PSYCHOLOGY MISCELLANY

No. 70 - April 2015

Kevin Brewer

Kevin Brewer BSocSc, MSc

An independent academic psychologist, based in England, who has written extensively on different areas of psychology with an emphasis on the critical stance towards traditional ideas.
     A complete listing of his writings at http://kmbpsychology.jottit.com and http://psychologywritings.synthasite.com/.

CONTENTS

1. WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT FOR NON-KIN VERSUS CO-OPERATION WITH THEM

1.1. WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT

Why do soldiers fight? "What inspires the willingness of humans to make their greatest exertions, to fight unto death with and for genetic strangers, a propensity to which no creature but humans seems subject? What determines the 'fighting spirit' that enables one group of combatants to defeat another, all other things being equal?" (Atran et al 2014 p17702). Self-sacrifice for non-kin [1] is a challenge to evolutionary theory.

One answer to the above questions is because of group loyalty. An ex-US marine described the other soldiers in his corp as closer than friends and family (quoted in Atran et al 2014). The theory of identity fusion can be applied here [2]. This suggests that different personal and group identities become a single identity, particularly within a small tight-knit group. The group is perceived of as an "imaginary family" [3] (Atran et al 2014) (appendix 1A).

Whitehouse et al (2014) collected data from 179 Libyan volunteers who fought or supported the fighters (eg: ambulance drivers) against Gaddafi's government in 2011. The participants completed a questionnaire including a pictorial fusion scale (Swann et al 2009), which offers five degrees of overlap between the self and a group (figure 1.1) (own family, own group of fighters, all same-side fighters in Libya, and ordinary Libyans). Over 90% of the respondents chose the option of no difference between the self and the group (ie: identity fusion) for family, own fighters, and all fighters. Just 1% made that choice for ordinary Libyans. Younger males

---

[1] This is sometimes called "parochial altruism" - "an evolutionary rationale to make costly sacrifices for the group to which one belongs in an effort to beat rival out-groups in competition for survival and dominance" (Sheikh et al 2014 p24).

[2] Fusion refers to "a powerful, visceral feeling of oneness with the group" (Swann et al 2014 p912).

[3] Swann et al (2014) stated: "Apparently, for strongly fused persons, recognising that other group members share core characteristics makes extended groups seem 'family like' and worth dying for" (p912).

had the strongest fusion with their own fighters.
Fighters had a stronger fusion than soldier-support.
Whitehouse et al (2014) concluded: "When ordinary
citizens band together and do battle, their connections
to one another take on familial — or even suprafamilial —
qualities. Moreover, once formed, these family ties may
compel combatants to make extreme sacrifices for their
group, including even the ultimate sacrifice" (p17784).

(Based on Figure 1 p17784 Whitehouse et al 2014)

Figure 1.1 - Pictorial fusion scale.

Atran et al (2014) added to this strong bond a
"morality" or "cause" [4]. In a study of volunteers in
Morocco for militant jihad in Syria, it was the
combination of identity fusion and "sacred values" (eg:
belief in Sharia) that was important: "a cluster of
friends or fellow travellers may come to hold sacred
values [5], perhaps initially influenced by one or a few of
them, and then fuse into an imagined family-like group
defined and driven by these values" (Atran et al 2014
p17703).
On the downside, "for such 'devoted actors',
rightness of in-group cause often leads to intractable
conflicts with out-groups that become immune to the give-
and-take common to 'business-like' negotiations" (Atran
et al 2014 p17702) (appendix 1B).

---

[4] The "devoted actor" hypothesis (Atran et al 2007). Atran and Ginges summed up: "People will
become willing to protect morally important or sacred values through costly sacrifice and extreme
actions, even being willing to kill and die, particularly when such values are embedded in or fused with
group identity, becoming intrinsic to 'Who I am' and 'Who We are' (quoted in Sheikh et al 2014 p24).
[5] Also certain things become "sacred symbols". "A symbol is an artefact: a 'thing' that exists out there
somewhere in space and time... Every symbol participates in a web of significances that we call
culture... Culture is not itself formed of symbols, but of the meaning that lies behind and unites
symbols" (Foster 1994 p366).

Recent research has produced a more nuanced picture of fused identity. Sheikh et al (2014) interviewed sixty-two Lebanese individuals recruited in public places in Beirut and Byblos (Jbeil) in 2014. They were asked about their religious group identity, which included "Christian", "Sunni", and "Shia", and the support for costly sacrifices to protect their group as well as measures of moral attitudes. There were also pictorial measures of fusion for religious group, Arab, Lebanese, close friends, and family.

Individuals who were fused with their religious group identity had significantly higher support for costly sacrifices for that group (eg: fight; give life) than non-fused respondents. This relationship was moderated by moral values. Individuals with group-binding (or sectarian) moral values (ie: fused morality with group identity) had stronger support than those with universal moral values [6].

Fused individuals with a low score on "no control over group's future" (ie: not fatalistic) had greater support for costly sacrifices for the group.

Altogether, parochial altruism is supported by individuals fused with the group identity, whose morality is based around that group, and are not fatalistic about the future [7].

1.2. WILLINGNESS TO HELP OTHERS

The willingness to fight for others has some similarities with the willingness to risk own life to help a stranger ("extreme altruism"; Bond 2015). The identification with the in-group is one such similarity, but in the case of helpers the whole of humanity is the "in-group". Monroe (eg: 2004) stated: "Where the rest of us see a stranger, an altruist sees a fellow human being" (Bond 2015 p38).

One area of "extreme altruism" is "Holocaust rescue". This describes individuals in the Second World War who rescued and hid Jews from the Nazis at great personal risk. Oliner and Oliner (1988) interviewed 406 such individuals and seventy-two who had not done anything like that during the war. The rescuers were more empathetic, had greater values of fairness, compassion and personal responsibility towards strangers learned from their parents, and tolerance of difference (Bond

---

[6] Individuals high in sectarian moral values would agree that someone sacrificing himself/herself for the group is an important moral issue, whereas the high scorer on universal moral values is more concerned with issues like someone killing someone else (Sheikh et al 2014).

[7] "Devoted actors are most likely to commit themselves to extreme actions of parochial altruism if they perceive themselves to be under existential threat from outside groups" (Sheikh et al 2014 p25).

2015). Fogelman's (1994) study of three hundred rescuers of Jews found the common characteristics of a nurturing and loving upbringing, altruistic parents as role models, and the tolerance of different people (Bond 2015) [8].

But "Most rescuers acknowledge that the initial act of such behaviour was not premeditated and planned. Whether gradual or sudden, there was little mulling over the moral dilemmas, conflicts, and life and death consequences involved in the decision to help. The decision to harbour Jews in extremis was often an impulsive response to an immediate situation" (Fogelman 1998). This fits with the traditional social psychology on bystander intervention, which suggests that situational factors are key in understanding who helps rather than just personality. More formally, such research highlights the awareness of something happening, interpretation of the situation as needing help, and taking responsibility to help.

Rescuers were aware of the Nazi propaganda, saw the danger to Jews, and could not ignore it (Fogelman 1998).

For her interviews, Fogelman (1998) distinguished types of rescuers:

i) "Moral rescuers" - The reported motivations for helping could not necessarily be articulated. Fogelman (1998) said: "The very question 'Why did you do it?' evokes discomfort and even annoyance in rescuers. The question challenges an instinctive response that stemmed from personal integrity, from their humanity. Rescuers are often embarrassed with their answers because they are not eloquent or philosophical and because the interviewer may be disappointed at the simple, 'It was the right thing to do'. 'I couldn't live with myself if I let this person die'. Psychologically, the very word 'why' often seems accusatory and puts the rescuer on the defensive".

ii) "Judeophiles" - "people who loved individual Jews or the Jewish people" (Fogelman 1998).

iii) "Concerned-detached professionals" - eg: diplomats, doctors, social workers.

