In Study 1, 907 participants initially consented to participate and 571 completed, while the figures were 1200 and 718 respectively in Study 2 (Erb and Busseri 2022).

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12. MOTORCYCLE DEATHS IN NORTHERN ITALY

World Health Organisation (WHO) data show that over one million road traffic deaths occur globally each year, and proportionally the risk is greater for older teenagers/young adults, and individuals in developing countries (Lusetti et al 2022). Riders of two-wheeled vehicles are also vulnerable (eg: 20% of traffic fatalities in the UK in the 21st century; Lusetti et al 2022).

"Road traffic accidents, including those involving two-wheeled vehicles, are among the so-called major traumas. This term is used to define injury patterns originating from complex dynamics related to the transmission of an energy of high intensity (ie: road traffic accident, precipitation, explosion deaths) and characterised by multiple, widespread and multi-form lesions (abrasions, contusions, lacerations, incised wounds, burns). In accidents involving two-wheeled vehicles, these complex injuries result from the complex dynamics of the crashes and the impact with other vehicles, the road surface, road barriers or parts of the two-wheeled vehicle itself (handlebars, brakes, levers etc)" (Lusetti et al 2022 p2).

Lusetti et al (2022) analysed data on road accident deaths involving mopeds or motorcycles in Parma, Placenza, and Reggio Emilia (Emilia Romagna region) in Italy between 1989 and 2019 (n = 350 cases). Around 60% of the cases involved motorcycles, and overall less than two-thirds of the victims wore a helmet. Over 90% of riders were male.

Lusetti et al (2022) summed up: "Fatal moped/motorcycle accidents that took place in the North of Emilia Romagna concerned people around 40 years of age and they occurred predominantly in the summer, during the daytime and at weekends, and mostly in extra-urban roads. Our results are in line with other studies and confirm that motorcycle accidents are sustained by young men in their working prime" (p4).

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13. ILLICIT DRUG USE IN BEIJING

Illicit drug use is a problem worldwide, but since the 1980s "the phenomenon of drug abuse has become increasingly serious in China" (Li et al 2022 p1). Establishing exact numbers is difficult, but official figures reported 427 000 drug addicts in China in 2020 (Li et al 2022).

One method is the analysis of biological specimens (blood, urine, and hair). Li et al (2022) analysed such data from suspected drug users in Beijing from 2018 to 2020 (n = 11 903 specimens).

There was a sharp increase in cases from 2018 to 2019 (by 69%), and a decrease in 2020 (by 25%). "A major reason for the increase of drug abuse cases is thought to be the increasing amount of synthetic drugs and their low price" (Li et al 2022 p2). The subsequent decrease was thought to be due to the effects of covid-19 and the government restrictions on people moving around.

Over 85% of cases involved males, and younger adults were the main age group (ie: up to 40 years old). The most common drug used was amphetamines, followed by opioids.

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14. CRIMINAL LONGEVITY AND SERIAL MURDERERS

14.1. Criminal achievement
14.2. Appendix 14A - Overkilling
14.3. References

14.1. CRIMINAL ACHIEVEMENT

The concept of "criminal achievement" describes the length of time that an individual commits a series of crimes before arrest. This can be applied to serial murderers. There are three groups of factors that influence the longevity of the criminal (Chai et al 2022):

a) Offender characteristics - eg: pre-meditation (ie: planning).

b) Victim characteristics - eg: police tend to be vigorous in their efforts for some victims over others. This has been called "victim preferencing" (Beauregard and Martineau 2014), and sex workers, the homeless, and runaways are examples of victims less likely to be on the police priority list (Chai et al 2022).

c) Crime characteristics - eg: situational factors like degraded evidence, and level of investigative expertise.

In a study of serial murderer's homicides, Campedelli and Yaksic (2022) found that "young female serial murderers who had prior criminal histories, who killed alone, targeted both sexes, used multiple killing methods, and who killed in more than one state, were more likely to have a longer career" (Chai et al 2022 p3). But this study was "limited in that it included spree killers and only US-based offenders operating without a partner" (Chai et al 2022 p3).

In a wider ranging study, Chai et al (2022) analysed data from 56 countries on the "Consolidated Serial Homicide Offender Database" (CSHOD). The database uses many sources, from scholarly journal articles, court and prison records, to "true crime" books. Chai et al (2022) focused on serial murder with three or more victims, that occurred in at least two separate events over a period longer than fourteen days (n = 1258 series). The outcome variable was "criminal longevity", defined as the number

of days from the first murder to the last murder before
arrest (mean: 2026 days). Predictor variables were scored
from three categories - offender characteristics (eg:
previous time incarcerated; previous murders before
series), crime parameters (eg: motivations; presence of a
"killing partner"), and crime-commission process
characteristics (eg: planning; evidence of overkill;
appendix 14A).

