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An independent academic psychologist, based in England, who has written extensively on different areas of psychology with an emphasis on the critical stance towards traditional ideas.

A complete listing of his writings at http://psychologywritings.synthasite.com/.

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1. WOMEN AND ISIS

1.1. INTRODUCTION

The "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria" (ISIS) [1] has attracted many women from the "West" to its ranks (eg: 600 Western female recruits according to "Time Magazine" in December 2015; Zafar 2018) [2] [3]. Some of the women accompanied their husbands, but lone women also migrated to ISIS territory, "motivated by different reasons and priorities, ranging from the romantic ideal of marrying a 'lion', that is, a combatant for the faith, to earning a well-rewarded eternal life" (Viano 2018a p2).

Though it is difficult to create profiles of Western women who migrate to ISIS territory, Peresin (2018) summarised what is known:

- Mainly 16-24 years old;
- Mostly travelled with families/relatives;
- The majority were descendants of Muslim immigrants, but also converts to Islam.

ISIS has a dual attitude towards women. "Women it considers heretics are treated as slaves, whose main role is to be commodities that can be traded and given away

[1] Also known as Daesh.
[2] But the same article estimates 700 female recruits from Tunisia alone (Zafar 2018).
[3] Peresin (2018) quoted 5000 men and 550 women from the West (without specifying a time period).

as rewards to jihadist fighters" (Peresin 2018 p33). On the other hand, Muslim women who migrate to its territory are viewed as important in building the "Caliphate".

1.2. ROLES FOR WOMEN

Zafar (2018) reviewed secondary sources, including "The New York Times", the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and "The Guardian", and distinguished thirteen female roles in the whole ISIS network:

1. Mothers, wives and daughters of ISIS fighters - Little freedom following a strict code of conduct.

2. "Morality police" - Members of the above group who ensured the strict code of conduct was followed [4].

3. "Sisterhood preachers" - Members of the first group and migrants to ISIS territory who preached the message of ISIS to women and children within ISIS territory.

4. Teachers, doctors and paramedics - A small number.

5. "Jihadi brides" - Women who migrated to ISIS in "the most romantic of all pull instruments so far used by the ISIS propaganda machines" (Zafar 2018 p15).

The term "jihadi brides" fits gendered stereotypes, but Peresin (2018) was clear about "an active participation of ISIS women in violence or their active support of it. There are many posts in the social media in which ISIS women support and celebrate brutality and violence, even against other women. They justify the mistreatment and sexual abuse of Yazidi women and girls, run slave markets and support and conduct punishments of women who do not abide by the required behaviour and dress code. They also rival the men when it comes to brutality. They call for 'more beheadings', celebrate executions of hostages and approve crucifixion" (p37).

6. "Sex slaves" - Women from minority groups (eg: Yazidi communities of Iraq and Syria). "Since ISIS has adopted a distorted Islamic decree that permits a holy fighter to have sex with the captive female slave, the ISIS fighters use the provision as a lifestyle entertainment. The medical examinations carried out at a United Nations clinic on such girls in Northern Iraq

[4] 400 women, according to Issacharoff (2016 quoted in Ben-Israel 2018).

revealed that only 5% of the abused captive girls actually got pregnant because 95% of them were forced to used pills and injections as contraceptive measures" (Zafar 2018 p15).

7. Religious converts - "Not only are non-Muslims considered infidels, but every Muslim whether Sunni or Shi'ite who refuses to accept the ISIS version of Islam is declared an infidel" (Zafar 2018 p16).

8. Social media: propaganda experts and recruiters - Foreigner females recruited by ISIS who can spread their message through social media in their own language.

9. Interpreters - For example, for "negotiation, trading, kidnapping and extortion-based business enterprises of ISIS the interpreters are used with key wheelers and dealers of ISIS. Most women interpreters are used in the illicit dark trade of sex slaves in slave markets as well as for trade across territorial borders and the ISIS groups/command structures within the larger IS territory" (Zafar 2018 p17).

10. International terrorists.

11. "Lone wolves" - These are "ideological followers in isolated places who are not directly in communication with the command structure of ISIS" (Zafar 2018 pp17-18).

12. "Sympathisers" - Spreading ISIS ideology (usually living outside ISIS territory).

13. "Reluctant romantics" - "A variety of ulterior motives from adventurism, sexuality, authority, identity, power, recognition and financial gains drives the fantasies of these reluctant fundamentalists" (Zafar 2018 p18).

A study of the ISIS magazine found women portrayed in five ways - contributor, mother/sister/wife, defender/fighter, corruptor, and victim. "Each of these female archetypes fits into one of two categories: part of the revered ingroup identity and its divinely ordained solutions or part of a despised out-group identity and a cause of crises" (Ingram 2016 quoted in Ben-Israel 2018) [5].

[5] Barna (2018) described the leaders of groups like ISIS as "false prophets". For marginalised and alienated individuals, their ideologies "offer their followers the feeling of being part of a group and of regaining self-confidence by promising them a 'superior', 'divine' destiny" (p159).

1.3. REASONS FOR MIGRATING

Viano (2018a) summarised five major reasons for women migrating to ISIS territory:

i) Oppression of the Muslims - A belief that "Western powers" are at war with Islam (appendix 1A). "The world is described in black and white, in binary terms as if there are two clearly defined opposing entities in an epic struggle with one another: the camp of the imam (that is, belief) versus the camp of the kefir (that is, unbelief)" (Viano 2018a p2).

ii) Building the Caliphate [6] - "Many of the migrant women are drawn by a combination of fantasy and the feeling that, by joining ISIS, they will be empowered, have an exciting life, and do something meaningful with their lives" (Viano 2018a p3).

iii) Individual duty and identity - Building a Muslim caliphate is seen as an obligatory religious duty.

iv) Earthly rewards, marriage - The "romantic idea of marrying a brave and noble warrior" (Viano 2018a p3).

v) Alienation and isolation - No sense of belonging in their country of birth or citizenship.

Peresin (2018) divided the push and pull motivating factors into three main groups - political, ideological (including religious), and personal motivations. The push factors included perceived oppression of Muslims, "identity crisis" of descendants of Muslim immigrants in the West, and personal dissatisfactions with own life, while the push factors included to play an important role in building a utopian society.

de Leede (2018) analysed the "road to terrorism" with three levels of factors:

a) Macro-level (societal, international and national factors) - eg: concern for wider Muslim community (Ummah).

b) Meso-level (group dynamics) - eg: peers as recruiter and group pressure.

c) Micro-level (individual, personal factors) - eg: personal trauma.

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[6] The proclamation of the "Caliphate" was made in June 2014 by the self-proclaimed Caliph, and leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Peresin 2018).

Weesnik's (2015) analysis of police files on young women in the Netherlands who tried to go to Syria showed some had a trouble past (appendix 1B). "Such experiences of course are not a necessary pre-condition for radicalisation, nor do they automatically lead to radicalisation, but they can make a person more susceptible to the rhetoric of extremists... For some women, travelling to Syria or Iraq provided an opportunity to start a new and independent life" (de Leede 2018 p47) (appendix 1C).

Five case studies were provided by de Leede (2018) to show the diversity of women attracted by ISIS (table 1.1).