Helpers are more likely to co-operate on economic games (ie: share), and appear to have physiological differences (eg: more responsive right amygdala) (Bond 2015). But the altruism needs to go with thrill-seeking to be a "hero" (Bond 2015).

---

[8] Fogelman (1998) stated: "Each rescuer was unique. Yet research shows patterns in the ways people became involved in rescue, which provide useful ideas as to how to nurture humane behaviour. It is not possible to predict who will risk their lives for total strangers, or even loved ones. No single personality type is apparent. However, certain features of family background, values and personality increase the likelihood that certain people will resist tyranny".

Focusing on decision-making, Rand et al (2014) argued that "intuition favours co-operation [9]", and deliberation over the optimum solution is more self-interested ("social heuristics hypothesis"; SHH). Put another way, co-operation is the automatic default position, which evolved as early humans lived together in small groups, where "daily life typically involves factors such as repetition, reputation and the threat of sanctions, all of which can make co-operation in one's long term self-interest" (Rand et al 2014). Such "social intuitions acquired in daily life spill over into one-shot anonymous interactions" (Rand et al 2014). Thus the co-operation with strangers met only once. There is also reflective decision-making as part of the dual-process framework of SHH.

Rand et al (2014) found support for the SHH in fifteen set of experiments over two years with economic co-operation games [10] where there was time pressure to make a decision (ie: forced reliance on intuition). When the participants had less than ten seconds to make a decision, there was more co-operation than if no time limit. Experienced participants, however, were less co-operative under time pressure.

Moral dilemmas, particularly as used in research, give the participants a choice of two actions. "Accumulating research suggests that serotonergic activity plays an important role in moral reasoning and related social behaviours" (Marsh et al 2014).

Marsh et al (2014) offered sixty-five healthy volunteers in the USA a set of moral dilemmas that would involve harm to one individual to save many (utilitarian moral judgments). In the unintentional but foreseen harm versions, a danger is diverted from five persons onto an innocent victim, while the intentional harm versions involved harming one person to save five. There was also control versions where a behaviour had no benefits (table 1.1). The participants responded to each dilemma on a seven-point scale, "How acceptable would it be to...", where 1 is "least acceptable" and seven is "most acceptable".

---

[9] Co-operation defined as "where individuals pay costs to benefit others" (Rand et al 2014).

[10] For example, in a public good game, independently four players, say, can give as much as they want to a public fund. The total amount is doubled and divided between the four players equally. Co-operation would be giving more to the public fund, while selfishness involved putting little in and trying to exploit the generosity of the other players. Take a co-operation example: each player has £1 and gives all, and thus receives back £2 (total £4 x 2 ÷ 4). In a freerider (or selfish) example, player A gives nothing while the other three players all give £1. Everybody receives back £1.50, and player A has benefited most. But if too many players become selfish this strategy does not work.

- Unintentional but foreseen harm version – Eric is hiking along a cliff when a rockslide occurs. A boulder is rolling toward five people on the trail and the cliffs are too steep for escape. By pushing hard on a tree near the trail Eric could knock it in the boulder's path and force the boulder down the cliff, saving the five. There is a hiker on a trail directly below who would be killed, though. Eric can push on the tree and the one hiker will die; or he can refrain from doing this, letting the five die.

- Intentional harm version – Eric is hiking along a cliff when a rockslide occurs. A boulder is rolling toward five people on the trail and the cliffs are too steep for escape. A sixth hiker is sitting in a tree over the cliff. By pushing hard on the tree, Eric could knock this hiker out of the tree and into the boulder's path, stopping it and saving the five. Eric can push on the tree and the one hiker will die; or he can refrain from doing this, letting the five die.

- Control version – "Eric is hiking along a cliff when a rockslide occurs. A boulder is rolling down the trail that Eric wants to hike down. By pushing hard on a tree near the trail, Eric could knock it in the boulder's path so the boulder will not block his trail. Eric can push on the tree and the trail will remain clear; or he can refrain from doing this, and the trail will be blocked.

(Source: Marsh et al 2011 table S1)

Table 1.1 - Example of versions of dilemmas.

Analysis of the DNA of the volunteers placed them in three groups for the gene 5HTTLPR (human serotonin transporter gene) - SS (short version from each biological parent), LL (long version from each parent) or SL (one of each). SS carriers have more serotonin, simplistically, and have been found to be more emotionally reactive. The researchers predicted that this group would be less willing to harm the innocent victim to save others.
    The three groups did not vary with the moral acceptability in the intentional harm (or control) versions, but SS carriers were significantly less likely to endorse the behaviour in the unintentional but foreseen harm versions (figure 1.2). "These results may aid in understanding why people disagree about the acceptability of causing foreseen harm to meet utilitarian goals. The results of the present study suggest that judgments in response to this kind of moral dilemma may be influenced by inherited variants in a genetic polymorphism that influences serotonin neurotransmission and patterns of responding to socio-emotional stimuli" (Marsh et al 2011).

Morality judgment — Intended, Neutral, Foreseen; LL, SL, SS

Figure 1.2 - Mean judgment of moral acceptability for
each version of the dilemmas based on version of gene.

1.2.1. Physical appearance of victim

Willingness to help in different ways is influenced
by many factors including the appearance of the
individual needing help. In the case of female hitch-
hikers it is physical attractiveness.
For example, Gueguen (2007) asked a twenty year-old
female to hitch-hike on a road in Brittany, France, and
varied the bra size of the woman as either small, medium
or larger-breasted. Otherwise, the same clothes were worn
and no make-up. An observer counted the number of cars
than passed and recorded the sex of the driver who
stopped.
Significantly more male drivers stopped in the
condition of the larger bra size than the others, but
there was no difference for female drivers (figure 1.3).
In a similar field experiment, Gueguen and Lamy
(2009) found that male drivers (but not female ones)
offered a lift to blonde female confederates
significantly more than brown or black-haired ones
(figure 1.4). Five female students aged 19-22 years old
varied the wig worn while wearing the same clothes.
Rich and Cash (1993) found that proportionally more
blondes appeared in "Playboy" than "Vogue" or "Ladies
Home Journal". Thus "the distortion of blondes seen in
the media may be sending men a message that associated
blondness with sexuality" (Gueguen 2014).

(Data from Gueguen 2007 table 1)

Figure 1.3 - Percentage of drivers who stopped.

(Data from Gueguen and Lamy 2009 table 1)

Figure 1.4 - Percentage of drivers who stopped.

Gueguen (2014) showed that males were significantly more willing to help a woman with higher heeled shoes. The length of the heels was varied in the experiments between flat, 5 cm (medium heels), and 9 cm (high heels). In Study 1, the female confederate approached individual men and said: "Excuse me, sir. We are currently conducting a survey on gender equality. Would you agree to answer our questionnaire? It will take 3-4 minutes". Nearly twice as many agreed in the high heel than flat condition (figure 1.5). In each condition thirty men in a town in Brittany were the participants.

(Data from Gueguen 2014 table 1)

Figure 1.5 - Percentage of men who agreed to complete questionnaire.

Study 2 involved four confederates in the three different shoes approaching 180 men and 180 women, and asking them to complete a survey on local food consumption habits. The rates of agreement did not vary between the conditions for the female participants, but was significantly more for the higher heels for male participants (figure 1.6).

(Data from Gueguen 2014 table 2)

Figure 1.6 - Percentage of men and women who agreed to complete questionnaire.

In Study 3, a female confederate approached men or women walking alone and accidentally dropped a glove apparently unaware of the loss. An observer counted the number of participants who picked up the glove. Ten men and women were tested in each of the three shoe

conditions. Significantly more males spontaneously helped in the high-heels condition (figure 1.7).

(Data from Gueguen 2014 table 3)

Figure 1.7 - Percentage of men and women who helped.