         Certain variables were associated with a longer
duration of the series of murders, including ethnicity of
the offender (White and Hispanic), prior incarceration,
the use of varied methods of killing or atypical ones,
choice of victims from ethnic minority backgrounds and/or
"marginalised" individuals. Two findings were surprising
- attempting to conceal the body led to shorter duration,
and the researchers found "no association between
planning and the duration of the homicide series" (Chai
et al 2022 p7).

         There are a number of methodological issues to
consider with this study, including:

         i) The dataset "lacked information pertaining to
'luck', which includes situational circumstances such as
degraded evidence, improper police practices, and poor or
lack of investigator's skills. Several studies have
identified luck as being a crucial factor in determining
whether the offender is able to escape detection" (Chai
et al 2022 p8). The researchers admitted that
operationalising such concepts would be difficult.

         ii) Some information could only be ascertained by
interviews with investigators or offenders themselves.
This study was based on secondary data in the CSHOD. The
database is designed to be comprehensive, and efforts are
made to achieve this end. "The validity of the data is
maintained by consistent cross-checks of old and new
information against daily Internet searches for the terms
'serial killer', 'serial homicide', and 'serial murder'.
Any new additions to the database are scrutinised by at
least two coders and measured against at least two
independent sources. Data are only input into the
database after approval by the co-ordinator" (Chai et al
2022 p3). Chai et al (2022), however, excluded an extra
1797 cases for missing information.

         iii) Uncontrolled or unmeasurable variables, like
interruption of series of murders by incarceration for
other offences, and non-criminal factors (eg: marriage,

child). Also the interaction of measured variables was not assessed.

iv) The data were drawn from 56 countries, but "it is still not clear how homicide cases were prioritised according to which criteria for each country in the sample. Investigative practices may also vary between police agencies in different countries, which could influence the crime solving and consequently the series duration" (Chai et al 2022 p9).

v) The cases covered 1948 to 2016, and investigative techniques and forensic services have developed during that period. However, nearly half the cases occurred since 1990.

vi) The data were based on known cases, and "it can be challenging to know if offenders are responsible for additional homicides that are unknown to police simply given the furtive nature of homicide and their efforts which are designed to conceal their actions" (Chai et al 2022 p9). Also attempted homicides were not included.

vii) The decisions made by the researchers, and the operationalisation of concepts. The inclusion of cases with three or more victims, whereas the FBI defined serial murder as two or more victims, and the exclusion of serial murders by "large organisations" (eg: criminal organisations; gangs), for instance.
Operationalisation refers to the process of defining concepts in a way that can be measured. For example, "evidence of overkill" was operationalised as "at least 15 crushing (eg: as with blunt trauma) or penetrating wounds (eg: as with stab wounds or gunshot wounds)" (Chai et al 2022 p4). The motivation(s) was divided into five non-exclusive categories - financial, enjoyment, anger, rape, and "other". "'Other' encapsulates attention (ie: to garner fame by way of the news or entertainment media or impress others with their prowess), avoid arrest (ie: to escape apprehension), torture (ie: to bring about pain and suffering), and mental illness (ie: a by-product of a disease or defect)" (Chai et al 2022 p4). Difference definitions and categories could change the numbers. Also motivation(s) depended on offender statements and/or media reports, usually after arrest.

viii) The concept of criminal longevity can be problematic "because serial murderers have the advantage of being in control of many variables related to their

crimes, police often do not connect their homicides until later in the series. This benefits offenders by providing what can amount to significant lead time, but this translates into a somewhat artificial extension of their longevity. Because the police were usually not aware of the early stages of the serial murderer's activities, those offenders did not have to work as hard to avoid apprehension in those circumstances" (Chai et al 2022 p9).

ix) The study provided law enforcement with information that could aid them. For example, prior experience with the criminal justice system was associated with a longer series, so "when a murder series has been identified, the first potential pool of suspects should be focused on those who had already been under police radar such as criminal and prison records, or information from crime linkage databases such as the Violent Criminal Apprehension Programme [in the USA]" (Chai et al 2022 p10).