Name	Key Details
Aqsa Mahmood	Raised in affluent neighbourhood of Glasgow; father from Pakistan; started degree in diagnostic radiology; secretly travelled to Syria at 19 years old.
Shukri F	Somali-Dutch; involved in recruiting members and disseminating ISIS materials; imprisoned in her early 20s.
Moezdalifa el A	15 year-old stopped on way from the Netherlands to Syria.
Nora el-Bathy	French 15 year-old; wanted to be doctor; disappeared from home in January 2014; seen in Syria.
Sophie Kasiki (not real name)	Born in Congo and raised as Catholic; moved to France at 9 years old where mother died soon afterwards; converted to Islam in 20s; working as social worker with immigrants in Paris; persuaded by three men to go to Syria in September 2014 with four year-old son; managed to escape with son; reported that had been tricked by three men.

Table 1.1 - Five diverse case studies of women involved with ISIS.

1.3.1. Pakistan

Pakistan has a special place in the recent history of "jihad", according to Gul (2018), as it is "usually known as the hub of the global militant and terrorists, a place which served as the springboard for the US-led anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s, a facilitation centre for the obscurantist Afghan Taliban movement, and a birthplace of the vicious Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan; TTP). Parts of it, particularly the north-western border territories, have also been known to serve as a transit area, a conduit as well as a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and its latest competitor Islamic State (IS) or Daesh" (p79).

Gul (2018) noted that "as of January 2016, a definite trend of female involvement with and for Daesh in Pakistan was discernible" (p85). For example, three female-led Lahore families moved to Syria to join ISIS, and a twenty-member group of female ISIS supporters was reported by the Karachi police in late 2015 (Gul 2018).

In a survey of attitudes towards ISIS in 2017, though the majority of respondents in Pakistan did not express an opinion, around a quarter had a negative view, which was much less than other Muslim countries, like Lebanon, Malaysia, and Indonesia (Gul 2018).

Gul (2018) pointed out the presence of radical Sunni Salafi mosques and seminaries in the country that "serve as the recruitment centres and the springboards for the 'jihad'" (p87), generally.

Factors that influence female involvement in terrorism specifically include, in the north-western and south Punjab territories, "ingrained religiosity, conservative social surroundings, and little exposure to modern knowledge that can help them think critically" (Gul 2018 pp87-88). Gul (2018) reported witnessing clerics in these area encouraging women to donate valuables to support jihad, and "women at times would upend men in the zeal to donate to what they had been made to believe was a sacred cause" (p88).

Other more general factors can be linked to Pakistan's situation, including "the rule of military dictators who were looking for international legitimacy, and thus became willing partners in campaigns that were geo-political in nature but entailed disastrous socio-political consequences. During the anti-Moscow jihad, Pakistani army-led authorities welcomed anyone from around the world. Despots 'emptied their jails' to help shore up the jihadi forces in Afghanistan, with the help of over US $6 billion that the CIA funnelled into the war" (Gul 2015 quoted in Gul 2018).

1.3.2. Theories

Sarnecki (2018) applied criminology/sociology theories to the case of Sweden, from where approximately thirty women (about 10% of the total) had left for Syria in 2016. These traditional theories included:

i) Individual physiological theories - eg: Low levels of the monoamine oxidise A (MAOA) gene and propensity to violence.

Applicability - "There are currently no studies on the central nervous system functions of individuals who might be labelled violent extremists. By definition, these individuals have a propensity for violence, but we

do not know why this is the case" (Sarnecki 2018 p124). Limited use for explaining female migration to ISIS territory.

ii) Social disorganisation and bonds - eg; A lack of social bonds that usually inhibit offending behaviour and attach an individual to mainstream society (Hirschi 1969).

Applicability - ISIS recruitment is focused on economically deprived areas where individuals may lack social bonds. The majority of women from Sweden who migrated to ISIS territory seemed to come from such areas (Sarnecki 2018).

iii) Learning - eg: Associating with criminals leads to the learning of their behaviour (differential association - Sutherland 1947).

Applicability - Individuals may not meet criminal face-to-face, but the Internet allows them to do so.

iv) Strain Theory (Merton 1938) - Strain (frustrations) from a mismatch between an individual's goals and their ability to achieve them can lead to deviant behaviour.

Applicability - Sarnecki (2018) stated that "many of the individuals who occupy somewhat more prominent positions in the various extremist environments may be experiencing a form of strain that is related not so much to their own situation as to the situation of the ethnic, religious or national group with which they identify" (p130).

v) Culture conflicts and sub-cultures - Conflict between the culture (values) of mainstream society and the sub-culture of certain groups.

Applicability - Some individuals are "unable to, or at least believe that they are unable to, establish themselves in the society in which they have grown up or may even have been born. They perceive themselves to be subject to discrimination, for example, in the form of racism, class oppression or some other form of ideological oppression. As a result, they develop a longing to return to their, often idealised, 'roots'. They reject a society to which they do not believe they will ever belong and instead adopt a radical position in relation to their situation. This position sometimes

leads to an identification with extreme groups that engage in acts of brutal violence against the society that the young people have failed to become part of" (Sarnecki 2018 p131).

vi) Labelling theory (Becker 1963) - Individuals labelled negatively by society face discrimination which leads them to fulfil the negative label.

Applicability - Immigrants, particularly Muslims, In Sweden face negative expectations which increase the risk of contact with the criminal justice system (Sarnecki 2018).

vii) Marxist theory - Violence is a product of inter-class conflicts in society, particularly as those in power are suppressing the lower classes.

Applicability - ISIS uses the argument that violence is necessary to defend their group in a conflict, but the conflict is presented as the West versus Islam.

The applicability of a number of the theories assumes a relatively easy transition from offending at home to violent jihad abroad. Referring to interview data, Sarnecki (2018) noted that "the adoption of an extreme form of Islam occurs often in connection with the conclusion of the traditional criminal career. Scholars in the field of life-course criminology often speak of turning points in life, which may lead to desistance from crime... A religious awakening or conversion of some kind is described as one of the possible turning points that can lead to a reduction in or desistance from crime, either temporarily or permanently. This also seems to hold for links to violent jihadist environments, at least with regard to involvement in traditional crime, although there is no cessation of involvement in violence. According to one of my informants, this transition from traditional to ideologically motivated crime is based on the belief that engaging in the battle to achieve the good can purify the individual from the sins he or she has previously committed. These sins will definitely be forgiven if the individual dies a martyr's death" (p136).

Sarnecki (2018) felt that all the theories had some exploratory value, but for male jihadists. The theories were less applicable for explaining why women joined ISIS because traditional theories (developed many years ago) have always been weak at explaining female offending, and because the "women's connection to Daesh is to lesser extent a criminal act, if one compare that with men's joining this organisation. The men, who join Daesh,

do it to a great extent, with the intent to actively participate in outlawed violent activities. Most women, who do this, admittedly accept Daesh violence, but few of them want, and will be allowed, to actively participate in this violence" (Sarnecki 2018 p140).