Gueguen (2014) used an evolutionary approach to explain the difference in men's behaviour between the conditions of the experiments - ie: women's physical appearance is key in potential mates (as opposed to women's preference for mates with resources). This is also seen in Gueguen's (2014) Study 4 where a female confederate sat alone in a bar, and the speed of males approaching her depending on the heels worn was measured. The woman was approached significantly quicker in high heels (figure 1.8).

(Data from Gueguen 2014 table 4)

Figure 1.8 - Mean time elapsed before woman approached (minutes).

Similarly, Gueguen (2013) found that more men approached a woman with a temporary tattoo on her lower back (than without), and perceived her as more likely to have sex on the first date.

In relation to the shoes worn, high heels produce the perception of a smaller foot size. Gueguen (2014) stated: "As children's feet are smaller than those of adults, a small foot on a woman maybe perceived as a sign of youthfulness. Research has found that men prefer women who exhibit morphological traits associated with youthfulness... Thus, in our studies, the heels could have created a difference in the participant's perception of the female confederate foot length which, in turn, led them to perceive the female confederate as more attractive and youthful".

Alternatively, high heels make the woman apart taller, which could be attractive, or high heels are associated with sexiness in the media. Gueguen (2014), again: "Research has found that men generally overestimate female sexual interest, especially when examining their clothing appearance... Thus, the over-association of high heels with women's sexiness and sexual content could lead men to misinterpret the sexual intent of women with high heels. Given that men were more eager for sexual intercourse than women..., they were probably more eager to approach a woman wearing high-heeled shoes". All of the experiments by Gueguen showed that "men focus on women's physical attributes when judging and interacting with them" (Gueguen 2014).

1.3. APPENDIX 1A - GROUP AS "IMAGINARY FAMILY"

Swann et al (2014) explored identity fusion and the group being seen as an "imaginary family" in six studies.

Study 1

Nearly 2500 individuals from eleven countries were surveyed about their fusion with country (eg: "I am one with my country"), pro-ingroup views (eg: "I would fight someone physically threatening another person of my country"), and who they would be willing to die for.

Fusion with country was positively correlated with pro-ingroup views, but the level varied between countries. Participants were more willing to die for local and/or smaller groups (ie: immediate family, close friends) than larger and/or extended groups (eg: country, religious group, political party).

Study 2

This experiment explored the willingness to self-sacrifice for the extended ingroup who shared a common set of genes. Eighty-three undergraduates in China read an article emphasising that a race had a common set of genes or an article saying that this was not so. Participants in the shared-genes condition had a stronger correlation between fusion of identity with race and pro-ingroup views. This study showed that priming [11] participants about shared biological characteristics encouraged fusion and ingroup support.

Study 3

This was the same experiment as Study 2 but with 95 individuals in India, and with similar findings.

From an evolutionary point of view, Studies 2 and 3 showed that ingroup support is linked to perceived common genes. But the subsequent studies showed that perceived common values increases fusion with the group, ingroup support, and willingness to self-sacrifice.

Study 4

One hundred and fifty individuals in the USA read an article entitled "Americans agree on core American values" (shared condition) or "Americans disagree on core American values" (non-shared condition). Fusion with the group (Americans) and support for self-sacrifice for the group was stronger in the shared condition.

Study 5

One hundred and twenty-one undergraduates in Spain were involved in an experiment similar to Study 4, but they also completed a measure of relational ties (eg: "Members of my country are like my family to me"). "Consistent with the results of Studies 2 to 4, Study 5 supports the notion that priming beliefs regarding shared core characteristics of group members increases the tendency for fused persons to endorse fighting and dying for a large, collective group. Furthermore, the results indicate that the tendency for familial ties to mediate the impact of fusion on endorsement of extreme sacrifice for the group was stronger in the shared-values condition

---

[11] Priming is focusing the attention or getting the individuals to think about a certain thing. In this case, how similar or not individuals of the same race were genetically.

as compared to the non-shared values condition" (Swann et al 2014 pp921-922).

Study 6

This study again used Spanish undergraduates, but varied the nature of the shared values in four conditions. Participants read an article that said Spaniards shared positive values, shared negative values, did not share positive values, or did not share negative values. The nature of the shared values did not change the fusion with the group and pro-ingroup views (ie: those in shared values conditions were than non-shared values conditions).

Putting the findings together, Swann et al (2014) argued that individuals fused their identity and had a willingness to self-sacrifice for "family-like" units. Emphasising the commonality of race or country makes these groups feel like "family-like" units, and so individuals fused their identity and were willing to sacrifice themselves for race or country. In evolutionary terms, the "mechanism" of self-sacrifice for kin has become "maladapted" to include non-kin that the individual has become bonded with. "From this perspective, what appears to be 'selfless' behaviour on the part of fused persons is not selfless at all. Rather, when fused persons endorse sacrifice for other group members, they do so out of a sense of personal obligation to individuals whom they construe to be living extensions of themselves, their family" (Swann et al 2014 p925).

1.4. APPENDIX 1B - SACRED VALUES AND COMPROMISE

Ginges et al (2007) showed that a different type of "logic" is involved in decision-making related to "sacred values". Rather than it being instrumental (cost-benefit), it is based on deontological (moral) rules and intuitions. So individuals react against compromise that treats "sacred values" in an instrumental way. The researchers showed this behaviour in field experiments with Jewish Israeli "settlers", Palestinian "refugees" and students. The participants were presented with hypothetical (but relevant) scenarios about peace in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. In each group, one-third of the participants read details of a peace deal that was instrumental (give and take) (known as "taboo" condition), one-third read about a scenario that included material incentives (known as "taboo+" condition), and the remainder had a scenario that included the symbolic compromise ("symbolic" condition) (table 1.2).

- Taboo condition - Palestinians would recognise the sacred and historic right of the Jewish people to Israel. There would be two states: a Jewish state of Israel and a Palestinian state in 99% of the West Bank and Gaza.

- Taboo+ condition - On their part, Israel will pay Palestine 1 billion U.S. dollars a year for 10 years.

- Symbolic condition - On their part, Israel will recognise the historic and legitimate right of the Palestinians to their own state and would apologise for all of the wrongs done to the Palestinian people.

(Source: Ginges et al 2007 p7359)

Table 1.2 - Example of scenarios used with Palestinian students.

Individuals who held their views about the dispute as "sacred values" (ie: moral absolutists) increased their support for violence when a deal was offered in a cost-benefit way and with material incentives (ie: taboo and taboo+ conditions). But the support for political violence declined if the adversary made symbolic compromises over their "sacred values" (ie: symbolic condition). Ginges et al (2007) stated about the experiments:

> These results have powerful implications for understanding the trajectory of many cultural, resource, and political conflicts, implying that when people transform a resource (such as land), an activity (such as hunting a particular animal or farming a certain crop), or an idea (such as obtaining a nuclear weapon) into a sacred value, attempts to solve disputes in a bargaining setting by focusing on increasing the costs or benefits of different actions can backfire. Instead, when dealing with conflicts involving sacred values, culturally sensitive efforts at identifying symbolic tradeoffs that involve equitable gains or losses over those values may open up new channels for peaceful resolution of otherwise intractable conflicts (p7359).

1.4.1. Revenge and Forgiveness

Early humans faced potential costs from those who wanted to harm them or their kin and allies, and from freeriders within the group. One solution to this problem is the imposition of a cost on such individuals - namely, retaliation or revenge [12] (ie: deterrence). McCullough et

---

[12] McCullough et al (2013) defined revenge as "a targeted imposition of costs or withholding of benefits, in response to a cost-inflicting (or benefit withholding) event, that results from a cognitive

al (2013) noted direct and indirect deterrence. The former involves costs for the harmdoer than outweighs the benefits of their harm, or the withholding of benefits from them. Indirect deterrence is revenge applied to the harmdoer's kin or allies.