14.2. APPENDIX 14A - OVERKILLING

"Overkilling" can be defined as "a specific type of homicide which characterises itself as exaggerated due to the number of injuries the victim has sustained" (Kopacz et al 2022 p1). But the practical cut-off of when injuries become overkill is unclear (eg: 3 wounds vs >17 in different studies) (Kopacz et al 2022).
Approximately 14% of homicides have been estimated as overkillings (Kopacz et al 2022).

Kopacz et al (2022) analysed retrospective autopsy and court data for 2004 to 2016 from one department of forensic medicine in Poland. Seventy sampled homicide cases were classified as overkill (ie: ten or more blunt or sharp force injuries) (n = 38) or not (n = 32).
The two categories of homicide varied in the areas of the body of the wounds - eg: more to the head and neck areas in overkilling. But there was no difference in number of fatal injuries. Defensive injuries were more common in overkilling as were post-mortem injuries. "Overkilling is more likely to affect victims with reduced ability to resist, especially women, which are more often lying or sitting at the beginning of the incident" (Kopacz et al 2022 p6).

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15. STATE VIOLENCE

15.1. OVERVIEW

Introducing the topic of "state violence", Butler (2022) observed: "When people think about violence, they usually think of physical violence, including assaults, beatings, and shootings. While those are some of the ways in which the government enacts violence upon individuals and communities, it is important to expand the analytic lens beyond physical pain and injury. Violence is not always an 'event', but rather a process or ongoing social condition embedded in our everyday lives. As such, state violence can take many different forms" (pp23-24).

Farmer et al (2006) talked of "structural violence", which "describes social structures – economic, political, legal, religious, and cultural – that stop individuals, groups, and societies from reaching their full potential... Structural violence is often embedded in long-standing 'ubiquitous social structures, normalised by stable institutions and regular experience'... Because they seem so ordinary in our ways of understanding the world, they appear almost invisible. Disparate access to resources, political power, education, health care, and legal standing are just a few examples" (quoted in Butler 2022).

State violence in this sense is wide-ranging, and includes health and income inequalities (based on race/ethnicity, say), and discrimination generally. "Both structural violence and overt state violence, including legal use of force and police 'abuse', cause suffering and death. Any effective analysis of, and reckoning with, state violence must include both" (Butler 2022 p25).

"The main response of the state to private violence is more violence, especially policing and punishment" (Butler 2022 p31). But an alternative is community-based programmes, as in the National Network for Safe Communities (NNSC) in the USA. "It supports strategic interventions to reduce violence, minimise arrest and incarceration, enhance police legitimacy, and strengthen relationships between law enforcement and communities" (Butler 2022 p31).

More that that, the NNSC "claims that by shifting the paradigm in which they analyse violence, they have been able to demonstrate conclusively that within communities, the overwhelming majority of residents are not dangerous, and the small number of chronic violent offenders are also at the most risk of victimisation themselves. Thus, the organisation is committed to utilising evidence-based strategies as well as support and outreach resources to protect the most vulnerable people in the most vulnerable places" (Butler 2022 p31). There is evidence of success - (eg: reduction in gun homicides in Chicago; Meares et al 2009).

15.2. INFORMATIONAL AUTOCRACY

Greene (2022) made the observation that "[I]n Russia and throughout much of the post-Soviet space, media are now less free than at any point since the end of the Soviet Union. Authoritarian regimes across the region have deployed a range of tactics to control citizens' access to information and their perceptions and interpretations of the information they do receive: hounding and marginalising some media outlets, co-opting others, and outright shuttering still others, as journalists are prosecuted, forced into exile and even murdered" (p1). This control is described as "informational autonomy" (Guriev and Treisman 2020), and shows that "contemporary authoritarian leaders tend to prefer strategies of persuasion and co-optation over outright coercion" (Greene 2022 p1).
The approach in Russia has been closer to this one, whereas in Belarus coercion and repression have been preferred by the government (Greene 2022). Surveys comparing the media preferences and exposures in these two countries have shown that the "softer" approach leads to the situation "in which even those Russians who prefer independent media have broad exposure to the Kremlin's messaging... By contrast, the heavier hand wielded by authorities in Minsk has helped create a highly polarised media system, in which oppositional media — despite massive repression — capture more audience attention than state-linked media, and consumers of independent media have very little exposure to state messaging. Attempts to stifle independent media outright only suffice to put oppositional audiences even further out of the reach of the state" (Greene 2022 p8).