Barna (2018) considered some key psychological theories:

a) Frustration-aggression hypothesis - Aggression follows from frustrations. But Wilkinson (1986) stated that this has "too little to say about prejudice and hate [...] and about fanatic behaviours which play an important role in boosting extreme violence" (quoted in Barna 2018).

b) Negative identity theory (Knutson 1981) - Based on the psychodynamic ideas of Erikson, the negative feelings inside are transformed into a new identity. Individuals "start out feeling humiliated, enraged that they are viewed by some 'other' as second class. They take on a new identity on behalf of a purported spiritual cause. The weak become strong [...] rage turns to conviction" (Stern 2003 quoted in Barna 2018).

c) Narcissism-aggression hypothesis - Personal grievances are given greater meaning when attached to a larger ideology, and when humiliated individuals react with violence.

1.4. GENDER STEREOTYPING

Peresin (2018) noted that the "motivations of women joining ISIS do not necessarily differ from the motivations of men making the same decision and can vary from one person to another" (p34).

de Leede (2018) pointed out "how gender stereotyping affects our (sub-conscious) view of female supporters of terrorist groups and female terrorists" (p44). Historically, women have been active in terrorist groups around the world (eg: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC); Brigate Rosse (Red Brigade) in Italy; Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka) (de Leede 2018) [7].

Eager (2008) argued that violent women are viewed by society as aberrant, except for in self defence of herself and her children, and so those participate in political violence and terrorism are not necessarily taken seriously (eg: manipulated, forced or misled into

[7] For example, between 1985 and 2010, around one-quarter of terrorist suicide bombers were female (Ben-Israel 2018).

involvement).

Sjoberg and Gentry (2007), referring also to academics, talked of "narratives or stories [that] offer different explanations for women's 'anomalous' behaviour, emphasising the singularity and corruption of violent women in an attempt to maintain the stereotype of women as more peaceful than men, leaving little to no room for women's agency in their violence" (de Leede 2018 p45).

Interviews with women who have been in other terrorist groups show that female participants hold views regarding violence the same as the male members (eg: Kashmir; Panashar 2011).

1.5. A FORM OF "FEMINISM"

Fraihi (2018) asked this question of Western females migrating to ISIS territory: "Why do these women and girls, often teenagers, give up their relative freedom in the Western world, only to bury themselves in a society which is fundamentally misogynist and where, within its interpretation of Islamism, the role of women is 'divinely' limited?" (p23).

The same author gave this answer: "The phenomenon of female migration to ISIS... is in fact an undervalued form of revolution for Muslim women [Muslimas]. It is, however, a bitter form of striving for women's emancipation" (p23) [8].

The women in ISIS achieve an "equality" through the keyboard as they share the propaganda, for instance. "Just as male recruiters, the women too become the spin doctors in a widespread machine of propaganda and indoctrination. In the virtual world the extremist Muslima considers herself equal to her brother. Shortly, she becomes a female armchair politician on a keyboard" (Fraihi 2018 p25).

Fraihi (2018) also drew attention to the "romantic longing for the early Islamic times and in particular the empowered female warriors that fought against the adversaries of the prophet Muhammad" (p26). Also to the adolescent "mania of jihadi groupies" (similar to "boyband mania"), which sees the men of ISIS as popular heroes [9].

Another strand of attraction for some women is

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[8] Fraihi (2018) coined the term "oemmaism" to describe "the reactionary form of a so-called emancipation/feminism" (p29).

[9] "Given the choice of a fairly mundane life in a second-tier job in the West, and this rather heroic andromantic image of jihadi life being portrayed by Islamic State propaganda, which is very well crafted, in a paradoxical way this gives women a sense of agency and empowerment" (Kaplan 2014 quoted in Ben-Israel 2018).

ISIS's "message that women are valued, not as sexual objects, but as mothers to the next generation and guardians of ISIS ideology" (Fraihi 2018 p28). Fraihi (2018) continued: "The female jihad is a bitter form of so-called emancipation or even feminism. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of the jihad bride and the jihad mother is an undervalued revolution for women. By passing on extremist thoughts to their offspring the women reinforce their traditional role of motherhood" (p28).

Fraihi (2018) quoted from an interview in 2006 with a woman in Antwerp, who said of her future son: "I will raise him to become a jihadi. I want to make him ready for al akhira (hereafter). Why? For instance, take the body of a martyr, it remains intact. No worm will eat it. And if my son dies as a martyr, he will receive 72 virgins at the doors of heaven. Moreover, his martyrdom will give 72 members of our family access to heaven. As the mother of the martyr, I surely count myself in" (p28).

Shorer (2018) commented on the strict rules that ISIS has for women to mostly remain hidden and indoors, and to concentrate on domestic roles. ISIS material criticises Western culture for stopping women from doing this (ie: being "feminine"), and "thus men's ability to be 'masculine'" (p98).

1.6. SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN

Barna (2018) outlined some myths developed by ISIS recruiters:

- "Knight-hero" (or "superhero") - Only they can change the world for good.
- "Humanitarian hero" - Helping those who are suffering (particularly attractive to female recruits).
- "The one who carries water" - Individuals need a leader to show them what to do.
- "Call of Duty" - Developed from the video game of that name to suggest that the real life war will be as much fun as virtual reality.
- "Limitless" person - Individuals can become anything they want as part of ISIS (ie: fulfil their potential).

Ben-Israel (2018) focused on the combination of digitally aware dissatisfied teenagers from second and third generation Asian-Muslim-oriented immigrant families in Western Europe, and the use made of social media by

ISIS. "ISIS's fans have presence in almost every social network, including Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr, Instagram, YouTube, Telegram and docs-sharing sites. A recent study found that Twitter is ISIS's most effective tool for reaching new recruits. By using popular hashtags (#) linked to cultural phenomena or popular events, ISIS can share its propaganda with millions of users across the world" (Ben-Israel 2018 p57) [10].

The term "ISIS-fangirls" (Melanie Smith quoted in Ben-Israel 2018) has been used to describe the parallel in sentiments to fans of sports clubs and stars, and of the famous in the entertainment world [11]. Ben-Israel (2018) analysed Tumblr (blogs) and Twitter accounts belonging to "ISIS-fangirls" in Western Europe.

"The blogs have a precise mixing of animals, digital technology, Islamic holism, war and military stuff and teenage Western pop culture: lions, Arabian horses, cats and kittens (the most popular online animal), next to holy books, mosques, minarets, Islamic clerics cuddling cats and kittens in courtyards of mosques. In addition, the blogs have mujahideen dressed in uniforms and armed with rifles softly cuddle kittens, executions, knives, Muslim prisoners dressed in orange and yellow uniforms in Guantanamo, AR-15 (M-16) Kalashnikov, AKC-74 Kalashnikov, etc, side by side with images of hearts, strawberries, plenty of pink colour, soft blankets with Disney cartoon pink cat images" (Ben-Israel 2018 p68). To sum up: "a surrealistic mix of Islam, religion, and 'militarism' with kittens, pink and strawberry" (Ben-Israel 2018 p68).

This compares to material from "fangirls" living in ISIS territory, which included "images of the owners of the blogs and their women friends, fully veiled, holding an AK47, or strolling in the streets of Aleppo and Raqqa, shopping and displaying their daily life. Sometimes the women post photographs and short videos with their mujahideen husbands and their children" (Ben-Israel 2018 p73).