But then a system of re-establishing harmony in a group and keeping the retaliation in check - ie: forgiveness. This is aided by the transgressor making amends. Also the value of the relationship is important (ie: closeness and commitment), particularly in assessing the risk of future exploitation by the harmdoer.

McCullough et al (2013) proposed these ideas as the basis of the evolution of cognitive systems for revenge and forgiveness. They stated: "Revenge and forgiveness... have complementary biological functions: We posit that mechanisms for revenge are designed to deter harms, and that forgiveness mechanisms are designed to solve problems related to the preservation of valuable relationships despite the prior impositions of harm" (McCullough et al 2014 p2).

1.5. REFERENCES

Atran, S et al (2007) Sacred barriers to conflict resolution Science 317, 1039-1040

Atran, S et al (2014) Devoted actors sacrifice for close comrades and sacred cause Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, USA 111, 50, 17702-17703

Bond, M (2015) We could be heroes New Scientist 24/1, 36-39

Fogelman, E (1994) Conscience and Courage: Rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust New York: Doubleday

Fogelman, E (1998) The rescuer self. In Berenbaum, M & Peck, A.J (eds) The Holocaust and History: The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed, and the Re-examined Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press

Foster, M.L (1994) Symbolism: The foundation of culture. In Ingold, T (ed) Companion Encyclopaedia of Anthropology London: Routledge

Ginges, J et al (2007) Sacred bounds on rational resolution of violent political conflict Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, USA 104, 18, 7357-7360

Gueguen, N (2007) Bust size and hitch-hiking: A field study Perceptual and Motor Skills 105, 1294-1298

Gueguen, N (2013) Effects of a tattoo on men's behaviour and attitudes towards women: An experimental field study Archives of Sexual Behaviour 42, 1517-1524

system designed (i.e: selected) for deterring other organisms from imposing costs (or inducing other organisms to confer benefits) upon oneself or other individuals in whom one has fitness interests" (p4).

Gueguen, N (2014) High heels increase women's attractiveness <u>Archives of Sexual Behaviour</u> (<u>http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-014-0422-z</u>)

Gueguen, N & Lamy, L (2009) Hitch-hiking women's hair colour <u>Perceptual and Motor Skills</u> 109, 941-948

Marsh, A.A et al (2011) Serotonin transporter genotype (5-HTTLPR) predicts utilitarian moral judgments <u>PLoS ONE</u> 6, 10, e25148 (Freely available at <u>http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0025148#pone-0025148-g001</u>)

McCullough, M.E et al (2013) Cognitive systems for revenge and forgiveness <u>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</u> 36, 1, 1-15, 48-58

Monroe, K (2004) <u>The Hand of Compassion: Portraits of Moral Choice during the Holocaust</u> Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Oliner, S.P & Oliner, P.M (1988) <u>The Altruistic Personality</u> New York: Basic Books

Rand, D.G et al (2014) Social heuristics shape intuitive co-operation <u>Nature Communications</u> 5, 3677

Rich, M.K & Cash, T.F (1993) The American image of beauty: Media representations of hair colour for four decades <u>Sex Roles</u> 29, 113-124

Sheikh, H et al (2014) The devoted actor as parochial altruist: Sectarian morality, identity fusion, and support for costly sacrifices <u>Cliodynamics: The Journal of Quantitative History and Cultural Evolution</u> 5, 23-40

Swann, W.B et al (2009) Identity fusion: The interplay of personal and social identities in extreme group behaviour <u>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</u> 96, 5, 995-1011

Swann, W.B et al (2014) What makes a group worth dying for? Identity fusion fosters perception of familial ties, promoting self-sacrifice <u>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</u> 106, 6, 912-926

Whitehouse, H et al (2014) Brothers in arms: Libyan revolutionaries bond like family <u>Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, USA</u> 111, 50, 17783-17785

2. DEALING WITH STIGMA IN DIFFERENT SITUATIONS

2.1. INTRODUCTION

Stigma is "a characteristic, trait, or diagnosis that discredits individuals and elicits prejudice, discrimination, and loss of status" (Young et al 2013) [13]. Being stigmatised leads to a "spoiled identity" (Goffman 1963), as well as the effects upon social relationships, quality of life, health, and help-seeking (Young et al 2013).

Rao et al (2009) outlined six factors about the condition or source of the stigma that influence the effect of stigma:

i) Concealability - whether the source of the stigma can be hidden or not.

ii) Course - the severity and pattern of development of the condition.

iii) Disruptiveness - how much the condition interferes with usual social interactions.

iv) Aesthetic qualities - how much the source of the stigma affects others' senses (eg: unpleasant to look at).

v) Origin - the perceived cause and responsibility of the sufferer for their condition.

vi) Peril - the amount of fear and danger for others from the condition.

Stigma can be "enacted" in experiences of discrimination, or "internalised" as the individual fears others' reactions. "Subjective experiences of stigma can be as damaging to health as acts of discrimination and

---

[13] Goffman (1963) defined it as "the situation of the individual who is disqualified from full social acceptance" (quoted in Rao et al 2009).

actual loss of social relationships" (Young et al 2013) (eg: perceived discrimination and depression; Finch et al 2000).

The internalisation of stigma follows a series of steps (Corrigan et al 2006): "First, a person with a stigmatising condition experiences discrimination and becomes aware of negative stereotypes around his or her illness. The awareness of the stereotype is sometimes called felt or perceived stigma... In the final step of the process, the person concurs that negative stereotypes apply to them and then internalises the stereotype. The internalisation is termed self, or internalised stigma, which then has negative consequences for the self" (Rao et al 2009).

2.2. MENTAL DISORDERS

How does the biological explanation for mental disorders affect the mental health professionals' empathy towards the sufferers? One possibility is that empathy is increased as the patient is seen as not to blame for their illness. On the other hand, biological explanations may reduce empathy by stigmatising sufferers. Lebowitz and Ahn (2014) stated that:

> biological explanations appear to lead to
> certain forms of so-called psychological essentialism
> (specifically, genetic essentialism and neuroessentialism)
> in which mental disorders are seen as having unique,
> immutable essences — located in the brain or DNA
> — that produce the symptoms and behaviour of patients.
> This view, in turn, can yield the belief that people
> with mental disorders are categorically dissimilar from
> so-called normal people, and the perception of such strict
> social boundaries between groups of people can lead to more
> negative intergroup attitudes. It can also exacerbate the
> perception that mental disorders are relatively permanent
> and difficult to overcome or treat effectively, which
> is known as prognostic pessimism. Additionally, if the
> behaviour of people with psychiatric disorders is seen as
> deterministically governed by biological abnormalities
> outside of their control, they may be seen as unpredictable,
> contributing to perceptions of them as dangerous,
> fearsome, and meriting avoidance. Moreover, viewing
> the actions of people with psychiatric illnesses as
> caused by neural or genetic aberrations — rather than
> by their own agency — might trigger mechanistic
> dehumanisation, which occurs when people are equated
> to automata or systems of interacting parts and is
> strongly linked to negative attitudes (p17786).

Lebowitz and Ahn (2014) found support for this latter position in three online studies with mental health professionals (eg: psychiatrists, therapists) in the USA. The participants read vignettes about

individuals which included biological (eg: genetics) or psychosocial (eg: life events) explanations for the unnamed disorders. Then the participants rated their feelings (eg: sympathetic, warm, compassionate) about the cases with eighteen adjectives, each on a seven-point scale.

Study 1 with 132 participants used cases of schizophrenia and social phobia, while Study 2 with 105 participants used major depression and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Study 3 added vignettes with combined biological and psychosocial explanations.

There was significantly less empathy for the biological than psychosocial explanation in all studies.

2.3. STIGMA AND A HEALTH CONDITION - MIGRAINE

Young et al (2013) investigated stigma and migraine with 246 sufferers of the condition at a specialist clinic in the USA. A comparison group of sixty-two epilepsy sufferers was recruited from another specialist clinic. Questionnaires were completed by attendees at the clinic aged 18-65 years between 2009 and 2011.