15.3. CHILD EXECUTION

The execution of child offenders takes place in the 21st century in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. In the first country, seventy-three executions between 2005 and 2015 (Aghtale and Staines 2022).

Aghtale and Staines (2022) saw child execution in Iran as an example of "structural violence". This type of violence is one of three, according to Galtung (1969), and it "is built into the structure, and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances" (quoted in Aghtale and Staines 2022). The other two types are "direct violence" ("a form of violence that is easily identifiable, such as killing and maiming, which involves a clear victim and an obvious perpetrator"; Aghtale and Staines 2022 p388), and "cultural violence", which is "the symbolic sphere of our existence exemplified by cultural features such as religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science — that can all be used to justify or legitimise direct or structural violence" (Galtung 1990 quoted in Aghtale and Staines 2022).

More specifically for Aghtale and Staines (2022) in Iran, "structural violence refers to the systematic ways in which social structures — including legislatures and religious organisations — harm or otherwise disadvantage individuals.... [adn] how religious narratives are used to legitimise structural violence, making it difficult to challenge and eradicate child execution" (p388).

The theocratic Islamic Republic of Iran has "tried to create a binary atmosphere between the 'good' and the 'evil'. If one believes and abides by the laws and policies, one is therefore closer to God and in the 'safe zone'; otherwise, one embodies the forces of Satan and deserves to be punished. Hence, when religion is used as a feature of cultural violence, 'Heaven and Hell can also be reproduced on earth' (Galtung 1990...)" (Aghtale and Staines 2022 p389). A particular interpretation of Sharia law is used to justify both corporal and capital punishment of children, despite Iran signing the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) in 1994 (Aghtale and Staines 2022).

Boms and Arya (2007 quoted in Aghtale and Staines 2022) have talked on "state sponsored child abuse" in Iran because of the normality of corporal punishment. "Children in Iran are also exposed to violence and subjugation through the implementation of legislation that undermines their rights and exposes them to potential sexual abuse and control. The low age of

marriage and, therefore, the implied age of sexual consent, particularly for girls (thirteen lunar years), is problematic as it may expose children to sexual abuse and exploitation, harm their reproductive health, and hinder their access to education or economic opportunities" (Aghtale and Staines 2022 p391).

Child execution is "perhaps the ultimate example of cultural violence against children in Iran that is justified through religious discourse: under Sharia law, girls nine (lunar) years and older and boys fifteen (lunar) years and older can be sentenced to death" (Aghtale and Staines 2022 p392).

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16. TRADITIONAL VS IDEOLOGICALLY-MOTIVATED HOMICIDE

16.1. OVERVIEW

In introducing a special issue of the journal "Homicide Studies", LaFree and Gruenewald (2018) outlined the need "to explore the similarities and differences between traditional homicide and a variety of less common homicide forms involving political and other ideological motivations" (p3) [14].

Firstly, the similarities between terrorism (ideologically motivated homicide) and crime. Simply, they both involve the breaking of laws, which was Clarke and Newman's (2006) position: "[t]errorism is a form of crime in all essential respects" (quoted in LaFree and Gruenewald 2018).

Other similarities include that "terrorism and crime have limited and common offender pools (ie: young males...), have deleterious effects on social trust and community cohesion..., and are social constructions which derive meaning from human interactions all the while reproducing rules and norms" (LaFree and Gruenewald 2018 p3).

While the key differences include that "traditional criminals are generally driven by personal gain and selfishness, while terrorism is most often motivated by the furtherance of political causes and even altruism... And though common criminals usually try to avoid detection, terrorists commit crimes unabashedly and often seek the largest audiences possible..., ostensibly justified by their perceived contributions to the greater good" (LaFree and Gruenewald 2018 p3).

Key to research on both terrorism and crime is the source of data. Traditional homicides are usually recorded by official bodies like FBI in the USA, but there is not the equivalent official data for

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[14] Compared to crime reporting, media accounts of terrorism are "episodic and unsystematic" (Cubukcu and Forst 2018 p96).

ideologically motivated crime (LaFree and Gruenewald 2018).

16.2. LONE-ACTOR TERRORIST

One particular type of terrorist is the "Lone-Actor" (also called lone wolves, solo terrorists, lone operator terrorists, and freelancers), though it is a "contested construct" (Liem et al 2018 p46).

Some authors argued that individuals who perform violent acts for personal motivation or criminal intent should not be classed as Lone-Actor terrorists (LATs) (eg: school or workplace shootings), and should include only politically and religiously motivated acts. "A complicating factor is that assigning motivations to individual acts of terror is inherently subjective and open to considerable interpretation" (Liem et al 2018 p46).