More generally, the carefully planned women-oriented social media campaign was "not focused only on glorifying ISIS activities and to promote its ideology and goals, but on talking about individual experiences of life in the ISIS-controlled territory. By presenting their normal daily activities, such as cooking, making Nutella pancakes or posting romantic pictures and writing blogs of normal daily-life activities, ISIS's female online promoters were offering a picture of life under ISIS's

[10] One estimate was that 60% of those recruited in Morocco were done so via the Internet and social networks. Official data in February 2016 stated that 241 women from Morocco had joined ISIS (Jamal 2018). Jamel (2018) lamented the lack of information (and academic interest) about these individuals.

[11] Jihadi fighters are "like the Justin Biebers of the Salafi (ultra-conservative evangelical) jihadi world" (Magnus Ranstorp quoted in Ben-Israel 2018).

rule that was positive and attractive to potential female recruits..." (Peresin 2018 p35).

The reality of life for Western women in ISIS territory only came from social media posts or individuals who escaped back home. The women on social media gave "insights into the complaints about daily life for females, often domestically isolated in severe conditions and on the realities of living in war zones. Instead of five-star hotels and other attributes of the promoted 'Muslim Disneyland', the reality included frequent gunfire, many ruined buildings, spotty electricity, insufficient medical care, etc" (Peresin 2018 p37).

Shorer (2018) outlined four main patterns of female recruiting used by ISIS on social networks:

i) Role models - Older women who adolescents on the social networks could compare themselves to. They can be "celebrities" or teachers/educators.

ii) Copy-cats - Sensational publicity of ISIS's violence that imitated.

"Copy-cat behaviour requires heavy coverage by mass media and establishing admiration from a certain part of the population. Desire for fame or seeking personal significance turns people so inclined into possible copy-cats. That is why massive usage across social media is required. Strategic usage of social media tools will be developed to realise the full potential of realistic viral video clips, which is the best strategy to trigger followers. Special channels that create Hollywood-style effects and glorification in turn bring more exposure, legitimisation and support" (Shorer 2018 pp96-97).

iii) The "sister" - "The 'sister' mobilisation mode is a special mode of guiding while sharing experiences or more knowledge. The 'sister' helps to guide a less experienced or less knowledgeable person while sharing her experience. The 'sister' would be of the same age or even younger, coming from a similar social background, freely offering and sharing her area of expertise or ground experience. She ideally comes from the same educational and social circles as her target. The relationship mode of both will be of a partnership and sharing of thoughts, as the 'sister' would have certain experience while the target would like to obtain and to learn from that experience" (Shorer 2018 p97).

iv) "Alimah" - An Islamic religious woman with authority in Islamic law.

1.6.1. Turkish Speakers

Ozeren et al (2018) analysed Turkish-speaking pro-ISIS Twitter accounts for July 2015. The data involved 25 403 tweet messages from 290 accounts. It was not possible to establish the gender of all account-holders from names, but based on pictures and images, forty-four were estimated to be female users.

The average number of "friends" of an account was 588, and the number of "followers" was 990. The average number of tweets per day was 819. Popular hashtags were used that include "IS" (in some form), but because of attempts by the Turkish security forces to crackdown on these, vaguer hashtags like "Islamic Press Cannot Be Silenced" were used.

It was estimated that 2472 messages were posted by female users during the study period. The top topics were "jihad", "women's issues" (eg: wearing hijab), and "hijra" (encouraging Muslim to move to ISIS territory).

"Like their male counterparts, female ISIS supporters view jihad as the most important duty of Islam. They repeat the arguments that the Islamic world has been humiliated by Western countries, that Islamic countries are actually governed by Western powers, and that all Muslims have to stand against such countries" (Ozeren et al 2018 p115). This is seen in messages about Muslim women and girls as victims of rape: "Men of ummah!... With which honour are you sitting quietly while your sisters are being raped. Shame on you" (quoted in Ozeren et al 2018).

On the other hand, among the messages were warnings about "men and women who were looking for a romantic relationship under the guise of jihad. One such message contained this complaint: 'Flirt is named as jihad. Hold my hand, let's go to jihad. Is jihad a place for committing sin?'" (Ozeren et al 2018 p117).

Ozeren et al (2018) summed up: "Cyberspace is one of the areas where ISIS is very active. Through a highly competent media communication strategy, the organisation tries not only to disseminate propaganda and recruit new members but also to provide a sense of belonging to a group with a self-proclaimed just cause and to strengthen existing bonds among its sympathisers – especially those in Western countries. The ISIS social media strategy is to create cohesiveness and a sense of belonging for its members, opening avenues for ISIS sympathisers to keep in contact regardless of geographic location. ISIS therefore gives special importance to propaganda activities and maintains its social media presence with striking professionalism" (p117).

1.7. RESPONSE TO ISIS

In terms of the response to ISIS, Viano (2018a) referred to the "three Ds":

a) Delegitimise - Showing the reality of the situation and claims of ISIS.

b) Deglamorise - "The media are too often glamorising terrorism and terrorists, ironically by depicting them as extremely evil but also as quite powerful and to be deeply feared. ISIS has dramatically supported this vision of itself through gruesome, violent, inhumane executions of its prisoners and hostages. There is no question that the visual depictions of the amputations, stoning, crucifixions, decapitations, burning people alive, mass executions, and destruction of churches and museums cause revulsion, horror and 'terror' at the realisation of the brutality of this group and its willingness to use it, openly defying standards of decency and any notion of human rights and freedoms. At the same time, this fear and terror generate awe, respect and submission. Instead, ISIS and other terrorist groups should be deglamorised, shown to be corrupt, hypocritical and exploitative, especially of women" (Viano 2018a p5).

c) Demobilise - Create pathways for women to exit ISIS and return to "normal life".

There are another "5 Ds" that can be used (Viano 2018a):

- Denial - Stop the flow of information from ISIS to potential female recruits.
- Defence - Defence against the online presence of women who migrated to ISIS-held regions.
- Dissuasion - Via education, mass media and social media campaigns.
- Diplomacy - Establishing international security policies and structures.
- Deterrence - The use of the criminal justice system as a deterrent, but, at the same time, leaving a "door open" for returnees. "Threatening arrest and prison terms will discourage women from coming back, share actionable intelligence, and cooperate in the fight against ISIS and its recruitment campaign" (Viano 2018a p7).

Viano (2018a) explained: "Providing a counter-

narrative tailored to a female audience is especially important. Women who have migrated and are in touch with women back home or themselves return home are the best source of this counter-narrative. Advertising and messaging techniques will then facilitate these female-focused counter-narratives to reach high-risk women across different social media platforms" (p7).

HSC (2018) described the "Tunisian and Dutch Youth Leaders for Resilience in High Risk Areas" project implemented in areas of Tunisia and the Netherlands to prevent youth radicalisation. Mentors were important for developing relationships with teenagers, for countering ISIS recruits, and to help youngsters "contribute to positive change in their own communities".

Viano (2018b) summarised the response of female migrants to ISIS territory under three headings:

a) "Multi-faceted recruitment counter-efforts" - eg: challenge the use of religious teachings (hadiths) to justify violence.

b) "Looking at women as survivors of ISIS on a continuum from free agent to victim" - "A general approach will not work. It is imperative to consider the individual and a range of responses. Each woman has a specific social experience, economic position, political opinion, geographical location, educational exposure, family structure and historical journey" (Viano 2018b p221).

c) "Movements of people need to be monitored with concern and respect for human rights and international treaties" - "An agenda of surveillance on flows of people in order to stop this phenomenon needs to be cognisant that people are migrating to seek refuge, find economic relief or reunite with their families and they can be caught in the crossfire of efforts to prevent terrorism" (Viano 2018b p222) (appendix 1D).