Migraine was defined with the following criteria:

a) At least two of - severe pain, unilaterality (headache focused on one side of head), throbbing, exacerbation with activity.

b) One of - nausea, light and sound sensitivity.

Chronic migraine (CM) was distinguished by more than fourteen headache days per month (of which at least eight were migraines), while episodic migraine (EM) was less than fourteen days per month [14]. The groups varied on their need for rest, for instance (figure 2.1).

The questionnaires completed included the migraine disability score (MIDAS) [15] (or Liverpool impact of epilepsy scale) [16], and the Stigma Scale for Chronic Illness (SSCI) (Rao et al 2009). This has twenty-four items about the degree and impact of stigma for a chronic illness, divided into two sub-scales. The SSCI-I measures "self/internalised stigma" (eg: feelings of shame), and the SSCI-E covers "enacted stigma" (ie: actual discrimination events). The maximum score is 120 (table 2.1).

---

[14] Half of the study respondents had CM and half EM.

[15] This measures the number of days of migraine in last three months and the severity.

[16] This measures the perception of the impact of epilepsy on work, personal relationships, and self-image.

Effect of Migraine on Need to Rest

Episodic Migraine
Chronic Migraine

Number or Patients

>1/2 waking hrs in bed
>1/2 waking hrs resting
>1/4 waking hrs in bed
>1/4 waking hrs resting
few days in bed
few days resting
very little time in bed/ resting

(Source: Young et al 2013 figure 2)

Figure 2.1 - Need for rest among migraine sufferers.

- Rao et al (2009) described the process of the development of the SSCI. Firstly, five focus groups with 56 adults suffering from a number of conditions like epilepsy, and multiple sclerosis were conducted in the USA to discuss quality of life issues (but not stigma directly). The themes from the groups were added to relevant items found in a literature review to give thirty-three statements. These statements were checked by experts to ensure they would be understood as intended, and this left twenty-six items. This first version of the questionnaire was given to 511 individuals with neurological conditions with five response options (from "never" to "always"). Two items were subsequently dropped to leave the final 24 statements, which sub-divided into SSCI-I (13 items) and SSCI-E (11 items) (via factor analysis). The mean total score was 42.7. The psychometric properties of the SSCI were established (eg: internal reliability).

- Example of items:

    * People with my illness lost jobs when their employers found out about it.
    * I lost friends by telling them that I have this illness.
    * Because of my illness, people made fun of me.
    * Because of my illness, people were unkind to me.
    * Because of my illness, people tended to ignore my good points.

Table 2.1 - Development of SSCI.

CM sufferers had significantly higher SSCI scores
than EM or epilepsy sufferers (figure 2.2), but the
majority of the difference was due to internalised rather
than enacted stigma. Young et al (2013) stated: "This
suggests that migraine patients have a more vigorous
process of converting enacted stigma into internalised
stigma. Alternatively, migraine patients may be better
able to suppress enacted stigma by being more circumspect
about divulging their medical condition while
experiencing the internalised stigma commensurate with
their illness severity". Stigma scores for migraine
sufferers did not differ with age, income, or education.
Those with migraine reported more work-related issues
(figure 2.3).

Histogram of Stigma Scores

(Source: Young et al 2013 figure 3)

Figure 2.2 - Mean and distribution of stigma scores.

The finding that migraine sufferers reported more
stigma than epilepsy sufferers contradicts a study in
Turkey (Aydemir et al 2011). However, this study did not
distinguish between CM and EM, and it used only a three-
item non-validated stigma scale (Young et al 2013).

(Source: Young et al 2013 figure 1)

Figure 2.3 - Ability to work.

2.4. STIGMA, DENIAL AND JUSTIFICATION OF MURDER

Men who murder their female partners tell a story that attempts to reduce the listener's horror of their behaviour. Dilmon and Timor (2014) asked: "What is special about the story that turns the tables? How does he manage to turn himself into a more positive figure and his crime into an act that may even have been unavoidable? Is he presenting reality as he perceives it, or knowingly and intentionally depicting a false reality?" (p1126).

The presentation of an explanation for such deviant behaviour requires the perpetrator to deal with their guilt. They can deny that they committed the crime, which has limited success for convicted offenders, or admit to

the act while neutralising the guilt. This includes: "A. using justifications to accept responsibility for the act, but deny it was bad; and B. using excuses to admit the act was bad, but refuse, to some extent, to accept responsibility for the act" (Austin 1961 quoted in Dilmon and Timor 2014) (appendix 2A).

Specifically, Wood (2004) described three categories of explanations used by men for their violent behaviour towards their partners:

- Justifications - eg: "She didn't appreciate anything I did for her".
- Remorse - eg: "I am sorry for hurting her".
- Dissociations - eg: I am not the kind of man who would abuse a woman" (Dilmon and Timor 2014).

There are also techniques of placing part of the blame for the behaviour on the victim, and the perpetrator presenting themselves as the victim (Dilmon and Timor (2014).

Dilmon and Timor (2014) analysed semi-structured interviews with twelve men convicted of murder or manslaughter of their partners in Ayalon prison in Ramla, Israel. The interviews were in Hebrew and translated into English. Content analysis of the interview transcripts found common themes.

i) The perpetrator as a positive person - eg: "It interested me, helping people, saving people, making people feel better" (Interviewee 14). "Presentation of the speaker himself as a generous person with a good heart does not relate directly to the story of the relationship or the murder, but it may create a picture for the listener of a person who is incapable of cruelty. It thus may contribute to creating the positive image desired by the speaker and pave the way for the description of the horrible act — to show that it is not in keeping with his character and nature" (Dilmon and Timor 2014 p1133).

ii) The victim as a negative person - eg: "Nothing satisfied her... My wife was greedy... That's what interested her - the money" (I2). This was part of the presentation of the victim as to blame for the murder.

iii) Explanation for the murder - Two main themes emerged here - provocation by the woman, and self-defence. In the former case, I2 reported being called a "deadbeat" and being spat at by his wife, while I5 explained that he was reacting to an attempt to stab him (self-defence).
Both types of explanation deny premeditation or that the victim was passive. There was also a third

explanation given - a mistake - eg: "I took a knife, she's sitting here (uses his hand to show his left side). I open a beer with a knife, because the bottle opener broke. I tried to pull the knife, and the cap flew at her. She yelled, said, 'Ow!'... I hurt her with the knife, hurt her in the chest. I didn't even see blood" (I13). "The speaker describes how he fatally stabbed his wife in the chest with a knife, without having had any intention of doing so. While he was trying to open a beer bottle, his knife flew sideways, hitting his wife in the chest. Her death was simply a mistake" (Dilmon and Timor 2014 p1135).

iv) Linguistic devices - There were a number of linguistic devices used by the speakers to distance themselves from responsibility - eg: the use of passive verbs: "She was murdered next to the house, by a knife" (I12); "there was an injury to her throat... things got out of control" (I8). Other devices included "linguistic hedging" (eg: "I don't remember... In court they say that it's possible that maybe a stone flew at him" (I10) [17], "contrastive 'but'" (eg: "I wasn't violent with my women. But, for example, if someone did something to me - I'd get back at them" (I7) [18], and repetitions (eg: "I remember taking the knife and throwing it, but I don't see anything, don't see anything, it's all a blur" (I6) [19].