Fein and Vossekuil (1999), for instance, found a variety of motivations among lone attackers on public officials or figures in the USA, including notoriety, attention, revenge, and suicide, while some individuals "clothed their motives with political rhetoric, through which they became 'murderers in search of a cause' who construct a narrative to legitimise their acts" (Liem et al 2018 p46).

In terms of data sources on LATs, there is the "American Lone Wolf Terrorism Database", which included 98 US cases between 1940 and 2013, created by Hamm and Spaaij (2015) [15]. "While the authors found no single 'profile', the majority of individuals in their sample were unemployed, single White males with a criminal record. Compared with members of terrorist groups, they found lone wolves to be older, less educated, and more prone to mental illness" (Liem et al 2018 p48).

Gruenewald and Pridemore (2012) produced a dataset of 108 "far-right homicides" in the USA between 1990 and 2008. The motivations of these perpetrators were "sentiments against certain ethnic groups, as well as sentiments ranging from anti-government, anti-homeless, anti-homosexual to anti-abortion. Far-right terrorism, they [Gruenewald and Pridemore 2012] held, is primarily a White male phenomenon, in which perpetrators are 'fuelled by the need for white males to re-establish their

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[15] Thirty-eight cases pre-9/11 (11th September 2001), and 60 post-9/11 (of which fifteen were "FBI stings" and not classed as "authentic" lone wolf attacks) (Hamm and Spaaij 2015).

threatened dominant position in society'" (Liem et al 2018 p49) [16]. The dataset was taken from the "Extremist Crime Database" (ECDB) [17], which is an open-source database of domestic far-right extremist and terrorist homicides in the USA.

The "Global Terrorism Database" (GTD) [18] is another of information, and Gill et al (2014) used it to produce a dataset of 119 LATs in the USA and Europe between 1990 and 2012. Common characteristics were being male, single (never married), socially isolated, unemployed (at the time of the event), and having previous criminal convictions (Liem et al 2018).

Ellis et al (2016) generated a dataset called the "Countering Lone Actor Terrorism (CLAT) Project". This included data from the GTD, and 120 cases in Europe between 2000 and 2014. "Almost half of the Lone Actors exhibited 'leakage' - meaning that they gave 'an indication of either their extreme views, intention to act or even some attack details in advance' (Ellis et al 2016...)" (Liem et al 2018 p49).

Liem et al (2018) compared LATs with "common" (non-ideologically-motivated) homicide offenders using the CLAT Project data (and updating it for 2015 and 2016), and the European Homicide Monitor (covering Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden 2003-2006). Lone-Actor terrorism was defined as "the threat or use of violence by a single perpetrator (or small cell), not acting out of purely personal or material reasons, with the aim of influencing a wider audience, and who acts without any direct support in the planning, preparation, and execution of the attack, and whose decision to act is not directed by any group or other individuals (although possibly inspired by others)" (Liem et al 2018 p51). Seventeen perpetrator variables were coded.

Between 2000 and 2016 there were 98 LATs, who typically attacked "random" victims in public places compared to family members or acquaintances in "common" homicides (figure 16.1). LATs constituted "a heterogeneous group" (Liem et al 2018 p45) with some similarities and differences to homicide offenders in terms of individual characteristics.

For example, LATs (96%) and homicide offenders (90%)

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[16] Gruenewald and Pridemore (2012) compared this group to 540 "common" homicides. "Domestic far-rightists were found to be more likely to be male, White, to commit the homicide with others, to victimise strangers, use other methods than firearms, and to kill multiple victims compared with offenders of 'common' homicides" (Liem et al 2018 p50).

[17] See https://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/extremist-crime-database-related-projects .

[18] See https://start.umd.edu/research-projects/global-terrorism-database-gtd.

Figure 16.1 - Victim known to perpetrator (%).

were male, and did not differ significantly in terms of
relationship status (ie: not in a relationship at the
time of the event), and unemployment, but the homicide
offenders were significantly less educated. Both groups
showed some indication of mental illness, but the
homicide offenders had a history of substance use, and of
prior violence.

Multi-variate analysis, which compared all the
socio-demographic variables, produced three significant
differences between the two groups - LATs attacked
"strangers", and with firearms, while homicide offenders
had a history of substance use.