1.8. PARENTS

Terrorist rehabilitation, "deradicalisation" or controlling violent extremism programmes (or "risk reduction programmes"; Horgan and Braddock 2010) have been introduced in many countries (appendix 1E).

One example in terms of early intervention is family counselling programmes "designed to help relatives and friends of radicalising or radicalised individuals to recognise the threat and establish contact to external intervention problems" (Koehler and Ehrt 2018 p179).

Koehler and Ehrt (2018) continued: "These 'associate

gatekeepers' are of essential value for prevention and intervention programs in order to reach their target groups... In this sense families, friends and colleagues are our 'first line of defence' against violent radicalisation, without implying the use of these emotional relationships for intelligence gathering or policing. On the contrary, partnerships based on trust and highly specialised expertise can provide effective and safe interventions in a pre-criminal space with the goal of safeguarding communities and families" (pp179-180).

This approach is based on the social ties of potential recruits, including the ability to influence individuals, and awareness of the increased radicalisation (eg: two-thirds of family and friends told by "lone wolf" offender about intension to engage in terrorist-related activities; Gill et al 2014). The other side of this is that social relationships play a role in recruitment (eg: one-third of sample; Bakker 2006).

Koehler and Ehrt (2018) interviewed members of the international "Mothers for Life" network, which involves mothers (and family members) whose children had gone to fight in Syria and Iraq with ISIS. "Mothers for Life" was established in 2014 as a self-help group, highlighting the benefits of meeting other mothers, helping in understanding and practical advice as well as offering trauma therapy (Koehler and Ehrt 2018).

Nine Western European mothers of deceased foreign fighters were involved in Koehler and Ehrt's (2018) study. The themes that emerged from the semi-structured interviews included:

i) Loneliness and trauma - "All mothers described the most terrible pain of learning about the death of their children or the fact that they had travelled to Syria from police and intelligence officers in their private homes, workplace or elsewhere. In many cases these officers were neither prepared nor trained to handle that situation. In addition, the mothers were subjected to first interrogations through these officers, as it was deemed necessary to gather all remaining information about the radicalised family member. Personal communication, cell phones, computers and other personal belongings were confiscated for processing by the authorities. Oftentimes these officers also conveyed to the families that their children had been under surveillance for some time and their progression into the jihadi movement was known within the security agencies" (Koehler and Ehrt 2018 p184).

ii) Death certificate - This was very important to the mothers for practical reasons as well as emotional ones. But difficult to acquire. The country where the

death occurred often refused to confirm death and the home country also would not help. "As a consequence, these mothers were put in the paradoxical situation to legally fight for the government to declare the death of their children, which it refuses to do, after it had informed the parents about the presumed death of their children. This situation is another aspect enforcing and intensifying the psychological trauma in the families and causing even more distrust and anger towards government institutions" (Koehler and Ehrt 2018 p185).

iii) Understanding the "why" and "how" of the child's behaviour and death.

iv) Threat of criminalisation of the family.

v) Pressure of the media - "Attempting to get an interview or show 'crying mothers', some reporters even approached the mothers at their workplace and showed them pictures of their dead children without any preparation or warning. Oftentimes the families (including remaining children) of killed foreign fighters were harassed by the press, which came as an additional enforcement of the trauma and prevented any healing or closure" (Koehler and Ehrt 2018 p187).

1.9. APPENDIX 1A - "INSTITUTIONAL ISLAMOPHOBIA"

Allegations of State-sponsored anti-Muslim discrimination (or "institutional Islamophobia") have been made for the UK. Hargreaves (2018) considered this in relation to the police stop and search powers, which "allowed suspected terrorists to be stopped without reasonable suspicion" (ie: no "objective basis" of facts, information or intelligence) (Hargreaves 2018) [12].

Official police records do not record a person's religious identity with police stop and search. So Hargreaves (2018) used data from the Crime Survey in England and Wales (between 2006 and 2011), which is a victim survey. A nationally representative sample of 45 000 respondents were questioned about their experiences of crime and the police.

The key questions for this study were:

i) "Have you ever been stopped and asked questions by the police when you were on foot?" - 11% of the total answered "yes" (of which one-fifth were subsequently searched).

[12] Terrorist Act 2000 (repealed in 2012) (Hargreaves 2018).

ii) "Have you ever been in a car or on a motorcycle which approached or stopped by police officers?" - 50% of respondents answered "yes" (and less than one-tenth of them had then been searched).

Analysis of these two questions by self-described religious identity (based on four categories for convenience - Christian, Muslim, Other, None) found mixed results depending on the statistical test used.

More sophisticated analysis included religious identity, age, gender, and ethnicity was made. In terms of (i) above, being Muslim had a small statistically significant greater likelihood of being stopped, but this was dwarfed by being male, being young, and being Black or Mixed ethnicity. Once stopped, being Muslim was more likely to be searched.

For question (ii), being Muslim reduced the likelihood of being stopped, while being male was the "greatest determining effect". Once stopped, Muslims were most likely to be searched.

Overall, "Muslim respondents were among the least likely to be stopped but among the most likely to be searched" (Hargreaves 2018 p1296).

Hargreaves (2018) warned that "if we consider 'institutional Islamophobia' in terms of its manifestations in police and state discrimination, and its effects on attitudes towards the police and state, findings from the analysis of Crime Survey data may be considered as a warning against the uncritical use of such labels within this context" (p1297). However, he continued, "it still holds true that the analysis revealed discrepancies in police searches against Muslim respondents. It would appear from the analysis of Crime Survey data that anxieties within British Muslim communities around the misuse of police stop and search powers are neither irrational nor unfounded" (Hargreaves 2018 p1297).

This study involving quantitative analysis of data has a number of limitations, including:

- Small Muslim sample size (n = 5951 out of 235 379 total respondents; 2.5%).

- Because of small numbers, some comparison categories like age were quite wide (eg: 30-59 years), and some categories "artificial" (eg: "Other religious" = Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Sikh, and other).

- "Survey data provide insights into policing in its observable forms but do not capture grievances towards more covert security methods" (Hargreaves 2018 p1296).

- No information on the motivation of police to stop

individuals, and then to search them or not. "Do police officers stop individuals who appear to be of Asian, Black or Mixed ethnicity, seek to establish the person's religion and then decide to search based on this information? Once stopped, is someone called Ahmed more likely to be searched than someone called Alex or Arawinda? The data suggest so, but more research is required to shed light on the processes that govern the extent to which the assumed religious identity of a suspect determines the exercise of stop and search powers" (Hargreaves 2018 p1296). This would require qualitative data.

- Uncontrolled for variables (eg: type of car; clothes worn; prior contact with police).

- The use of secondary data. The Crime Survey asked about many different experiences of victimhood, and the police stop and search questions are part of that. A specific questionnaire on the subject may ask different things.

- All self-reported questionnaires depend on the honesty of the respondents (including deliberative lying and mistakes in recall).