Dilmon and Timor (2014) summed up: "The speaker is faced with a very tough challenge: trying to change his social image as perceived by the representative of society. If he is able to accomplish this, he will receive approval for a more positive image than that of a cruel murderer. If he fails in this, he may experience social exclusion, apathy, depression and other psychological problems ...To create a narrative that will suit his purpose, he uses the ultimate tools at his disposal. He turns the tables and describes himself in the most flattering colours and the murder victim in the most negative fashion. In doing so, he becomes the real victim in the narrative and his partner, the murder victim, the true criminal. Even when he admits that he caused the death of his partner, for the most part he does not define the act as murder, but rather as an act

---

[17] Dilmon and Timor (2014) pointed out: "The fact that a stone was thrown is made light of twice by the use of two minimisers: 'it's possible' and 'maybe' the event occurred. The tactic introduces doubt: The event may not have occurred" (p1139).
[18] "The speaker claims he was not violent and them immediately contradicts himself. The final implication of his comments is that if necessary, he is actually violent" (Dilmon and Timor 2014 p1140).
[19] "In doing so he emphasises his claim that he was not in possession of his faculties at the time of the event" (Dilmon and Timor 2014 p1141).

of self-defence, in response to a provocation, or for reason of insanity" (p1143).

2.5. "DIRTY WORK"

"Dirty work" (Hughes 1958) refers to a "physically tainted occupation" (Ashford and Kreiner 1999) that involves dirt and danger, and so is viewed as distasteful or undesirable, like the butcher trade. "Dirty work" has the "potential to damage feelings of self-worth and is often carried out by those at 'lower levels' of the social hierarchy" (Simpson et al 2014) [20].

Simpson et al (2014) explored how twenty-six male butchers in London and Devon dealt with such issues in a traditional "masculine" trade (which is also in decline with the rise of butcher counters in supermarkets). "In the context of butchery, the daily contact with the 'powerful pollutant' of dead meat can create, from Ackroyd (2007), a 'defilement' that is difficult to assuage. Butchers must routinely deal with potentially unpleasant sights, smells and sensations: blood stains their clothing and lodges under fingernails; offal is malodorous and offensive to the touch; skills such as cutting and filleting and implements such as knives and grinders can potentially put men's bodies at risk" (Simpson et al 2014 p758).

The interviews explored the occupation, and experiences of the men, and broad themes were drawn out from the analysis of the transcripts.

1. "Notions of sacrifice: choice, acceptance and physicality of work" - The men, who would be viewed as working-class, had found their way into the occupation (eg: a Saturday job as a teenager), and had not changed mainly because of limited opportunities to do so (ie: few educational qualifications).

For working-class men, "job choices are often made by accident, with little meanings attached to different types of work. Instead, despite acknowledgement of its limitations ('that's all I've done'), value is attached to employment per se ('it's a job'). Here, particular pride was taken in occupational longevity, where continuity and effort were presented as integral to notions of work, carrying traditional meanings of resilience and discipline" (Simpson et al 2014 p762). Meaning was constructed then in the ability to endure the

---

[20] Skeggs (2004) described how the working-class can be positioned as undeserving, which has consequences for the sense of self - "working-class lives are characterised by limited choice and opportunity, with individuals often perceived as 'passive agents' (Sennett and Cobb, 1972) who misuse and/or waste any opportunities on offer." (Simpson et al 2014 p757).

physical demands (eg: carrying heavy carcass; working in refrigerated conditions) (sometimes called "physical capital"), and in making the sacrifice as the family breadwinner (eg: their children having "aspirations to do something more").

 2. "Changing work practices and erosions of physical capital" - Increasing regulations and the decline of the small butcher's shop was lamented. One interviewee said: "It's always been a physical job... that didn't bother me. And then sort of gradually over the years it's become, you know, you are more like an office worker now than a butcher. Everything has to be recorded... It's become sort of, yeah, it's too clinical" (Simpson et al 2014 p764).

 3. "'Authentic' trade practices and distinctiveness" - A pride in the shared membership of a trade, which is lost in supermarkets. One interviewee said: "We hang our beef for 28 days – if you go to a supermarket it's literally been killed one day and it's in the cabinet the next". While another said: "You see they're not real butchers in a supermarket. A lot of their stuff all you need is a Stanley knife, open the box and put it out.. they haven't got the same skills as we have" (Simpson et al 2014 p765).

 Simpson et al (2014) summed up: The interviewees "mourn the loss of weighty loads as beef is processed offsite; they dwell on the physical endurance that used to be required; they regret the bureaucratisation that has removed practices and aspects of dirt; they experience as loss the heavy knife work that was involved" (p766). These features were part of the meaning and belonging that help the individuals cope with the low social value of "dirty work". The authors described the features as "forming part of a working-class 'habitus' [21]" (Simpson et al 2014 p754).

2.6. YOUNG WHITE WORKING-CLASS

 A variety of colloquial terms with negative connotations are used to describe an "undeserving poor" (young, poor and White) in the West, including "trailer park trash" (USA), "bogans" (Australia), "neds" (Scotland), "chavs", "pikies" and "scallies" (England)

---

[21] This draws on the work of Bourdieu (eg: 1984). "Habitus" refers to "sets of 'dispositions' informed by particular social and cultural conditions, or 'fields', that structure judgement and practices and which, together, generate value to different forms of capital" (Simpson et al 2014 p755).

(Nayak and Kehily 2014). Such terms are "recognisable taxonomies of class derision in late modernity" (Nayak and Kehily 2014).

How do individuals given these labels manage the stigma? Nayak and Kehily (2014) replied that "young people may be aware of the deeply affective nature of these signs and attempt to displace such representations by reimagining themselves in alternative ways, for example, as competent carers, friendly folk or active citizens" (p1331). In other words, "forms of negotiation, resistance and reappropriation" with these labels/stereotypes.

Nayak and Kehily (2014) used data from an ethnographic study in a high-unemployment area of Newcastle in Northern England, and from first-time young working-class mothers in South-East England. Individuals in both groups came under the official category of NEETS (not in education, employment or training), estimated at 15% of young people (1.07 m) in 2013 (Nayak and Kehily 2014).

In the first sample, the focus was upon understanding the identity of "chavs" or "charvers". For example, "Crystal" distinguished it from being poor - "How dare people say that chavas are all about poverty! I come from Newcastle but not everyone dresses, talks and acts the way they are made out to. Chavism is a personal fashion statement and one which should be respected and admired by others" (p1335). In postings on a web forum about the topic, it was clear that "chav identity" is a contested one around the clothes worn and the music liked, as well as everyday talk in the Newcastle area where these aspects are embraced but the "thick and thieving" stereotype is rejected. Nayak and Kehily (2014) stated: "Interestingly, some young people who spoke disparagingly about charver style in one context were willing to admit that they were 'a bit charver' in their tastes towards Rave music and certain elements of fashion, which could be 'toned down' or 'played up' according to time and place. At the very least, this suggests some emergent, partial and ambiguous identification that works against a national discourse of derision" (p1338).

Nayak and Kehily (2014) gave an example of the reappropriation of the term: "Comments about chavs as 'the friendliest people I know', 'respecting all your friends' and treating 'mates like family' are then part of a deeper psychosocial stitching together of working-class respectability, a recuperation that entails a moral revaluing of everyday life" (p1338).

In relation to young working-class mothers (sometimes called "pramface"), who often lived with their parents, were single, and dependent on State benefit,

they existed in a cultural context where motherhood is presented as "the apex of feminine achievement and a celebration of romantic coupledom for women who have put education and career first. Pregnancy magazines, for example, celebrate the increased visibility of pregnancy and the confidence of mature motherhood. While older mothers are depicted as hosting pink champagne baby showers spilling over with designer accessories..." (Nayak and Kehily 2014 p1339). For these young mothers, "the pregnant tummy was a potential source of shame, the locus of attention and judgment" (Nayak and Kehily 2014).

This was resisted by the "tummy flash". For example, "Zoe" said: "[At the parenting class] some girls cover their bump and some girls don't. I usually do but sometimes my tops do rise and I think that's what they were shocked about 'cos some of my tummy was hanging out" (p1340).