Liem et al (2018) noted differences in motivation
between the two groups, which "could mostly be summarised
by instrumental versus expressive motivations...: Lone
Actors being mostly driven by instrumental aims, whereas
homicide offenders typically commit the offence in the
context of interpersonal conflict" (p63).

The following key limitations can be noted about
Liem et al's (2018) study:

i) Because of the small number of cases of LATs,
they were "lumped" together (eg: far-right and
religiously-motivation individuals).

ii) The two groups varied in time periods, and geographical distribution.

iii) The database inclusion depended on different official definitions in each European country, and the amount of detail collected by authorities and in reports.

iv) In relation to future improvements, Liem et al (2018) accepted that the definition of LATs based on ideological motivation and victim choice may not be "a useful one to come to a full understanding of individual motivations underlying the event" (p65).
Furthermore, these authors continued that in future research "the role of mental illness warrants particular attention - In the case of a profound role of mental illness, it may be questioned what causes one offender to commit a politically, religiously, or ideologically motivated crime aimed at strangers, while another offender suffering from a similar mental disorder resorts to victimising individuals known to him" (Liem et al 2018 pp65-66).

16.3. GLOBAL JIHADIST MOVEMENT

The category of terrorism apparently most prominent in the 21st century is the "Global Jihadist Movement" (GJM) [19], but is this movement more lethal than other ideological-based groups?
LaFree and Dugan (2016), for example, pointed out that thirteen of the twenty deadliest terrorist groups were "Islamic", and were much more likely to target "non-Islam" individuals. But this was a small sample of groups (Carson and Suppenbach 2018).
There is interest in the "ideology-lethality connection" - ie: whether the particular type of ideology of a group/movement makes it more lethal [20]. A key distinction is religious or non-religious ideology (or "supernatural vs. earthly"; Carson and Suppenbach 2018) [21]. Studies are divided as to whether one type of ideological-based movement kills more people than another (Carson and Suppenbach 2018).
Carson and Suppenbach (2018) addressed the ideology-

[19] Other terms used include "Radical Islamic terrorist", "Islamist terrorism" and "global jihad" (Carson and Suppenbach 2018).

[20] An example of a non-lethal movement would be "radical Greens" or radical eco-groups who "rarely harm civilians" (Carson and Suppenbach 2018 p22).

[21] The ability to dehumanise the target (ie: to "other" them) is also important (Carson and Suppenbach 2018).

lethality connection for the GJM using the GTD. Data for 1994 to 2014 were analysed. The GTD uses a definition of terrorism of "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (LaFree and Dugan 2007 quoted in Carson and Suppenbach 2018) [22].

There were over 87 000 incidents in the study period collected from open sources by the GTD (including newspapers, wire services, and government reports) [23]. Incidents with unknown perpetrators/groups were removed, leaving 38 330 incidents (44% attributed to the GJM). The perpetrator of each incident was categorised as GJM or "other" using a definition from McCauley and Moskalenko (2014) [24].

Overall, ideology was "a significant predictor of whether an incident involved a fatality, injury, or could be labelled as a suicide attack" (Carson and Suppenbach 2018 p18). GJM incidents were over three times more likely to cause death, 1.7 times more likely to cause injury, and six times more likely to be classified as a suicide attack than "other" incidents. Carson and Suppenbach (2018) explained that the "GJM has, in the last two decades, become a dominant manifestation of terrorism. This is not necessarily through frequency nor through a distinctive targeting strategy. The movement also does not appear to utilise unique weapons or attack types than that of other ideologies save suicide attacks... Rather, the GJM has a distinct ability to kill and maim civilians. al Qa'ida alone has averaged 63.2 deaths per incident, which is a 761% higher average than the next group" (p22).

This fits with the view of Asal and Rethemeyer (2008), who felt that "the GJM's ideology is 'intrinsically linked' to deadliness through the constructs of a supernatural audience and a distinct 'other'" (Carson and Suppenbach 2018 p22).

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[22] Also the following criteria: "**(1)** The incident must be intentional-the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator. (2) The incident must entail some level of violence (including violence against property) or threat of violence. And **(3)** there must be sub-national perpetrators" (LaFree and Dugan 2007 quoted in Cubukcu and Forst 2018).

[23] "Most of what we know today about terrorism - how often, how serious, by whom, against whom, and where and when it occurs - derives from a fundamentally different source than for crime: accounts by reporters" (Cubukcu and Forst 2018 p94).