1.10. APPENDIX 1B - WEESNIK (2015)

Researchers have debated how individuals become radicalised and join terrorist groups. There are many theories, but a key disagreement is around whether the individuals suffer from "some sort of mental disorder" or not.

Crenshaw (1981) asserted that "the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality" (quoted in Weesnik 2015). On the other hand, Bakker (2006) found that mental illness was over-represented in a sample of European jihadists, while Venhaus (2010) reported no signs of psychosis, but "anti-social behaviour was clearly present in all" of their sample.

Weesnik (2015) surveyed the Dutch National Police database for personal details of "known and suspected jihadists", and concentrated on 140 individuals trying to travel from the Netherlands in early 2014. Three categories of problem behaviour were created - mild to serious [13], and information about a diagnosed mental health problem was noted.

[13] Problems included persistent offender, behavioural problems as a child, and time spent in youth detention.

The sample was 84% male, with an average age of 25 years old (compared to 21 years for the 23 women). Just under half of the sample (46%) were categorised as "problem behaviour", and another 6% had been diagnosed with mental illness or personality disorder.

Other common characteristics included low educational achievement (no higher education completed), and irregular employment or unemployment, while some individuals had experienced homelessness, and parental loss.

The police data were limited in medical details.

1.11. APPENDIX 1C - RADICALISATION

Silber and Bhatt (2007) described radicalisation as a process involving the stages of pre-radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadisation. The pre-radicalisation phase is "when individuals begin to develop sympathies for extremist ideas or terrorist movements without becoming directly involved" (Bhui et al 2014a p1).

Bhui et al (2014a) investigated this phase with a survey of 608 18-45 year-olds of Pakistani- or Bangladeshi-origin Muslim-heritage living in East London and Bradford, England. The representative sample completed the specially-designed inventory of radicalisation called "SyfoR" (sympathies for radicalisation). Attitudes to sixteen items were measured on a seven-point Likert scale. The items included support for "use of bombs to fight injustice", "violence to fight police injustice", and "threat to commit terrorist acts". Other information about the respondents was also collected (eg: health, anxiety, income).

Factor analysis of the survey responses produced a cluster of items that were named "radicalisation" (eg: "use of suicide bombs to fight injustice"; "commit terrorist acts"; "use violence").

Overall, 2.4% (n = 92) of respondents scored highly on this factor, which supports that "sympathies for violent protest and terrorism were uncommon" (Bhui et al 2014a p1).

Individuals scoring high on these items had a higher income, or were more likely to be in full-time education, and/or under 20 years old.

Bhui et al (2014a) commented: "The study showed that poor health or adverse experiences were not influential in radicalisation. This study does not support the view that sympathies for terrorist acts develop as a result of grievance related poor health (physical and mental) and social inequalities, or poor education or a lack of political engagement. The trends suggest that people in education and high earners were more likely to support radical acts; this may reflect accident proneness and

risk taking behaviour more generally, or this sub-group may have much in common with gang members who commit violent acts" (p8).

Bhui et al (2014b) reported further analysis of three groups - most sympathetic towards radicalisation (ie: high scorers), least sympathetic/most resistant (low scorers) (n = 93), and the rest (n = 423). High scorers were more likely to report depression, and to report that religion was important to them than the other groups, while low scorers had more social contacts, less social capital (eg: felt less safe in neighbourhood), worked in the home, had a disability, and were not born in the UK.

This study was cross-sectional, so causality cannot be established, and it cannot tell if "people who are sympathisers are likely to progress to terrorist acts" (Bhui et al 2014b p7).

Barna (2018) described five stages in the radicalisation of a disenfranchised teenager:

a) Negative feelings based on social comparison with others (eg: unemployment, poverty).

b) A reinvention of the self through a new ideology or religion.

c) Becoming part of the new group (ingroup).

d) Alternatives (ie: outgroups) to the ingroup are viewed negatively.

e) Action against outgroups.

Other relevant factors include:

- Viewing the world in black and white terms.
- Desire for adventure.
- Desire for fame (or infamy).

1.12. APPENDIX 1D - SURVEILLANCE

Lewis (2018) observed: "Things that used to be anonymous, private, and unnoticed are now in plain sight. Alexa eavesdrops in our homes, Google remembers our most revealing searches, and even churches are using facial recognition to find out who is sitting in the pews... We are starting to see a bigger picture of limitless monitoring: a world where the watchers never reach the point of 'enough' information and instead require an ever-expanding data set about our movements, buying patterns, online activity, and workplace productivity".

For individuals there is an ambivalence towards this: "We might be excited to hear that a digital pill can tell our doctor via Bluetooth that our meds have been ingested on time, but worry what will happen once the insurance companies know the contents of our stomach" (Lewis 2018).

Lewis (2018) described "a kind of surveillance denial", "assuming it's not a problem if we're not doing anything wrong, or that it's only a concern in other countries".

But without knowing it, behaviour is being changed by the increased surveillance. For example, research has found that workers who are aware that they are being watched "'follow rules more carefully and act more subservient' as well as experiencing greater stress, a loss of personal control, and a 'decreased sense of procedural justice'" (Lewis 2018).

Lewis (2018) argued for "the right to be left alone" - "we need freedom from insidious kinds of supervision, coercion, expectation, and obligation, all of which are rife in a world of ubiquitous surveillance".

"Surveillance-oriented security technologies" (SOSTs) (Pavone and Degli Esposti 2012) are used by governments to "collect and analyse electronic data concerning, inter alia, the communications, financial transactions, and travel movements of citizens to determine likely threats" (Ball et al 2018 p103) (eg: CCTV, biometric identification systems, digital communications surveillance technologies). Public acceptance of SOSTs in a country depends on the perceived institutional trustworthiness of security agencies using them.

Akter et al (2011) defined trustworthiness as "a set of beliefs about a third party that facilitates 'a willingness to depend on [that] party in a situation of risk" (Ball et al 2018 p108). It has three components - competence ("whether the institution is perceived to be able to deliver its objectives"), benevolence ("whether the institution is perceived to be concerned about the welfare and integrity of the community, as opposed to acting out of self-interest"), and integrity ("whether the institution is perceived to act in an ethical way and not to abuse its power") (Ball et al 2018 p109).

Ball et al (2018) concentrated on one type of SOST, namely deep packet inspection (DPI), which allows the reading of internet communications (ie: a "middleman" between the sender and the receiver). "When DPI is perceived to be operated by trustworthy security agencies, the public are more inclined to believe that it is effective and hence more willing to accept it as a legitimate security solution. They are also more inclined to consider that the technology is less intrusive and again be more willing to accept it. Second, however, when

DPI is believed to be operated by untrustworthy security agencies, the more that the public perceive it to be intrusive, the more critical they become and the less likely they are to believe in its effectiveness and support its use" (Ball et al 2018 p104).

Ball et al (2018) collected attitudes measures from over 1200 participants in six European countries who watched a short film about DPI in 2014. The following hypotheses were supported by the data (at $p<0.001$) (figure 1.1):

- "The more that citizens perceive security agencies to be trustworthy, the more likely they are to find DPI acceptable".
- "The more citizens perceive security agencies to be trustworthy, the more likely they are to rate DPI as effective".
- "The more that citizens perceive security agencies to be trustworthy, the less likely they are to rate DPI as intrusive".
- "The more that citizens perceive DPI to be effective, the more likely they are to find it acceptable".
- "The more citizens perceive DPI to be intrusive, the less likely they are to find it acceptable".
- "The more that citizens perceive DPI to be intrusive, the less likely they are to find it effective" (Ball et al 2018 pp110, 111).