Nayak and Kehily (2014) described another way that the young women dealt with society's view of them:

> Other young women in the study found ways of managing stigma and performing respectability through practices of consumption. In an effort to make limited resources go a long way, many young women developed a finely tuned pecuniary knowledge, investing in a stylisation of themselves as well-informed and experienced shoppers. By making particular consumer choices, young mothers-to-be demonstrated their capacity to care and their readiness to be a mother. While chav culture is associated with the 'bling' of excessive and conspicuous consumption, early motherhood signalled the end of selfish and self-centred spending and the beginning of responsible adulthood where baby comes first... A haunting feature of young women's accounts is the need to claim their status as good mothers through consumption. There is an insistence on buying everything new to showcase a fitness for motherhood (p1341).

"Mumtaz" is an example of this when she said: "I'm gonna buy the nicest pram, my pram has to be wicked. I don't wanna be walking down the street with a bad pram. Don't want people to think, you know, I can't provide for my baby. Oh my God, of course I can provide for my baby" (p1341).

Nayak and Kehily (2014) described "the discursive clearing of spoiled identities... to make hygienic what is publicly regarded as toxic" by both groups. For the "chavs it was their friendliness, while for the young mothers it was "the recasting of motherhood as a quasi-universal experience for women that seeks to render age irrelevant and the negative affect attributed to the 'teenage mum' redundant" (p1342).

2.7. APPENDIX 2A - SYKES AND MATZA (1957)

Individuals found guilty of crimes do not necessarily accept that guilt, and they find ways to attribute blame away from themselves. Sykes and Matza (1957) described five "techniques of neutralisation" that allowed offenders to deny that their actions were harmful or wrong.

i) Denial of responsibility (eg: blaming their upbringing) - The offender provides "a 'billiard ball' conception of himself in which he sees himself as helplessly propelled into new situations" (p667).

ii) Denial of injury to victim - eg: vandalism is "mischief", and "does not really cause any great harm".

iii) Denial of victim - Transforming the victim into "a person deserving injury".

iv) Condemnation of condemners (ie: critical of criminal justice system) - "a bitter cynicism directed against those assigned the task of enforcing or expressing the norms of the dominant society" (p668).

v) Appeal to higher loyalties (eg: peers).

Blaming the victim for their own misfortune is an example of a "defensive attributional mindset", and offenders are making an external attribution for their behaviour.

These are all attempts at minimalisation - ie justification of the offender's or delinquent's behaviour by suggesting that it is not that bad. Sykes and Matza (1957) called it "essentially an unrecognised extension of defences to crimes, in the form of justifications for deviance that are seen as valid by the delinquent but not by the legal system or society at large" (p666).

Measures of the attribution of blame have been developed by researchers, like the Blame Attribution Inventory and the Attribution of Blame Scale (ABS). The ABS measures the level of blaming of the victims, themselves, alcohol, or society by the offender for their behaviour. Respondents rate their level of agreement with statements like "victims of crime nearly always deserve what they get", "women entice men to rape them", and "living in a bad neighbourhood is the cause of most crime" (Di Fazio et al 1997).

Techniques of neutralisation, denials and justifications can come together in a worldview for the offender that sees their crimes as entirely acceptable

(eg: Willott and Griffin 1999; table 2.2).

- Aim: To explore male economic crime offenders' justifications for their behaviour.

- Procedure: Nine group discussions were carried out in the West Midlands, England with sixty-six working-class men serving probation orders in the community for economic crimes (eg: burglary). The discussion was started by asking the men about the relationship between crime and needing or wanting money. Then the discussions were allowed to develop without limits by the researchers. This is why they were classed as semi-structured group discussion.
    The researchers later analysed the transcripts of the discussions for relevant themes.

- Findings: Five overarching and inter-related themes emerged from the analysis.

    i) "We're meant to be the criminals, but they're the biggest criminals" - This theme involved the men presenting "themselves as decent folk who are forced into 'crime' by a knowing and unjust State system" (p451). For example, "Martin" said: "If you're claiming unemployment and social and doing a little bit of work on the side, that's classified as a crime, even though the social money isn't enough for you to live on".

    ii) "From the cradle to the grave"? - broken promises - The previous theme was emphasised as the men talked about governments failing to provide adequate support in terms of the Welfare State.

    iii) Men as family breadwinners - Because the State has failed, the men are forced to fend for themselves in order to fulfil their role as family breadwinners. This allowed them to present their theft "as putting their children first".

    iv) "It's time to build your own lifeboat" - The previous theme is fully developed in the idea that the men had a duty to do whatever they could to get money for the family.

    v) "Robin Hood, Robin Hood" - This theme meant that "the men can argue that crime through theft is morally acceptable if you steal from the rich and give to the poor". For example, "Mark" told the story of a prisoner he met who "done a residential burglary an' all he'd took out of the place was food, to feed his kids, that's all he took, didn't take nothing else, just emptied the food cupboards".

- Conclusion: Willott and Griffin (1999) stated that these themes together showed how "these men can position themselves as decent men who, in being forced by a criminal State to build their own economic lifeboat, adhere to a moral code whereby a redistribution of wealth along the lines implied by the Robin Hood narrative is acceptable if women and children are first into the lifeboat" (p456).

- Evaluation: The strength of the study was that it showed how criminals make sense and justify their behaviour. It did not try to examine whether what was said was true or not. Interviewing the men in a group may have encouraged them to talk honestly, or meant that there was more bravado and impression management (eg "good family man").

Table 2.2 - Willott and Griffin (1999).

2.8. REFERENCES

Ackroyd, S (2007) Dirt, work and dignity. In Bolton, S (ed) <u>Dimensions of Dignity at Work</u> Amsterdam: Elsevier

Ashford, B & Kreiner, G (1999) "How can you do it?" Dirty work and the challenge of constructing a positive identity <u>Academy of Management Review</u> 24, 3, 413-434

Austin, J.L (1961) <u>Philosophical Papers</u> Oxford: Oxford University Press

Aydemir, N et al (2011) A comparative study of health related quality of life, psychological well-being, impact of illness and stigma in epilepsy and migraine <u>Seizure</u> 20, 679-685

Bourdieu, P (1984) <u>Distinction</u> London: Routledge

Corrigan, P et al (2006) The self-stigma of mental illness: Implications for self esteem and self efficacy <u>Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology</u> 25, 9, 875-884

Di Fazio, R et al (1997) The Attribution of Blame Scale with an incarcerated sample: Factor structure, reliability and validity <u>Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health</u> 7, 153-164

Dilmon, R & Timor, W (2014) The narrative of men who murder their partners: How reliable is it? <u>International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology</u> 58, 10, 1125-1149

Finch, B.K et al (2000) Perceived discrimination and depression among Mexican-origin adults in California <u>Journal of Health and Social Behaviour</u> 41, 295-313

Goffman, E (1963) <u>Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity</u> New York: Simon & Schuster

Hughes, E (1958) <u>Men and Their Work</u> Glencoe, IL: Free Press

Lebowitz, M.S & Ahn, W-K (2014) Effects of biological explanations for mental disorders on clinicians' empathy <u>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA</u> 111, 50, 17786-17790

Nayak, A & Kehily, M.J (2014) Chavs, chavettes and pramface girls: Teenage mothers, marginalised young men and the management of stigma <u>Journal of Youth Studies</u> 17, 10, 1330-1345

Rao, D et al (2009) Measuring stigma across neurological conditions: The development of the stigma scale for chronic illness (SSCI) <u>Quality of Life Research</u> 18, 5, 585-595

Sennett, R & Cobb, J (1972) <u>The Hidden Injuries of Class</u> Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Simpson, R et al (2014) Sacrifice and distinction in dirty work: Men's construction of meaning in the butcher trade <u>Work, Employment and Society</u> 28, 5, 654-770

Skeggs, B (2004) <u>Class, Self and Culture</u> London: Routledge

Sykes, G & Matza, D (1957) Techniques of neutralisation <u>American Sociological Review</u> 22, 664-670

Willott, S & Griffin, C (1999) Building your own lifeboat: Working-class male offenders talk about economic crime <u>British Journal of Social Psychology</u> 38, 445-460

Wood, J.T (2004) Monsters and victims: Male felons' accounts of intimate partner violence <u>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</u> 21, 555-576

Young, W.B et al (2013) The stigma of migraine <u>PLoS ONE</u> 8, 1, e54074 (Freely available at http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0054074)

3. SLEEP AND MENOPAUSE

The menopause is defined as amenorrhea (no menstrual bleeding) for twelve consecutive months after the last period. The average age is early 50s, and the menopausal transition (peri-menopause) can begin 8-10 years before as the production of oestrogen by the ovaries decreases (Taranikanti et al 2014).