[24] The group can be categorised by the following criteria: "**(1)** Islam is under attack **by** Western crusaders led **by** the United States; (2) Jihadis, whom the West refers to as 'terrorists,' are defending against this attack; **(3)** The actions they take in defence of Islam are proportional, just, and religiously sanctified and therefore; (4) It is the duty of good Muslims to support these actions" (McCauley and Moskalenko 2014 quoted in Carson and Suppenbach 2018).

Carson and Suppenbach's (2018) study has two key limitations:

i) Definitions - The categorising a perpetrator as GJM or not when there is no consensus about the categories/definitions. Also treating all non-GJM perpetrators as one "other" group. Furthermore, many incidents had no information about the perpetrator's affiliation.

ii) Data - The GTD data lacked details in some cases to allow classification. Open-source databases depend upon media reports, in the main, and these can over-represent incidents with causalities (Carson and Suppenbach 2018).

Cubukcu and Forst (2018) emphasised this point: "The more newsworthy an event, the greater the chance it will reach wider audiences and draw more public attention. Not all incidents receive same level of media attention" (p95).

Another problem is what can be called "temporal factors": "Gradual reduction in media coverage is possible, especially in prolonged conflicts, as the public tends to reduce its attention and sensitivity after each repeated episode... On the other side, media capacity to process and publish information is not limitless. When there is a wave of terrorist events, the media may become congested and "crowd-out" some of subsequent terrorist attacks relative to other newsworthy events" (Cubukcu and Forst 2018 p96).

Cubukcu and Forst (2018) compared the GTD to the official accounts of the Turkish National Police (TNP) for 1996 to 2012 in Turkey. Only 3.2% of cases in the TNP data appeared in the GTD, while around 15% of cases in the GTD were not in the TNP data. "This raises concerns about the prospects of both under-reported events in the GTD and over-reporting in the TNP data" (Cubukcu and Forst 2018 p104).

The open-source data (used in the GTD) was more likely to include fatalities (eg: suicide bombings) (ie: the extent of harm and the number of fatalities) than not. "This suggests that inferences from open-source data involving fatalities are likely to be both more valid and more reliable than inferences from open-source data that include non-fatal incidents" (Cubukcu and Forst 2018 pp107; 110).

16.4. HONOUR KILLINGS

Hayes et al (2018) compared "honour killings" (HKs) to "hate homicides" (or bias-motivated violence) committed by far-right extremists (ideological-based crime) and domestic violence homicides (non-ideological-based crimes) in the USA (appendix 16A). All three types of crime fit with Perry's (2001) idea of violence as "doing difference" (ie: punishing those who break "rules"). "Both honour killings and domestic violence sustain male dominance and punish women for behaviours that are seen to shame men. Similarly, bias-motivated violence may maintain identity and punishment of 'Others' as 'the perpetrator can reassert his/her hegemonic identity and, at the same time, punish the victim(s) for their individual or collective performance of identity' (Perry 2001...)" (Hayes et al 2018 p75).

HKs are "conceptualised as violent acts committed by one or more perpetrators, generally a male, to restore honour to their family in response to the victim's perceived violation of familial honour codes or misbehaviours that are believed to shame the family" (Hayes et al 2018 p71).

Hayes et al (2018) identified three components to HKs:

i) The violent act (fatal or non-fatal) - estimated by the United Nations at around 5000 deaths of women and children globally annually, "though this estimate likely under-reports the true numbers" (Hayes et al 2018 p71).

ii) The victim is targeted because of their behaviour seen as a real or perceived violation of norms (usually female chastity norms) that "dishonour" the family.

iii) The belief by the offender(s) that the family's honour will be restored by the violent act. Hayes et al (2018) commented that "what is important is that the concept of honour serves as a mechanism to reinforce and legitimate patriarchy within particular cultures" (p71).

The perpetrator(s) may be brothers, father, spouse, or extended kin. Hayes et al (2016) examined sixteen US HKs, and found that the father or spouse was the most frequent perpetrator, and the key motivation was marital separation, or "westernised behaviour".

HKs could be classed as a sub-set of domestic violence, on the one hand, but they "also resemble hate

homicides committed by extremists if the offenders are partially motivated by furthering political or cultural belief systems, as opposed to only being motivated by personal considerations" (Hayes et al 2018 p72).

Hayes et al (2018) used data from the ECDB, which covers violent and financial crimes by political extremists in the USA from open-source materials. The period 1990 to 2016 was the focus for HKs, and one-month periods for the other two types. For convenience, sixteen cases of each of the three types of crime were analysed.