(Based on Ball et al 2018 figure 4 p115)

Figure 1.1 - Model of trustworthiness and DPI acceptance.

1.13. APPENDIX 1E - TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, AND REFUGEES

Transitional justice "encompasses the body of scholarship and practise that concentrates on responses to large-scale wrongdoing in the context of an attempted shift from conflict and/or repression... [including] reparations, truth commissions, criminal trials, amnesty and memorials" (Murphy 2018 quoted in Palmer and Watene 2018).

One barrier to such justice is "that oppression can become so entrenched in settler-colonial systems that many no longer see Indigenous peoples' concerns as urgent or significant" (Palmer and Watene 2018 p134).

1.13.1. Refugees

Duarte et al (2016) noted how the use of the term "refugee crisis" in the West ignores the wider issues, like the large number of refugees located in non-Western countries. Thus, "the refugee crisis is interpreted as something 'to be solved'. While there is nothing wrong in aiming to conceptualise the kinds of duties that are owed to refugees, or in trying to find acceptable solutions to the prevailing refugee situation, these debates are often abstracted from the lived realities of refugees and those around them. Refugees are not an abstract group of people, but each has a story to tell of their hopes and aspirations, and of the journey they have embarked upon in order to find safety" (Duarte et al 2016 p247).

Duarte et al (2016) stated: "In the European context, for example, the definition of refugees has been called in to question. An increasingly restrictive notion of what constitutes a refugee has been used by authorities in order to reduce the number of those entitled to assistance. Those who do not fit the restrictive definition are labelled 'illegal immigrants' or 'economic migrants'. Whereas the term 'refugee' denotes a vulnerable individual who is forced from his or her home, the term 'migrant' often implies that the individual has voluntarily left his or her home. Because their movement is voluntary, migrants do not seem to generate a duty to aid on behalf of receiving states, unlike refugees. The result of this distinction is that while 'genuine' refugees are often allowed to claim asylum, receive aid and have their rights respected, those deemed to be mere 'migrants' can be sent back without any violation of human or refugee rights, since they do not have a right to entry and settle in a foreigner territory" (p246).

Cole (2016) argued that refugees are not only excluded in the physical sense, but also in relation to "the ethical and political frameworks within which the

refugee question is debated..." (Duarte et al 2016 p248).

Azevedo et al (2019) showed how the visual framing of refugees in large groups, as opposed to small ones or individuals, led to a more negative reaction. "Specifically, refugees are typically depicted in medium to large groups, without recognisable facial features, and in medium-to-long camera shots. The choice of this particular visual framing often reflects the socio-political ideology of the publishing media, and is complemented by narratives that convey xenophobia. Humanities have suggested that this particular visual framing portrays refugees in an inhumane way, as it diminishes the perceived vulnerability of the refugees and emphasises the security risks of a refugee crisis, rather than presenting it as a humanitarian crisis" (Azevedo et al 2019 p4).

The outcome measure was dehumanisation of refugees as measured by a reduced attribution of emotions like tenderness, compassion, warmth, and competence to the individuals. Participants viewed photographs of small groups (less than eight individuals) with recognisable facial features or large groups of refugees.

1.13.2. War Refugees

War refugees have suffered in many ways, but "they have not been wronged (at least in some cases), because no one intentionally caused or brought about their suffering" (Kling 2016 p327). Because they are "collateral damage", "nothing is owed to them as a matter of justice, because their suffering is not the result of intentional wrongdoing; rather, it is the regrettable and unintended result of doing what is right" (Kling 2016 p328). This is the traditional view, which was stated in the 1907 Hague Conventions on war, and allowed "the shelling or bombing of defended areas containing innocents so long as those innocents are not targeted" (quoted in Kling 2016).

According to the western just war tradition, the term is "morally licit" (Cohen 1989). The killing of civilians as a side effect is distinguished from deliberately bombing civilians in wartime. This is summed up in the "doctrine of double effect" - "well-intended actions with bad side effects are permissible, so long as the action itself is good (or at least neutral, if that is possible), the good done by the action outweighs the harm done, the harm is not the means to the good end, and the harm is not intended as an end in itself" (Kling 2016 p329).

Kling (2016) challenged this view that war refugees are "harmed but not wronged". They are "innocent

bystanders, and so are an exception to the principle that permits defence by whatever means are necessary and proportionate. Just as an individual may not kill or seriously harm an innocent bystander in order to save herself, so too national or extra-national groups may not create war refugees in order to win a war. If such groups do create war refugees in the course of the legitimate pursuit of their military goals, they have wronged those refugees, and so owe them recompense" (Kling 2016 p328).

An important upshot of this position for Kling (2016) is that the "Global North", which has been involved in military conflicts that created war refugees, and has the resources, should not block war refugees from entering their countries. There is also a responsibility to fund agencies that work with war refugees like the UNHCR. So, "every war refugee, as a matter of justice, should be provided with a chance for a minimally decent life, that is, a life where they can regain and enjoy their basic security and property rights. Such provision is what recompense for the severe wrongs that they have suffered requires" (Kling 2016 pp328-329).

Davidovic (2016) argued that "when a war itself or particular strategies in war create an excess number of refugees, belligerents responsible for that war or those strategies have a stringent duty to provide for the resulting refugees" (p347). This is the duty to remedy past harms, while non-belligerents have a duty to aid. The duty to aid includes granting asylum, and ensuring that refugee camps meet basic human rights needs of the refugees. The latter "stands in stark contrast to the common view that we owe very little to the refugees in camps, and that majority of our duties ought to be discharged in the form of asylum if and when refugees seek it and meet all other conditions for asylum" (Davidovic 2016 p362).

Odutayo (2016) reflected on how, in recent years, "public discourse has increasingly framed the asylum process in negative terms. Asylum seekers in Europe, Canada, the United States, and Australia have been cast as a threat to national security. The imaginary scenario of a state rendered powerless by 'waves' of migrants 'invading' the country has contributed to fears about the porousness of international borders, the integrity of domestic refugee programmes, and the vulnerability of the nation-state more broadly. Mobilising fear to securitise the asylum process has become an effective means for states to justify violations of both domestic and international law by excluding refugees from their sovereign territory" (p386).

1.13.3. People Smuggling

"People smugglers" facilitate the movement of migrants across international borders without official authorisation in return for a reward. "People smugglers are guides who escort migrants to and from specific points, drivers who transport migrants in trucks or boats, staff who operate safe houses for migrants, guards who protect migrants on their journeys, or coordinators who handle the logistics of smuggling operations" (Hidalgo 2016 p311).

People smuggling (PS) is illegal, but is also seen as immoral. A former Australian Prime Minister described it as "the world's most evil trade", and the individuals involved as "the vilest form of human life" (quoted in Hidalgo 2016).

The moral condemnation revolves around the exploitation of vulnerable migrants for profit. But Hidalgo (2016) argued that PS is "sometimes morally justified", when it helps refugees to escape from threats to their human rights.