Around 25-50% of women during menopause have a sleep problem compared to 15% of the general population, with the most common problems being insomnia [22] and sleep disordered breathing (Eichling and Sahni 2005). Progesterone has an effect on breathing (ie: stimulates), and a reduction in it may explain the increased sleep apnea at menopause (Eichling and Sahni 2005). Low oestrogen is associated with increased awakenings after sleep, particularly when progesterone is also low. While oestrogen replacement increases the amount of slow-wave and REM (rapid eye movement) sleep, and reported sleep quality (Eichling and Sahni 2005).

The vasomotor symptoms (eg: nocturnal hot flushes or sweats, headaches, fatigue, mood swings) "may cause or at least contribute to sleep problems" (Kalleinen et al 2008 p97) [23].

Taranikanti et al (2014) found more sleep problems among peri-menopausal and post-menopausal women than pre-menopausal in an Indian cross-sectional study. Two hundred and seventy women attending a hospital in Hyderabad were questioned about insomnia. This study has a number of methodological issues:

- No details are given about the recruitment process, nor the reason for attending the hospital as outpatients.

- The women were divided into four groups based on age (below 40, 41-45, 46-50, and older than 50 years), and a number of each group had "attained menopause".

- No details of how "attained menopause" was measured.

- No standardised questionnaire was used. No details are given of the exact questions asked and the scoring of replies used.

Freeman et al (2015) noted that "evidence indicating

---

[22] For example, post-menopausal women with insomnia have lower melatonin levels, and this is influenced by oestrogen (Eichling and Sahni 2005).

[23] The "sleep disruption could be a result of hot flashes themselves, an increased sensitivity to disrupting events or a loss of some other sleep maintaining quality of oestrogen. The disruptionsthen can create insomnia" (Eichling and Sahni 2005 p294).

that biological decline in ovarian function has direct effects on sleep is limited and controversial. Furthermore, a time course of poor sleep relative to the final menstrual period (FMP), the primary marker of ovarian senescence, has not been identified" (p1).

Freeman et al (2015) used data from 255 women in the sixteen-year Penn Ovarian Aging Study cohort, which followed 436 women randomly telephone recruited in Philadelphia in 1996 aged 35-48 years old.

The last assessment in 2012 was telephone-based, and included the question: "Have you experienced trouble sleeping in the past month?". The frequency and severity of insomnia, based on further questions to "yes" answers, was scored as mild (1), moderate (2), or severe (3) poor sleep (primary outcome variable). Time since FMP was established.

The prevalence of moderate/severe poor sleep was just under one-third throughout the menopausal transition, and did not change. Pre-menopausal sleep status was the strongest predictor of peri-menopausal sleep status. For example, moderate/severe poor sleepers pre-menopause were around two to three times more likely to report moderate/severe poor sleep subsequently. This study has the strength of a longitudinal design, which follows the same individuals over time rather than a cross-sectional design that compares groups at one point in time.

But the measure of sleep was subjective (though the researchers argued that it was a valid measure - correlated with a standardised measure). Also the researchers "were unable to evaluate possible conditions underlying sleep disturbances or whether the types of complaints associated with poor sleep changed during the reporting period. Furthermore, the data were not sufficient to control for the use of medications related to sleep..." (Freeman et al 2015 p7).

They also admitted: "It is possible that including women who had sleep difficulties at pre-menopausal baseline obscured information about poor sleep that first occurred in the menopausal transition. Further studies evaluating sleep disturbances that first occur in the menopausal transition may identify whether there is a menopause-specific form of sleep disturbance" (Freeman et al 2015 p7).

There may be changes in sleep architecture (eg: stages of sleep) during the menopause, but these can be difficult to distinguish from ageing generally (Eichling and Sahni 2005). Though some studies comparing pre- and post-menopausal women have found no difference (eg: Shaver et al 1988), or better sleep after the menopause (eg: Sharkey et al 2003). Young et al (2003), for

instance, found lower sleep efficiency [24] pre-menopause. Kalleinen et al (2008) commented about the different findings: "The fact that the findings were in different sleep variables further complicates the interpretation of the influence of the menopause on sleep. Variation in sample sizes could partly explain these different findings" (p102). Furthermore: "Most of the studies examining the interactions between menopause and sleep compare pre-, peri- or postmenopausal groups in settings where it is difficult to differentiate between the menopausal and age effects" (Kalleinen et al 2008 p98).

These researchers took this into account in their study in Finland, which compared three groups of women - 20 pre-menopausal (aged 45-51 years), 28 post-menopausal (aged 59-71), and eleven controls (20-26 years old).

The women spent two consecutive nights in a sleep laboratory with objective measures as well as completing questionnaires about subjective sleep quality [25], and keeping a sleep diary for a month.

The objective measures showed significant differences between the controls and both groups of older women, but not between the pre- and post-menopausal women (eg: less total sleep). Similar age differences were found for self-rated insomnia (figure 3.1).

Kalleinen et al (2008) summed up: "Our results confirm earlier observations that post-menopausal women are less satisfied with their sleep than their pre-menopausal counterparts. However, neither direct (polygraphic sleep recordings) nor indirect measures of sleep disturbances (cognitive function tests, assessment of sleepiness and mood) revealed any clue of possible mechanisms or consequences of the poor sleep perceived by postmenopausal women. Major impairments in objective sleep quality were observed only when comparing pre- and postmenopausal women with young women. Thus, it seems that age rather than the menopausal state per se contributes to these changes" (p102).

[24] Time asleep as percentage of total time in bed.
[25] Eg: Basic Nordic Sleep Questionnaire (BNSQ) (Partinen and Gislason 1995) - insomnia in past three months.

(a) Sleep efficiency

(b) Total sleep time

(c) BNSQ insomnia score

(Data from Kalleinen et al 2008 table 2 p100)

Figure 3.1 - Three significant differences between controls and older women.

REFERENCES

Eichling, P.S & Sahni, J (2005) Menopause related sleep disorders Journal of Clinical Sleep Medicine 1, 3, 291-300

Freeman, E.W et al (2015) Poor sleep in relation to natural menopause: A population-based 14-year follow-up of midlife women Menopause (http://journals.lww.com/menopausejournal/Abstract/publishahead/Poor_sleep_in_relation_to_natural_menopause___a.98251.aspx)

Kalleinen, N et al (2008) Sleep and the menopause - do post-menopausal women experience worse sleep than pre-menopausal women? Menopause International 14, 97-104

Partinen, M & Gislason, T (1995) Basic nordic sleep questionnaire (BSNQ): A quantitated measure of subjective sleep complaints Journal of Sleep Research 4, 150-155

Sharkey, K.M et al (2003) Effects of menopausal status on sleep in midlife women Behavioral Sleep Medicine 1, 69-80

Shaver, J et al (1988) Sleep patterns and stability in peri-menopausal women Sleep 11, 556-561

Taranikanti, M et al (2014) Sleep disturbance in women during menopausal transition and menopause International Journal of Biomedical and Advance Research 5, 10, 496-498

Young, T et al (2003) Objective and subjective sleep quality in pre-menopausal, peri-menopausal, and post-menopausal women in the Wisconsin sleep cohort study Sleep 26, 667-672