The researchers presented the key characteristics of the three types of crime:

a) Relationship of victim and offender - The hate homicides were more likely to involve strangers as victims, while the key relationship was father-daughter for HKs and current/former girlfriend with domestic violence homicides.

b) Prior involvement with the criminal justice system - A small number of all three groups had prior involvement for non-domestic violence-related offences, but the HKs category had a history of domestic violence, followed by domestic violence homicide perpetrators.

c) Motivations - The hate homicides were motivated by the victim's hated characteristic (eg: race/ethnicity; sexual orientation). Separation/divorce was found as the motivator in six of the HK and six of the domestic violence homicide cases. But the remainder of HKs were motivated by "actual or perceived Western behaviour of the victim", while the domestic violence homicides had a variety of motivations (eg: argument that escalated; history of abuse).

d) Perpetrator's claims of mental illness - Few perpetrators in each group made this claim.

The data analysis showed that HKs had similarities with both other types of homicides. The common ground with domestic violence homicides was the family victim relationship, and the history of domestic violence. But the goal of restoring honour made HKs different to domestic violence homicides.

HKs and hate homicides shared the common focus on the "other" or difference of the victim. For hate homicides it was a characteristic of the victim, while it was a behaviour as well for HKs. "For example,

perpetrators of honour killings are not killing any woman who they perceive violates female chastity norms. Rather, they only murder family members for this behaviour. Thus, it is the combination of the behaviour and the familial identity that contributes to the honour killing perpetrator's motivation" (Hayes et al 2018 p85).

In summary, Hayes et al (2018) felt that "honour killings are intriguingly a strain of domestic violence homicides that shares characteristics with hate homicides" (p86).

In terms of methodology, there were only sixteen HKs in the USA in the study period, but many more other types of homicides, which meant the sampling of the latter to give six comparison cases each. All data were open-source.

16.5. APPENDIX 16A - FEMICIDE

"Femicide" has been used to describe the killing of women. Diana Russel defined specifically at the "International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women" in 1976 as "killings of females by males because they are females" (quoted in Cecchi et al 2022).

Medico-legal definitions, however, vary around the world, as Cecchi et al (2022) showed in their survey of the literature. For example, in Jordan, "there are different forms of femicide: the so-called honour crime (when the woman deviates from the sexual norms imposed by society); the fatal intimate partner violence (indicating the killing of the wife by her husband and related to religious and cultural norms) and a third, less prevalent, category encompassing 'other domestic violence' (perpetrated by male members of the family other than the husband). These must be distinguished from the killing of women during robbery or for economic or accidental reasons" (Cecchi et al 2022 p3).

Cecchi et al (2022) commented: "Our results denounce the lack of specific legislations on femicide in most countries of the world and, despite the attention given to violence against women, a framing of the term femicide is often not provided. Consequently, this favours both an under-estimation of the phenomenon and the view that this crime is not deserving of stricter provisions intended specifically to contrast it. Furthermore, the lack of specific laws distinguishing femicide from other murders, documents that there is still no consensus on the definition of femicide and a question remains as to whether it is synonymous of murder of women or

constitutes a crime separate from the mere killing of women. In addition, most laws on femicide define it as a homicide perpetrated by an intimate partner, which may be reductive" (p4).

These authors preferred a definition "based not on the sex of the victim or of the perpetrator, but on the reasons that underpin the 'dis-ethics' of abuse, especially the violation of women's right to freedom and right to life" (Cecchi et al 2022 p4). So, they proposed: "a murder perpetrated because of a failure to recognise the victim's right to self-determination". They explained: "The victim is killed because she has answered 'no' to a request from the murderer or because the desires or beliefs she wants to affirm do not coincide with those of the aggressor. This approach would still include as femicide those cases in which the murder is perpetrated by an (ex-)partner and motivated by requests of divorce, jealousy or possession; which are all motives not recognising a woman's right to freedom, to betrayal or to affectively belong to another man. In addition, the proposed definition of femicide would also include cases not concerning partners or ex-partners, such as the killing of a woman that has refused a marriage imposed by the family, or the murder of a woman to prevent her emancipation. On the contrary, cases that would not be considered femicide would be: merciful killing (in which the murder kills his partner because she is severely ill), homicides due to mental disorders or drug addiction of the murder, or to robbery. In the authors' opinion, all these cases are not femicides, but fall within the category of mere homicides, regardless of the sex of the victim" (Cecchi et al 2022 p4).

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