Hidalgo (2016) outlined the "presumptive argument" for PS with a hypothetical case of "Ibrahim" who smuggles individuals to Europe, and "Khaled" fleeing civil war:

"(1) While Ibrahim has moral reasons to transport Khaled to Europe, it is false that Ibrahim is morally required to transport Khaled to Europe without compensation.

(2) If it is permissible for Ibrahim to refrain from transporting Khaled to Europe without compensation, then it is prima facie permissible for Ibrahim to transport Khaled in return to compensation if (i) Khaled consents to use Ibrahim's services, (ii) Khaled benefits from using Ibrahim's services, and (iii) this interaction avoids violating the rights or entitlements of other agents.

(3) Ibrahim secures Khaled's consent, Khaled benefits from the exchange, and Ibrahim avoids violating the rights of third parties.

(4) So, it is prima facie permissible for Ibrahim to smuggle Khaled to Europe" (p312).

But it could be argued that this hypothetical example avoids the reality of PS as a crime (eg: using violence and exploiting the "customers"). Research on PS has found that reputation is important, and it is "a bad business strategy to acquire a reputation for abusing clients and violating their rights" (Hidalgo 2016 p316). For example, Spener (2009) studied smugglers ("coyotes") crossing the Mexico-Texas border: "to the extent that they need to attract customers, coyotes needed to be concerned with their reputations 'on the migrant street', since word of failure, imposition of hardships, or malfeasance on their part was likely to travel throughout the region in which they operated" (quoted in Hidalgo 2016).

Hidalgo (2016) distinguished between "exploitative smugglers" and "fair smugglers". The latter involves a risk to the smuggler, who makes a small profit from charging the market price. Exploitative smuggling involves excessive profit for the smuggler who faces little risk or cost. Spener's (2009) research, for instance, suggested that PS was highly competitive and so monopolisation of the market and exploitative smuggling was limited.

However, individuals wanting the service of smugglers have restricted choices as they must travel. Hidalgo (2016) drew an analogy with commercial airlines, bus and shipping companies. "Few people argue that commercial airlines are inherently unjust because they exploit their customers. Yet it is hard to see how people smuggling is fundamentally different from these legal services. After all, both people smuggling and commercial airlines or busing companies involve transporting people to new locations in return for compensation, but people smuggling just happens to be illegal. At first glance, if people smuggling is necessarily exploitative, then it seems that we must conclude that airlines or busing companies are necessarily exploitative too" (Hidalgo 2016 pp319-320).

A different criticism of PS is what Hidalgo (2016) called the "motivational objection". This is the idea that people smugglers help migrants for the "wrong reasons" (ie: profit). Hidalgo (2016) rejected this objection as "it is unclear why bad motivations would transform actions that would otherwise be permissible into impermissible actions" (p320). Some strugglers are motivated by greed, but others may be motivated by making money for their family or the desire to help. "Suppose that someone wants to earn a high income and she trains to become a surgeon in part because surgeons are well paid. But this person also wants to save lives and this fact motivates her to become a surgeon as well. This person's motivations are over-determined. She is motivated both by financial considerations and other-regarding concerns" (Hidalgo 2016 p321).

There is also the "law-breaking objection" to PS (Hidalgo 2016). PS is morally wrong because it is illegal. There is a "content-independent duty", which is a duty to obey a law irrespective of what the law says. But the "necessity defence" "holds that a person's illegal conduct is justified if this conduct prevented a greater evil than her conduct caused, there was no legal alternative action that would have averted the harm, and this person was not responsible for creating the threat that she helped avert" (Hidalgo 2016 p322). "Rescue smuggling" could fit here. This is where an individual is smuggled from grave harm.

Finally, "some smugglers help compel rich states to bear their fair share of the world's refugee population and assist refugees in evading threats to their human rights. People smuggling can be a weapon of the weak against immigration restrictions that prevent refugees and other migrants from escaping threats to their lives and liberties" (Hidalgo 2016 p323).

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2. AN EXAMPLE OF RESEARCH TRIANGULATION

Research triangulation involves "carrying out two or more approaches as a means of checking results" (Baker and Levon 2015 p223). Baker and Levon (2015) reported an exercise in triangulation where one researcher used a qualitative approach and the other researcher a quantitative one on the same dataset to answer the same question, "how are different types of men represented in the British press?". The dataset covered articles on masculinity in the British national newspapers between 2003 and 2011.

The quantitative approach was corpus analysis of 41.5 million words, which used software to show the frequency of association between different words, while the qualitative approach used discourse analysis of fifty-one articles. For convenience, the focus was on six groups of men - Black, Asian, White, working-class, middle-class, and upper-class.

The findings were presented under three headings:

i) Shared - eg: negative stereotypes and associations with Black men; White working-class men as "beleaguered" (ie: unfairly excluded. disadvantaged).

ii) Unique to qualitative approach - eg: Black men as unambitious; working-class men as "indiscriminately violent".

iii) Unique to quantitative approach - eg: Black men as victims of violent crime; successful working-class men associated with "self" as in "self-made" or "self-motivated".

In terms of triangulation, Baker and Levon (2015) concluded: "Reassuringly, both approaches to the analysis uncovered a set of shared findings. These tended to be based around frequently articulated representations of the various groups – they were frequent enough to emerge both from a corpus analysis which tends to prioritise frequency and/or saliency, as well as being very likely to appear in the down-sampled dataset due to their high probability of occurrence... The fact that neither approach yielded any contradictory findings is also reassuring, although we cannot claim that this state of affairs would be replicated had we used a different down-sampled set or even used different analysts" (p233).

Table 2.1 lists the main strengths and weaknesses of the methods in this study.

	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
CORPUS ANALYSIS	• Larger dataset. • No prior assumptions taken to the data (ie: "naive"). • Showed frequency of words and associations.	• "patterns based around word frequencies may mean that in some cases a purely descriptive analysis emerges which does not attempt to provide interpretation, critique or explanation for the patterns found. Nor may such analysis engage with the wider social and historical context beyond the corpus" (Baker and Levon 2015 p231). • Possibility of erroneous conclusions from frequencies only.
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS	• Willingness to explore "complexity that enables the analyst to discover subtle, and perhaps unexpected, patterns of socially meaningful language use, and to situate those patterns within a broader social, historical and ideological context" (Baker and Levon 2015 p232). • Discover implicit representations. • More detailed analysis.	• "'cherry-pick' or intentionally select (possibly atypical) data" (Baker and Levon 2015). • Focus on well established patterns leading to "so what" findings (Baker and Levon 2015).
BOTH TOGETHER	• Best of both methods. • Complement each other. • "The corpus approach was able to pick up on repeated lexical pairings across very large amounts of text which pointed to a set of representations that were also very frequent (but did not appear in the down-sampled set), while the qualitative analysis was able to uncover discourses that were linguistically realised in more complex ways, for example, more easily being able to uncover how authors attempted to explain or imply certain representations" (Baker and Levon 2015 p234).	• "under-analysis through summary" (Antaki et al 2003 quoted in Baker and Levon 2015) (ie: no depth). • What to do about contradictory findings.

Table 2.1 - Main strengths and weaknesses of methods used by Baker and Levon (2015).

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